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EDITOR’S NOTE

I

’m pleased to announce some long-term changes that I believe will greatly
improve Court Review. Alan Tomkins, a law and psychology professor with
experience in editing a similar journal, has agreed to join me as coeditor.
As you’ll see from a greater description of his background, he brings a great
number of valuable contacts throughout both the academic world and the
judiciary.
Alan is presently the director of the University of Nebraska Public Policy
Center after many years as a faculty member in the University of NebraskaLincoln Law-Psychology Program. He has worked with the National Center
for State Courts on many research projects over the years and he has previously published two articles here in Court Review. He also has worked at the
Federal Judicial Center. And he served for five
years as the editor of Behavioral Sciences and
the Law, a respected, interdisciplinary journal,
as well as serving on the editorial boards of
two other journals at the intersection of law
and social science.
Alan will also be able to enlist the support
of others at the University of Nebraska.
Elizabeth Neeley, a sociologist who serves as
the Public Policy Center’s project director for
the Nebraska State Bar Association/Nebraska
Supreme Court’s Minority Justice Committee
and the Judicial Restructuring Project, and
Kimberly Applequist, a lawyer who worked in
health law in California before coming to Nebraska to pursue a doctorate in
Cognition, Learning & Development, will be helping out as Editorial Board
member and assistant editor, respectively.
With the new assistance, we should be able to get Court Review back on
track with its publication schedule in the next year. The two issues following
this one are already in process, so that you should receive them within a very
short time frame. Being both an officer of AJA and the editor of Court Review
(while also holding down my “day job” as a judge) was more than I was able
to keep up with, I’m afraid, but I appreciate your patience and support as we
have worked through it. With Alan’s help, we are now moving forward in
ways that will be quite beneficial to you. We will continue to emphasize practical articles and research in the areas most of interest to judges.
This issue includes four articles. Tomkins and Neeley review a test project
from the courts in Lincoln, Nebraska, designed to improve the screening for
indigency when appointing counsel. Michael Langan discusses case law
involving overly litigious pro se litigants—courts in the Second and Third
Circuits have acted in several cases to limit special privileges otherwise given
to pro se or indigent civil litigants. And our issue concludes with Professor
Charles Whitebread’s annual review of the civil and criminal decisions of the
United States Supreme Court for the past year.—SL
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A S S O C I A T I O N

Spring 2007

Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews. Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the working judges of the United States and Canada. In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case management, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work. Guidelines for the submission of manuscripts for Court Review are set forth on page 42 of volume
42, issue 3-4. Court Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or reject material submitted for publication.
Court Review is in full text on LEXIS and is indexed in the
Current Law Index, the Legal Resource Index, and
LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are welcome. Please send such letters to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe,
Kansas 66061, e-mail address: sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
intended for publication, also are welcome.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for products and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Deloris Gager at (757) 259-1864.
Photo credit: Mary Watkins (maryswatkinsphoto@
earthlink.net). The cover photo is of the Tarrant County
Courthouse in Fort Worth, Texas. Built in 1893, it was
the third courthouse built on the site—the first burned in
1876 and the second was torn down to build the larger,
current structure. When it was built, the $500,000 price
tag so angered the citizens that they voted the county
commissioners out of office.
©2007, American Judges Association, printed in the
United States. Court Review is published quarterly by the
American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member subscriptions are available for $35 per volume (four issues
per volume). Subscriptions are terminable at the end of
any volume upon notice given to the publisher. Prices are
subject to change without notice. Second-class postage
paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
offices. Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
undeliverable copies, and change of address to
Association Services, National Center for State Courts,
Williamsburg, Virginia 23185-4147. Points of view or
opinions expressed in Court Review are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the positions of
the National Center for State Courts or the American
Judges Association. ISSN: 0011-0647.

President’s Column
Steve Leben

The American Judges Association is the Voice of the
Judiciary.® So says the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, which accepted the AJA’s registration of this service
mark on the principal register for patents and trademarks on
March 27, 2007.
This column will seek to answer two questions: What does
this mean? And how did it come about?
Let’s take the second question first. Many years ago, the AJA’s
long-range planning committee noted that one of our central
purposes was to act as a national voice for judges. Later, under
the leadership of then-president Gayle Nachtigal, the AJA
adopted a single phrase to capture this goal and message: we
began calling ourselves the Voice of the Judiciary.
During Gayle’s year as our president, she issued a news
release commending the president of a large national legal organization for his public statement in response to attacks that had
been made on judges involved in the Terri
Schiavo case. The AJA news release noted that
“the mission of the AJA, as the Voice of the
Judiciary, is to ensure that judges, justices, and
other judicial officials remain unaffected in their
role as an independent branch of government.”
The AJA news release was later circulated on email list serves of both the AJA and a judicial
group within the large national legal organization
previously referenced.
One month after Gayle’s news release, this
other judicial group began including a tag-line on e-mails it sent
to its members—the other group was now calling itself “the
voice of the judiciary.” It had not done so before. We were disappointed by this move. The AJA had joined in a common campaign with their organization to support judicial independence
and to oppose unfair attacks on judges. In response, they had
begun using our service mark. Confusion between the groups
would no doubt be substantial.
With some research, we learned that many similar associations had avoided such confusion by obtaining trademark protection for similar service marks. For example, groups had
obtained trademark protection for “the Voice of the
Independent Funeral Home” and “the Voice of the Construction
Industry.” So AJA filed for protection of its service mark, the
Voice of the Judiciary.
Our application was filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office. After review, it was approved as to form and official
notice of our application was published. After opportunity for
objection, the application was approved on March 27, 2007
through another published notice and the issuance of a certificate of registration. The AJA is now the owner of a registered
service mark, the Voice of the Judiciary, for use in connection

with the provision of association services promoting the interests of judges and the judiciary.
That’s how the trademark registration came about. Now, for
what this all means.
AJA is fully committed to serving as the Voice of the
Judiciary. Perhaps more than at any time in the almost 50-year
history of our association, judges and the judiciary are under
attack. About a year ago, my wife received a fundraising letter
from my law school classmate, U.S. Sen. Sam Brownback. He
sought money to fight judiciary tyranny. He wrote that “we are
now engaged in the most important political battle of our lifetimes: the battle over whether we continue to be a free, self-governing republic or a nation ruled by judicial edict.” He asked my
wife to sign a proclamation against judicial tyranny and, of
course, to send money.
Now, I find it hard to believe that Sen. Brownback really
believed that this battle against judiciary tyranny
was “the most important political battle of our
lifetimes.” Could it really be more important than
the civil-rights movement? Even if even Sen.
Brownback would concede that the civil-rights
movement was a tad more significant, though, his
rhetoric in fundraising typifies the fire used these
days in some quarters to demonize judges.
In response, the AJA is actively working to
defend courts that are both fair and accountable—
free from political influence but accountable to
the Constitution and the rule of law. As a sample of AJA efforts,
just in the past month I have had opinion columns defending
fair courts published in the National Law Journal and the
Providence Journal (in Rhode Island, site of our 2007 midyear
meeting). I will be engaging in a debate this summer at a sixstate bar conference with those who proposed the misguided
“Jail 4 Judges” initiative last year in South Dakota. These sorts
of efforts will continue.
In addition, the AJA is working on a major white paper that
will outline ways judges in all courts can work to improve public perceptions of their fairness and public satisfaction with and
acceptance of their rulings. Our white-paper committee is
under the leadership of Kevin Burke, a Minneapolis trial judge
who won the prestigious Rehnquist Award for Judicial
Excellence in 2003. The paper will be presented at AJA’s 2007
annual educational conference in Vancouver this September.
Substantial follow-up efforts will begin immediately after the
Vancouver conference.
These and many other efforts by AJA committees and leaders reflect our resolve to speak on your behalf and to earn,
through words and deeds, the right to be known as the Voice of
the Judiciary.®
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Evaluating Court Processes
for Determining Indigency
Elizabeth Neeley and Alan Tomkins*

T

he Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees all
people accused of a crime the right to legal counsel. In the
landmark 1963 decision Gideon v. Wainright,1 the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the right of indigent defendants
to have counsel provided. But Gideon did not end the Supreme
Court’s discussion of the circumstances in which the state is
required to provide defendants with an attorney when they
claim not to have the means to pay for one.2 Nor did it end the
states’ examination of the requirement of any legal assistance
paid for by taxpayers.3 Moreover, it is not mandated by constitutional law, congressional statute, or U.S. Supreme Court
interpretation how states will fund these programs (will it be a
state or local, e.g., county, responsibility?) or the procedures by
which a defendant will be deemed indigent. States and counties have developed a range of programs designed to provide
counsel to indigent defendants (the most well known is the
public defender model; other examples are the appointment

from a roster of practicing attorneys and contracts with willing
practitioners).
States and counties have also developed a range of procedures to assess whether a defendant is unable to afford an
attorney without assistance.4 A 2002 report by the
Spangenberg Group documents the variability across states
with regard to various aspects of indigency determinations,
including how presumptions of indigency are determined (i.e.,
what factors are taken into consideration, such as the defendant’s income in relation to federal poverty guidelines, assets,
complexity of the case, resources of relatives and friends,
whether the defendant can afford to pay bail, etc.), whether or
not formal guidelines are in place, who makes the determination (the public defender’s office or the court), whether the
court utilizes a financial questionnaire or affidavit, whether the
client’s claim is investigated, and so on.5
The specific purpose of this article is to report on an evalu-

Footnotes
* We appreciate the assistance we received in visioning, collecting,
and assessing the information used in this evaluation. We are
especially grateful for the help and guidance we received from the
Project Oversight Committee, beginning with their ideas for what
needed to be evaluated and concluding with comments and corrections to earlier drafts. The Oversight Committee members
included: Steven Burns (Lancaster County District Court Judge),
Kerry Eagan (Lancaster County Chief Administrative Officer),
James Foster (Committee Chair and Lancaster County Court
Judge), Peggy Gentles (Lancaster County Court Judicial
Administrator), Dennis Keefe (Lancaster County Public
Defender), Gary Lacey (Lancaster County Attorney), Catherine
Reech (Lancaster County Court Screener), Toni Thorson
(Lancaster County Juvenile Court Judge), Mike Thurber
(Lancaster County Corrections Director), and Janice Walker
(Nebraska State Court Deputy Administrator). We would also like
to acknowledge the following for their assistance: Kimberly
Applequist (University of Nebraska Public Policy Center), Pamela
Casey (National Center for State Courts), Ian Christensen
(University of Nebraska Public Policy Center), Carly Duvall
(University of Nebraska Public Policy Center), Jenn Elliott
(University of Nebraska Public Policy Center), Carol Flango
(National Center for State Courts), Roger Hanson (Independent
Law and Society Researcher, Williamsburg, VA), Patrick J. DornKennedy (University of Nebraska Public Policy Center), Katie
Novak (University of Nebraska Public Policy Center), David
Rottman (National Center for State Courts), Nancy Shank
(University of Nebraska Public Policy Center), and Ann Skove
(National Center for State Courts).
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367 (1979); Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001);
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
3. E.g., Alexander v. State, 527 S.W. 2d 927 (Ark. 1975); Carey v.

Zayre of Beverly, Inc., 324 N. E. 2d 619 (Mass. 1975); Brown v.
Multnomah County Dist. Court, 570 P. 2d 52 (Or. 1977); State v.
Ponce, 611 P. 2d 407 (Wash. 1980); State v. Jones, 404 So. 2d 1192
(La. 1981); State v. Novak, 318 N.W. 2d 364 (Wis. 1982); Canaday
v. State, 687 P.2d 897 (Wyo. 1984); State v. Buchholz, 462 N. E. 2d
1222 (Ohio 1984); State v. Orr, 375 N.W. 2d 171 (N.D. 1985);
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 507 A.2d 57 (PA 1986); State v.
Lynch, 796 P. 2d 1150 (Okla. 1990); Hlad v. State, 585 So. 2d 928
(Fla. 1991); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 666 A. 2d
813 (R.I. 1995); Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S. W. 2d 494 (Tex,
1995); People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1997); Russell v.
Armitage, 697 A.2d 630 (Vt. 1997); State v. Woodruff, 951 P. 2d
605 (N.M. 1997); El Pueblo de Puerto Rico v. Amparo
Concepcion, 98 TSPR 93 (PR 1998); State v. Stott, 586 N.W. 2d
436 (Neb. 1998); Johnson v. State, 735 A. 2d 1003 (MD.1999); Ex
parte Lareed Shelton, 851 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 2000); In re Welfare of
G.L.H., 614 N.W. 2d 718 (Minn. 2000); Barnes v. State, 570 S.E.
2d 277 (Ga. 2002); City of Urbana v. Andrew N.B., 813 N.E. 2d
132 (Ill. 2004); People v. Russell, 684 N. W. 2d 745 (Mich. 2004);
Lucero v. Kennard, 125 P.3d 917 (Utah, 2005).
4. Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense
Systems in the United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31
(1995)[hereinafter Spangenberg & Beeman, Indigent Defense
Systems]; Spangenberg Group, Indigent Defense Services in the State
of Nevada: Findings and Recommendations (Dec. 13, 2000) (available at http://www.spangenberggroup.com/reports/report_
121301.pdf); Spangenberg Group, Determination of Eligibility for
Public Defense (2002) [hereinafter Spangenberg Group,
Determination of Eligibility] (available at http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/determinationofeligibility.pdf#search=%22Determination%20of%20Eligibility%20f
or%20Public%20Defense%22).
5. Spangenberg Group, Determination of Eligibility, supra note 4.

4 Court Review

ation of a pilot program implemented in Lancaster County
(Lincoln), Nebraska, designed to change the way in which a
defendant’s claim of indigence is assessed by the legal system.
Regardless of whether a jurisdiction uses public defenders or
another form of retaining defense counsel for indigent defendants, a determination must be made regarding a defendant’s
indigency status. Given the increasing caseloads for court systems and public defender offices6 and given the interest in
ensuring that governmental procedures are optimized for efficiency and fairness, specific counties or even statewide judicial
systems may choose to assess, reform, or implement new systems for determining indigence. There are a myriad of interests
in assessing indigency determination programs. For instance,
these programs have the potential to increase fairness and consistency in indigency appointments, increase the efficiency of
the system, and defray costs of the justice system. Thus, the
general purpose of this article is to provide courts with evaluation input into this important public function.
LANCASTER COUNTY INDIGENT DEFENSE
PILOT PROJECT

Prior to the implementation of an experimental, pilot project in Lancaster County, there were no set guidelines in
Nebraska for determining indigence.7 Judges relied on their
own philosophies and definitions of indigence, thereby creating variability in indigency appointments across judges.
Similarly, it was left to a judge’s discretion to determine
whether the defendant was eligible for a court-appointed attorney. Not surprisingly, there was great variability across judges,
ranging from those who employed a rigorous line of questioning, to those who based their decisions on a few questions and
an assessment of the defendant’s appearance.8 As is typical in
most jurisdictions, assertions made by defendants regarding
claims of indigency were not verified by the court. From time

6. Spangenberg Group, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department
of Justice, The Bureau of Justice Assistance NCJ pub. no. 185632,
Keeping Defender Workloads Manageable (2001) (available at
http://www. ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/bja/185632.pdf).
7. Research by the Spangenberg Group indicates that there are several states with no formal standards or guidelines including Texas
and Connecticut. Spangenberg Group, Determination of Eligibility,
supra note 4.
8. See generally, State v. Lafler, 399 N.W.2d 808 (Neb.1987); State v.
Richter, 408 N.W.2d 717 (Neb. 1987); State v. Eichelberger, 418
N.W.2d 580 (Neb. 1988).
9. Nebraska is not unique in any of this. See generally, Spangenberg
& Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems, supra note 4; Spangenberg
Group, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice,
The Bureau of Justice Assistance NCJ pub. no. 181160,
Contracting for Indigent Defense Services (2000) [hereinafter
Spangenberg, Contracting] (available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdf
files1/bja/181160.pdf); Spangenberg, Defender Workloads, supra
note 6; Joshua S. Stambaugh, Alabama v. Shelton: One Small Step
for Man, One Very Small Step for the Sixth Amendment's Right to
Counsel, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 609 (2004).
10. Technical and additional information is provided in footnotes for
interested readers.
11. Lancaster County’s Indigent Eligibility Rule (NEB. 3RD JUD. DIST.

to time, cases occurred in which defendants with great wealth
were subsequently found to have been given an attorney at taxpayer expense, thereby creating a maelstrom of news coverage
and the popular perception that there are defendants “freeloading” off the system.9
In January 2001, a three-year pilot project was initiated in
Lancaster County for the purposes of assessing three aspects of
the indigency determination system, each of which were initiated at the same time.
1) A uniform rule was developed to guide defendant eligibility
for court-appointed counsel that judges were required to
follow.
2) A standardized form for documenting eligibility for
appointed counsel was introduced that judges were
required to complete.
3) A position was created and a function for the position was
determined, meaning there were would be dedicated county
court staff (“Defense Eligibility Technician” or Screener) to
obtain financial information from a defendant and verify
the information submitted by a defendant in support of a
claim of indigency.
The program was limited to adults charged with a felony or
misdemeanor. The cost for the Screener was estimated to be
approximately $50,000 per year (changing the rule and creating a standardized form did not create annual costs). The
impacts were expected to be increased rejection of defendants’
requests for a court-appointed attorney for those not eligible
for one and an increase in court-appointed attorneys for those
eligible who might have been refused an attorney under previous practices. A preliminary evaluation of the pilot project was
conducted in 2002 by the authors.
Indigency Rule and Financial Eligibility Form10
Lancaster County’s Indigency Eligibility Rule11 contains

COUNTY CT. R. I (2000) [hereinafter Rule I] (available at
http://court.nol.org/trialcourt/county/LanCo.htm#1) is intended
to clarify the state’s indigency provisions, which are not as specific
as to the financial circumstances under which a defendant is entitled to a court-appointed attorney. Id. at Comment. Under the
state’s indigency eligibility rule, indigency “mean[s] the inability
retain legal counsel without prejudicing one’s financial ability to
provide economic necessities for one’s self or one’s family.” NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-3901(3) (Reissue 1995). Functionally, this means
the judge must undertake “a reasonable inquiry to determine the
defendant’s financial condition,” considering such factors as “the
seriousness of the offense; the defendant’s income; the availability
of resources, including real and personal property, bank accounts,
Social Security, and unemployment or other benefits; normal living expenses; outstanding debts; and the number and age of
dependents,” State v. Eichelberger, 418 N.W.2d 580, 587-88 (Neb.
1988), as well as considering whether the defendant is at risk for
incarceration if convicted, as opposed to having to pay a fine, State
v. Dean, 510 N.W.2d 87 (Neb. App. 1993). See also State v.
Masilko, 409 N.W.2d 322 (Neb.1987). Lancaster County’s
Indigent Eligibility Rule preserves § 29-301(3)’s discretionary provision and adds two additional provisions that are intended to be
presumptive for establishing indigency.
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three provisions, or “tiers.”12 Financial information relevant to
these tiers is documented on a standardized form (the
“Indigency Information Form”) and then given to the judge as
part of the defendant’s file.
The Indigency Information Form provides information relevant to deciding indigency under each tier. Under Tier 1 of the
Rule,13 if a defendant is receiving any type of federal, state, or
local poverty assistance, he or she automatically qualifies for
court-appointed counsel unless the offense will not result in
imprisonment.14 If the accused is not currently receiving any
type of federal, state, or local poverty assistance, the total
annual income and the number of dependents must be considered. A defendant is considered indigent under Tier 2 of the
Rule if he or she earns less than 125% of the federal poverty
guidelines. (Each spring, the amount of money reflected by
125% of the federal poverty guidelines is updated.) If the individual earns more than 125% of the federal poverty guidelines,
then the judge’s discretion becomes relevant under Tier 3.
The judge is to consider sources of additional income
(interest and dividends, profits off rental property, cash earnings, etc.), assets, and debts in order to determine whether the
projected cost of hiring private counsel will interfere with the
defendant’s ability to provide for the “economic necessities” of
the defendant or his or her family.15 The judge must make
“findings, including [a] comparison of the party’s anticipated
cost of counsel and available funds when applicable, on a form
. . . filed with the papers in the case.”16
In summary, under the first two tiers of the Rule, eligibility
is presumptively determined. If the defendant qualifies under
the criteria and is in jeopardy of being incarcerated if convicted, then the defendant is eligible for a court-appointed
attorney. If the defendant does not qualify under the first two
tiers, the judge proceeds to the Tier 3 in order to make the traditional determination of what funds are available to retain private counsel so that the judge can balance the defendant’s
assets against the anticipated cost of counsel. It was initially
expected that more than 75% of the cases before the courts
would be determined under the first two tiers.17
Defense Eligibility Technician.
The position of Defense Eligibility Technician/Screener was
created as a central part of the project. The Screener was designated a paraprofessional position. The Screener collects and
verifies information from defendants about their financial status. The Screener briefly interviews defendants to collect
financial data, obtaining information about income, debts,
resources, and other financial information. The information

12. Rule I, supra note 11.
13. According to the first tier of the Rule, indigent means “[a] party
who is [r]eceiving one of the following types of public assistance:
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Emergency
Aid to Elderly, Disabled and Children (EAEDC), poverty related
veteran’s benefits, food stamps, refugee resettlement benefits,
Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or County
General Assistance Funds.” Rule I, id.
14. State v. Dean, supra note 11.
15. This provision contained in Tier 3 of Lancaster County’s Rule is
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obtained by the Screener is recorded on the Indigency
Information Form. The information is then provided to the
judge for an indigency eligibility determination. Thereafter, the
Screener maintains a computerized record of the form and verifies the accuracy of parts of the defendant’s financial information, reporting any discrepancies to the judge.
ASSESSMENT AND METHODS

Research questions were determined in consultation with a
Project Oversight Committee, which included Lancaster
County judges, prosecutors, public defenders, court administrators, county commissioners, and court staff. The evaluation
was primarily based on information obtained from interviews
with key stakeholders. Information also was obtained from
basic screener program data (statistical information), an analysis of screener verification efforts (truthfulness inquiry), and
courtroom observations. The evaluation design was largely a
function of the data available. Although quantitative designs
are often preferred in situations such as these for their objectivity and ability to definitively show patterns, trends, and
changes overtime, the prior system left no quantitative data
available to compare. The best means to make comparisons
before and after implementation of the pilot project was to
qualitatively explore the opinions and experiences of those
involved in the system. Quantitative data available since implementation of the project were combined with stakeholders’
qualitative assessments of the project.
Interviews
Interviews were conducted with 25 stakeholders, including
judges (county, district, and juvenile court; n=10), lawyers
(from the county and city attorneys’ offices and the office of
the public defender; n=4), screener staff, judicial administration staff, and criminal justice administration staff (n=6), and
defendants (n=5). Interviews were undertaken to obtain stakeholder insights into how the project was operating, along with
other stakeholder information such as estimates of time spent
on indigency determinations, proportion of cases in which
erroneous information is given by defendants, and so on.
Interviews were semi-structured, thus providing consistency of
information across the respondents, while still allowing for
flexibility with each interviewee.
Screener Program Data
Prior to the project’s implementation, no records of requests
for court-appointed counsel were kept. Upon implementation
of the project, a database was created that recorded the infor-

intended to operate in the same manner as Nebraska’s current
indigency eligibility statute, NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3901(3) (Reissue
1995)
16. Rule I, supra note 12.
17. Dennis Keefe, Test of New Indigency Rules and Procedures: Three
Year Pilot Project in Lancaster County, 4 NEB. JUD. NEWS 17 (2000)
(full, unpublished report available from Lancaster County Public
Defender’s Office, 555 S 10th St, Room 202, Lincoln, Nebraska
68508).

mation provided on the form. In order to produce a reliable
and current sample, cases for a one-year span (Fiscal Year
2001-2002) were selected for review. Screenings in over 5,000
cases (N=5,232) were examined.
Truthfulness Inquiry
An issue of interest is the accuracy of the information defendants provide to the Screener. Since the truthfulness and accuracy of a defendant’s statements have no pre-established data
points, this information cannot easily be gleaned from the
Screener’s data files. Therefore, a data sample was collected
during the month of September 2002. The Screener maintained a record of when inaccuracies in a defendant’s report
were identified pursuant to the Screener’s verification activities. These data were collected to provide some insight into the
proportion of defendants who provide inaccurate or false
information to the courts.
Courtroom Observations
Research staff observed 10 arraignment sessions to determine the approximate time taken by the judge to determine
indigence (a stopwatch was used to time how long the process
took, but because a conversation might return to the question
of the defendant’s finances, we believe the assessments are
approximate, not precise), and to document the content and
extent of judges’ questioning under this process. Three of the
county court judges were observed in these sessions. During
these sessions, 115 cases were heard, and the public defender
was appointed in 33 of these cases, not appointed in two, and
refused by the defendant in three.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

As previously noted, there are a myriad of interests in
assessing indigent-defense-screening programs. Programs such
as this have the potential to increase fairness and consistency
in indigency appointments, increase the efficiency of the system, and reduce the costs of the criminal justice system by
appropriately denying those not entitled to legal aid. Of
course, it is also the case that a more fair and consistent procedure might result in a court-appointed attorney in instances
where an attorney was previously denied, thus increasing
costs. Nonetheless, it was hypothesized that oversight of eligibility would decrease costs overall.
Indigency Rule and Financial Eligibility Form
Fairness and Consistency. One way to assess the fairness of
the Indigency Rule is to determine if appropriate appointments
are made. More specifically, are defendants who are eligible
under the Rule to receive counsel appropriately receiving a
court-appointed attorney? Are eligible defendants erroneously
being denied court-appointed counsel? Are defendants who
are ineligible to receive counsel erroneously receiving a court-

18. This suggestion is consistent with the Rule already. “If the court
finds that a party is not indigent under § 2(3)(a) the court shall
next determine whether the party is indigent under § 2(3)(b). The
court shall record its findings, including its comparison of the

appointed attorney? Are ineligible defendants appropriately
being denied a court-appointed attorney?
As indicated previously, there were 5,232 cases screened
during FY 2001-2002 (see Table 1). The data reveal that
approximately 25% of those who receive some type of public
assistance (Tier 1 eligibility) were not appointed public
defender services. Additionally, almost 20% of those whose
income is below that of the federal poverty guidelines (Tier 2
eligibility) were not appointed public defender services. It is
not possible to know whether eligible defendants were “erroneously being denied court-appointed counsel” in these
instances as there are many reasons why defendants may not
be appointed counsel: no potential jail time, a plea of guilty,
or the judge believed they had the means to hire counsel. It is
not possible to know whether certain judges provide almost
100% of Tier 1 and Tier 2 defendants with a public defender
while other judges find fewer defendants eligible despite the
intent of the Rule. In any event, the rate of non-appointments
for defendants who otherwise seem eligible for a courtappointed attorney was higher than might be expected. The
issue could be further investigated if judges regularly were to
indicate their reason on the Form for not appointing counsel
in each case.18
Overall, it seems that the majority, but not all, defendants
who were eligible under the Rule to receive counsel appropriately received a court-appointed attorney. It is likely that some
defendants who were ineligible to receive counsel were erroneously receiving a court-appointed attorney. Given that so
many defendants are, in fact, eligible, however, we believe the
cost of an additional $50,000 to employ a Screener to find the
comparatively few ineligible defendants is less beneficial than
the error of simply providing them with a public defender. Of
course, this depends in part on the success rate of identifying
ineligible defendants (if most ineligibles will be detected, it is
a different matter than if a small percentage of ineligibles will
be detected). In any event, fairness and consistency are
TABLE 1: DEFENDANTS PRESUMPTIVELY QUALIFYING FOR
INDIGENCY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (FY 2001-02)

Number Percentage
of Cases of Cases

Judge
Appointed
Atty.

Judge Did
Not Appoint
Atty.

Tier 1

1,112

21.2%

75.5%

24.5%

Tier 2

2,819

53.9%

81.3%

18.7%

Tier 3

1,301

24.9%

62.6%

37.4%

TOTAL

5,232

100.0%

75.4%

24.6%

Note: Some defendants presumptively qualified under both Tier 1 and Tier
2. The number of cases presented in Tier 2 does not include those who
previously qualified under Tier 1.

party’s anticipated cost of counsel and available funds when
applicable, on a form.” (Rule I, supra note 12). However, our
review of the Forms indicates that judges do not tend to regularly
record their findings.
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enhanced by providing more defendants with a public
defender even if the county would not have to do so if all the
facts were verified.
Judges and other court personnel indicate their confidence
that the Indigency Rule and Form have increased the consistency in determining indigence. First, judges are provided with
the same information for each defendant; therefore, defendants
have a more equal assessment of their financial situation.
Second, it provides for somewhat more consistency across
judges in that all judges are provided with the same information. This finding of uniformity does not obviate the concern
noted previously, that is, the fact of variability across judges;
however, the impression we obtained from a variety of interviewees is that most of the legal professionals in the Lancaster
Court system believe that uniformity is enhanced both by the
Rule and by the standardized information sought by the Form
than was obtained before review by the Screener.
Efficiency. When judges were asked about time savings, several responded that before the pilot project, determinations
(including questioning) could take anywhere between three
and five minutes. They estimated that determinations now
take under one minute (courtroom observations confirm that
determinations generally take less than 30 seconds). It appears
that the information on the Form was adequate in that judges
did not ask additional questions. In short, judges found the
financial information included on the Form to be useful,
allowing them to streamline their time and effort related to
determining indigency.
Cost Savings. A cost savings via the introduction of the Rule
and Form would be realized if these components resulted in
more ineligible defendants appropriately being denied services. This does not appear to be the case. On the whole, interviews indicate that the majority of Lancaster County judges
believe that, considering all interests at stake, it is better to err
on the side of providing a public defender than it is to deny
someone in need of a public defender. Several of the judges to
whom we spoke commented that when jail time is a possibility, even if the prosecutor might not be asking for jail time,
they are very likely to appoint an attorney. Our courtroom
observations documented this orientation: Even defendants
who refused the public defender services that judges offered
them were urged to think seriously about refusing.
We commend the practice of these judges. Court appointment of an attorney ensures the defendant will have access to
legal advice. Legal advice may help defendants to avoid unnecessarily pleading guilty to an offense in circumstances in which
representation may result in conviction for, or pleading guilty
to, a less serious offense, or even help secure a defendant
acquittal. In addition, court appointment helps to promote
efficient administration of justice by avoiding pro se litigation
or by ensuring that legal issues are raised and legally relevant
facts are presented. As was noted by several of the attorneys
and judges we interviewed, the criminal charge is more efficiently resolved when a knowledgeable attorney is representing the defendant. However, it appears not to be simply a matter of case resolution that prompts the judges to encourage
(and appoint) public defense counsel, it is a matter of the
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interest in justice that appears to inspire their behavior.
Overall, then, it seems that the rule and form do not appear to
have a significant impact on cost savings.
Defense Eligibility Technician
Fairness and Consistency. Using a defense eligibility technician to obtain a defendant’s financial information appears to
increase fairness and consistency by providing a more uniform
and accurate assessment of the defendant’s financial information. The judges uniformly reported that they did not obtain
nearly as much financial data as the screeners provide.
Additionally, the screener can provide accurate calculations to
the judges. Defendants appear to like having the opportunity
to provide the information to a court employee who is responsible for collecting this information but not for making indigency determinations. They indicated they believed they were
being treated fairly. Thus it seems a screener contributes to the
efficiency of the court and the dignity and privacy of the defendant by collecting financial information in a more private setting than in the open courtroom, without the pressures and
anxieties of providing such information in court as part of a
public, and perhaps confusing, process.
Efficiency. According to those involved in the process,
when the defendant’s financial information is obtained by the
Defense Eligibility Technician prior to, rather than during, a
court appearance, there is a decrease in the amount of time that
judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and other criminal justice system personnel spend on the issue of determining indigence. A Screener saves judges time that they would otherwise
spend obtaining the defendant’s financial information, and it
saves attorneys time they otherwise have to spend listening to
the judge obtain the information. We spoke to six defendants
about screening issues. Defendants who had been screened in
the previous and current way commented the new pilot procedure created a time savings and the overall appearance of a
more efficient courtroom.
Cost Savings. Interviews indicate that the Screener does
provide a time savings. These savings in time could add up to
a substantial cost savings if more cases could be processed or
if judges and prosecutors were able to conduct other business
with the time they saved from having to be involved in collecting or listening to financial information. However, as some
interviewees pointed out, since court officials are paid whether
they are in court or not, there are probably no measurable savings by having defendants prescreened. Although a time savings may not necessarily translate into a cost savings for the
county, there may be value in freeing up the time of court staff
(bailiffs, sheriffs, etc.) so that they can better use their time.
This savings in time is also relevant for the public, who likely
wait less time to be arraigned. On the other hand, several interviewees questioned the expenditure of additional funds on a
task that could be done by a judge, who already is receiving a
salary from the public.
Verification
Fairness and Consistency. The impetus for reforming current
processes for determining indigence typically stem from the

occasional case in which defendants with great wealth are
found to have been given an attorney at taxpayer expense,
thereby creating a maelstrom of news coverage and the perception that there are defendants “freeloading” off the system.19 Verification may add a sense of fairness to the system by
allowing numerous court personnel, administrators, and taxpayers to feel that defendants are not “getting away” with
access to governmental services (i.e., a public defender) to
which they are not entitled. Verification provides the sense that
some deterrence exists, reducing the likelihood that a defendant will get away with giving false information to the court.
Efficiency. In its current configuration, verification efforts do
not appear to impact efficiency. In virtually no cases have there
been any additional legal actions taken in instances in which
the Screener has found that false financial information has
been provided. Even if a falsehood is detected, the majority of
judges indicated they were unwilling to stop a case to remove
the public defender once the case has started. They offered a
range of reasons. Some judges state that even if a defendant
lies, it is typically the case that the defendant does not have a
lot of resources anyway. Other judges said it would be more
expensive to the system to stop proceedings midstream and
require the defendant to find private counsel. A few judges
believe there should be prosecutions, but other judges say it
does not seem to be a good use of scarce resources to prosecute
these cases.
Cost Savings. If the screening process is successful in “weeding out” those who do not qualify for counsel it would represent a cost-savings for the court system.20 In order to successfully identify “freeloaders,” the accuracy of financial information being provided to the court and the Screener’s verification
efforts must be considered.
At our request, the Screener gave us information regarding
inaccurate or false information for a one-month period. Of the
460 cases screened in the month, the Screener said she learned
that 25 individuals (5.4%) lied about financial information.
The Screener reported the month was not atypical in numbers
of defendants, kinds of cases, and so on.
There were basically three categories of inaccurate or false
information:
When asked about their employment, four defendants
provided false information as to when they were last
employed. Three said they were unemployed recently, but
records showed that they were unemployed from two
months to two years longer than they had reported. It is
useful to note that this false information would lead a judge
to believe the defendants had more financial assets than
they actually had. The fourth defendant lied in the expected

19. Spangenberg & Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems, supra note 4;
Spangenberg, Contracting, supra note 9; Spangenberg, Defender
Workloads; supra note 6; Stambaugh, supra note 9.
20. The Court Administrator in Oregon claims that their program,
which is a statewide—not a single court’s—effort using a centralized screening process, saves $2 for every $1 it spends on verifi-

direction, stating that he had been unemployed longer than
he really had been.
Eleven defendants reported that they were currently
employed when they were not, at least by the employer with
which they said they were employed. This falsehood could
have made these defendants ineligible for a public defender
when in reality they might have been eligible.
Ten defendants provided a fraudulent Social Security
number.
These findings indicate that in a typical month, 5% of
defendants provided inaccurate or false information to the
court. Of those providing inaccurate information, however,
only one person in 25 gave information that could have possibly increased their chances of receiving public defender services. In fact, the inaccurate information may have not even
been such that it would have made a difference in eligibility.
These findings are consistent with what several interviewees
(including the Screener and a defendant) told us: Defendants
are as likely to lie to make themselves seem more financially
secure than the facts would indicate. The reason for wanting to
seem better off financially may include such factors as wanting
to appear worthy of lesser bond, not wanting to appear destitute in front of other defendants (even when financial information is provided to the Screener, other defendants are
around to overhear the conversation, especially in the jail setting), or as one judge told us, they simply do not know how
much compensation they receive from work.
The perception by some in the court system is that the presence of the Screener and the fact of verification both promote
honesty. However, conversations with defendants suggest that
they are not especially motivated to honesty, or deterred from
dishonesty, by the presence of the Screener or the existence of
a verification program. No defendant believed financial
information was verified—they did not think there would be
time to do so between the time they provided the Screener with
information and the time of their court appearance. Apparently
the prospect of future verification was not a salient concept,
nor did they indicate it was a deterrent. Similarly, judges stated
their belief that if the defendant was going to lie, the defendant
would lie to the Screener as well. The data we obtained from
the Screener support the view that either (a) not much lying
takes place, or (b) the pilot project was not much better at
catching liars than was the system in place beforehand.
CONCLUSION

Overall, the project clearly increased consistency in indigency appointments by ensuring that the same financial information was collected for each defendant and that each judge
was provided with the same information regarding each defendant. Collecting financial information from defendants in a

cation. Personal Communications from Carol R. Flango, Director,
Knowledge and Information Services, National Center for State
Courts (October 3 and October 8, 2002). We do not know the
accuracy of Oregon’s claim.
21. SPANGENBERG GROUP, CONTAINING THE COSTS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE
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more private setting prior to the hearing also was advantageous.
Not only did it increase the efficiency of the process by reducing in-court time for judges, attorneys, and defendants, but collecting financial information in a more private setting than in
the open courtroom also seemed comforting to defendants.
Data are less conclusive with regards to the extent by which
the project improved fairness in indigency appointments. The
rate of non-appointments for defendants who otherwise
seemed eligible (based on Tier I and Tier II eligibility criteria)
for a court-appointed attorney was higher than might be
expected. Interviews with judges, however, indicated that they
prefer to err on the side of providing counsel, rather than
denying someone in need of counsel. This issue could be more
fully examined if judges provided the rationale for denying
counsel on the form.
The project’s verification component in its current configuration does not seem effective in uncovering financial information that results in a denial of public defender appointments
that, but for verification, otherwise would have occurred.
Findings suggest that the percentage of defendants who are
caught providing inaccurate information about their financial
status is minimal; defendants who were caught lying were
more likely to have tried to make themselves look more financially secure than impoverished enough to have been more
readily eligible for court-appointed counsel.

who will verify financial information. It is not clear that verification efforts succeed in uncovering financial information that
results in a denial of public defender appointments that, but
for verification, would have otherwise occurred. We do not
believe verification detects very much false or inaccurate information. Part of the problem is it is hard to uncover the negative. Thus, it is quite difficult for the verification process to
find that a defendant who denies employment actually has a
job or to find a savings account when the defendant does not
list one. Even when verification uncovers dishonesty, the dishonesty can be so minimal that it does not actually affect the
defendant’s indigency status. Finally, in most instances, it does
not seem to be good practice or policy either to stop judicial
proceedings or to prosecute defendants in those rare instances
in which inaccurate or false information is uncovered.

Implications for Courts Beyond Lancaster County
For jurisdictions interested in assessing, reforming, or
implementing new systems of determining indigence, the
results of this evaluation strongly support the adoption of a
uniform rule and form for determining indigence. Interviews
revealed that those involved in the court system are virtually
all positive about the uniform rule, primarily because it is
believed the Rule has resulted in greater uniformity and consistency in indigency appointments. The standardized form is
considered beneficial because it helps direct the collection of
useful financial information judges need to know in order
make the decision whether to appoint counsel.
Although screening staff appear to create a time savings for
judges and attorneys, and provide defendants with a semiprivate environment to provide financial information, the benefits
of their verification are less clear. On the one hand, verification
allows people to feel that defendants will not receive benefits
(court appointments) at taxpayer expense to which the defendants are not entitled. On the other hand, verification does not
appear to fulfill its promise. It is our opinion that defendants
are not more honest simply because there is a court employee

Alternative Verification Strategies
There are several options that would make verification
efforts more cost-effective. One possible way to address the
cost issue is to consider additional changes to the Rule that
would allow recoupment of costs incurred to provide indigent
services. Spangenberg and his colleagues are advocates of
efforts to offset costs.21 There may be some preference to
implement up-front user or application fees as opposed to
after-the-fact recoupment costs.22 With as slight a charge as
$10 application or use fee per defendant there would be
$50,000 in revenue generated, enough to virtually support the
annual cost of a Screener. For example, in FY 2001-02, there
were 5,232 cases considered for court appointment. If each
defendant were charged $10, the revenue would be over
$50,000. Or a slighter higher base fee could be established
with a sliding scale, with the goal of generating the average
amount of $10 per defendant.
Another alternative is to staff the Screener position differently. Might there be others who already have investigative
skills who could conduct the verification for the court? If pretrial service officers were conducting verification activities
along with their other activities, it might be possible to reduce
the costs incurred when a position is designed solely to screen
and verify financial information.
If pretrial services were to verify, who would screen? Again,
pretrial service staff could collect financial information for the
jail population. Clerk staff might be considered for undertaking the responsibility of screening cases for defendants not in
jail. Again, you would have staff members who are working on
financial matters (in this case, screening) along with other
responsibilities throughout their workday. Verification respon-

PROGRAMS: ELIGIBILITY SCREENING AND COST RECOVERY PROCEDURES
(National Institute of Justice 1986); Spangenberg Group, An
Assessment of the Pierce County Washington Indigency Screening and
Cost Recovery Program (Dec. 1998)(unpublished manuscript,
available from Spangenberg Group, 1001 Watertown Street, West
Newton, MA 02465); Spangenberg, Contracting, supra note 9;
David Carroll & Robert Spangenberg, Assessment of Indigent
Defense Cost Recovery in Fayette and Jefferson County, Kentucky
(October, 2001) (available at http://www.abanet.org/legalser
vices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/ky-costrecovery.pdf).

22. In Pierce County, Washington, for example, a county ordinance
was passed allowing the assessment of a $25 application fee for
those requesting indigent services. PIERCE COUNTY, WA.,
ORDINANCE 99-31 (May 25, 1999) (available at http://www.co.
pierce.wa.us/xml/abtus/plans/perf-audit/appendix%201%20%205.pdf); see also Public Defense Cost Recovery Task Force,
Recommendations to Implement Change in Indigent Defense
Screening and Cost Recovery (1999) (available at http://www.
co.pierce.wa.us/xml/abtus/plans/perf-audit/appendix%201%20%205.pdf).

10 Court Review

sibilities could be vested solely with pretrial service staff, and
pretrial staff could be responsible for checking the financial
data obtained by the court administrator’s staff.
Postscript
In 2005, the Lancaster County Indigency Screener Project
was cut from the county budget. During the four years the
screening project took place there was no indication that the
program was impacting (reducing) the number of defendants
receiving court-appointed attorneys, and there was no indication of a cost savings from verification. Consequently the decision was made to terminate the project, and the money for the
project was used to fund an additional attorney in the Public
Defender’s office. Administrators decided that for the program
to be successful, the screening needed to take place days before
the arraignment, which was not the way Lancaster County had
organized its program.
As detailed in this article, there are clear benefits to a uniform rule and form for determining indigence. Jurisdictions
interested in including a screening or verification component
should consider the alternative screening/verification strategies discussed in here: establishing a mechanism to recoup
costs, pairing the screening position with existing court staff,
or pairing verification efforts with existing pretrial services.
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Grounding Frequent Filers:
The Trend of Revoking the Special Status
of Overly Litigious Pro Se Litigants
Michael G. Langan*

S

ince the early 1990s, federal courts in the Second and
Third Circuits have, with increasing frequency, revoked
the special status of pro se civil litigants who have been
overly litigious. This article discusses the reasons for this
trend’s appearance in the Second and Third Circuits, the rationales for the trend, the fairness of the trend, and some practical advice for courts and practitioners wrestling with the issue
of whether or not the special status of a particularly litigious
pro se litigant should be revoked.
I.

NATURE OF SPECIAL STATUS AND TREND

As a general rule, every federal court in the United States
affords “pro se”1 civil litigants special status, although courts
often differ on the way they describe that status.2 This general
rule is followed, to varying degrees, by state courts.3
Uniformly, this special status consists of a right to have one’s
pleadings construed more liberally than those of a represented
litigant.4 For example, this liberal construction might result in

*

1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

The views expressed in this article are those only of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York, where the
author is employed.
“Pro se” is a Latin term meaning “[f]or oneself” or “on one’s own
behalf.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1236 (7th ed. 1999). When used
in a legal setting, the term means acting “without a lawyer.”
Similar Latin terms include “pro persona” and “in propria persona.”
See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“less stringent standards”); Ruotolo v. IRS, 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (“special solicitude”); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir.
1992) (“great leniency”).
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Abdulwadud Abbas, No. H028443,
2006 WL 788900, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App., March 29, 2006); Barrett
v. City of Margate, 743 So.2d 1160, 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999); Myers v. Estate of Wilks, 655 A.2d 176, 177-178 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995); Barnes v. Texas, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992); Du-Art Film Labs., Inc. v. Wharton Int’l Films, Inc.,
457 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61-62 (N.Y. App. Div., 1982).
See, e.g., Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982); Estelle,
429 U.S. at 106; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972).
See, e.g., Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2005);
Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 927, 928 n.2 (4th Cir. 1977);
Merriweather v. Zamora, 04-CV-717076, 2005 WL 2448946, at *1
n.1 (E.D. Mich. May 4, 2005); Fiore v. City of N.Y., 97-CV-4935,
1998 WL 755134, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1998); Coleman v.
Runyon, 93-CV-0016, 1996 WL 528855, at *1 n.3 (E.D. Pa. March
11, 1996).
See, e.g., Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2006); U.S.
v. Arnold, 114 F. App’x 76, 78 (11th Cir. 2005); Melencio Legui
Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 933-934 (9th Cir. 2000); Whitford v.
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a court recognizing a pro se plaintiff’s complaint as alleging a
fact or claim, even if the complaint makes no express mention
of such a fact or claim.5 However, a pro se litigant’s pleadings
are not the only documents that are routinely afforded a liberal
reading. Also liberally construed are a pro se litigant’s briefs,6
affidavits,7 and notices of appeal.8
Moreover, depending on the court, this special status may
confer a variety of other benefits on pro se litigants: (1) a right
to have one’s complaint treated as amended by one’s papers in
opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim;9 (2) a right to file an amended complaint,
including a second amended complaint;10 (3) a right to be
specifically notified of the consequences of failing to respond
to a summary judgment motion before being subjected to
those consequences;11 (4) a right to be excused from complying with service deadlines, discovery deadlines, motion-filing
deadlines, and page limits;12 and (5) a right to be presumed to
have been acting in good faith when sanctions are being con-

Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 535 n.10 (7th Cir. 1995); SEC v. AMX, Int’l,
7 F.3d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1993).
7. See, e.g., Smith v. McMichael, 153 F. App’x 566, 568-69 (11th Cir.
2005); Wilson v. Weisner, 43 F. App’x 982, 986 n.1 (7th Cir.
2002); Connor v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir. 1992),
vacated on other grounds, 61 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 1995); Williams v.
Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974).
8. See, e.g., U.S. v. Garcia, 65 F.3d 17, 19 (4th Cir. 1995); U.S. v.
Willis, 804 F.2d 961, 963 (6th Cir. 1986); Yates v. Mobile County
Pers. Bd., 658 F.2d 298, 299 (5th Cir. 1980); see also 8A Moore’s
Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 37.04[2] (2d ed. 1986) [collecting cases].
9. See, e.g., Boguslavsky v. Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1998);
Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1987); Donhauser v.
Goord, 314 F. Supp. 2d 119, 212 (N.D.N.Y.), vacated on other
grounds, 317 F. Supp. 2d 160 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).
10. See, e.g., Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Gomez v.
USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999); Davidson
v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1994).
11. “The Second, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit
Courts of Appeals mandate that notice of summary judgment
requirements be given to pro se litigants.” Jessica Case, Pro Se
Litigants at the Summary Judgment Stage: Is Ignorance of the Law an
Excuse? 90 KY. L.J. 701, 704 n.24 (Spring 2001) [citations omitted]. “The Ninth Circuit requires notice of summary judgment
requirements for pro se prisoner litigants only.” Id.
12. See, e.g., LeSane v. Hall’s Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d
Cir. 2001); Habib v. GMC, 15 F.3d 72, 74 (6th Cir. 1994); Sule v.
Gregg, No. 92-36888, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 17169, at *3 (9th Cir.
July 7, 1993); Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984);
Jackson v. Nicoletti, 875 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 & n.6 (E.D. Pa.
1994).

templated.13 The rationale for conferring this special status is
that pro se litigants need help since they are often inexperienced or unfamiliar with legal procedures or terminology.14
Historically, federal courts across the United States have
been willing, on occasion, to diminish or look past this special
status when pro se litigants abuse the litigation process.15 This
willingness has been shared by many state courts.16 Moreover,

since the early 1990s, federal courts in the Second and Third
Circuits have, with increasing frequency, revoked the special
status of pro se civil litigants who have been overly litigious.17
While courts outside the Second and Third Circuits have also,
during this time period, diminished or looked past the special
status of such pro se civil litigants, they have done so less frequently.18

13. See, e.g., Maduakolam v. Columbia Univ., 866 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir.
1989); see also Brian L. Holtzclaw, Pro Se Litigants: Application of a
Single Objective Standard Under FRCP 11 to Reduce Frivolous
Litigation, 16 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1371, 1373-1375 & n.15-16
(Spring 1993) [citing cases].
14. See, e.g., Korsunskiy v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir.
2006); Int’l Bus. Prop. v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 65 F.3d 175, at *2
(9th Cir. 1995); Flynn, 32 F.3d at 31; Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 781
F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827
(10th Cir. 1979); Zaczek v. Fauquier County, 764 F. Supp. 1071,
1078 (E.D. Va. 1991); Life Science Church v. U.S., 607 F. Supp.
1037, 1039 (N.D. Oh. 1985); see also John C. Rothermich, Ethical
and Procedural Implications of “Ghostwriting” for Pro Se Litigants:
Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2687,
2697 (Apr. 1999) [citing cases].
15. See, e.g., Day v. Allstate Ins. Co., 788 F.2d 1110, 1111-1113 (5th
Cir. 1986); In re Martin-Trigona, 763 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1985);
McCutcheon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 88-CV-9965, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8141, at *2, 24 & n.3-6 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 1989); Williams
v. Giant Supermkt. Store, 88-CV-2434, 1989 WL 10600, at *1
(D.D.C. Jan. 31, 1989); Castro v. U.S., 584 F. Supp. 252, 264 (D.
Puerto Rico 1984); Welsh v. Steinmetz, 84-CV-1846, 1984 WL
13132, at *5 (D.N.M. Dec. 20, 1984); Hosley v. Bass, 519 F. Supp.
395, 407 n.27 (D. Md. 1981); Raitport v. Chem. Bank, 74 F.R.D.
128, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
16. See, e.g., Colo. v. Dunlop, 623 P.2d 408, 410-411 (Colo. 1981);
Birdo v. Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411, 412-413 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989);
Kondrat v. Byron, 579 N.E.2d 287, 288-289 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989);
Mullen v. Renner, 685 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
Bardacke v. Welsh, 698 P.2d 462, 466-471 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985);
Hunnewell v. Hunnewell, 445 N.E.2d 1080, 1083 (Mass. App. Ct.
1983); Muka v. Hancock, Estabrook, Ryan, Shove & Hust, 465
N.Y.S.2d 416, 416-417 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983); Hotel Martha Wash.
Mgmt. Co. v. Swinick, 324 N.Y.S.2d 687, 694 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
17. Second Circuit: See, e.g., Iwachiw v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Motor Veh.,
396 F.3d 525, 529 (2d Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Eggersdorf, 8 F.
App’x 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’g, 97-CV-0938, Decision and
Order (N.D.N.Y. May 28, 1999); Johnson v. Gummerson, 201 F.3d
431, at *2 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’g, 97-CV-1727, Decision and Order
(N.D.N.Y. June 11, 1999); Flynn, 32 F.3d at 31; Edwards v. Selsky,
04-CV-1054, 2007 WL 748442, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. March 6, 2007);
Rolle v. Garcia, 04-CV-0312, 2007 WL 672679, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 28, 2007); Mora v. Bockelmann, 03-CV-1217, 2007 WL
603410, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2007); Brown v. Goord, 04-CV0785, 2007 WL 607396, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007);
Mitchell v. Harriman, 04-CV-0937, 2007 WL 499619, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007); Sledge v. Kooi, 04-CV-1311, 2007 WL
951447, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2007); Gill v. Pidylpchak, 02CV-1460, 2006 WL 3751340, at *2 n.3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
2006); Saunders v. Ricks, 03-CV-0598, 2006 WL 3051792, at *2
& n.11 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2006); Tibbetts v. Stempel, 97-CV2561, 2005 WL 2146079, at *7 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2005); Gill v.
Frawley, 02-CV-1380, 2006 WL 1742738, at *3 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y.
June 22, 2006); Davidson v. Talbot, 01-CV-0473, 2005 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 39576, at *18-20 & n.10 (N.D.N.Y. March 31, 2005); Gill
v. Riddick, 03-CV-1456, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5394, at *7 & n.3
(N.D.N.Y. March 31, 2005); Yip v. SUNY, 03-CV-0959, 2004 WL
2202594, at *3-4 & n.7, 10 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2004); Davidson
v. Dean, 204 F.R.D. 251, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Santiago v. Campisi,
91 F. Supp. 2d 665, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); McGann v. U.S., 98-CV2192, 1999 WL 173596, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 1999); Jones v.
City of Buffalo, 96-CV-0379, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6070, at *1619 & n.7-8 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1998); Brown v. McClellan, 93-CV0901, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8164, at *3-4 & n.3 (W.D.N.Y. June
10, 1996); Brown v. Selsky, 93-CV-0268, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
213, at *2 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1995); Baasch v. Reyer, 827 F.
Supp. 940, 944 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Kissel v. DiMartino, 92-CV-5660,
1993 WL 289430, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 1993); Hussein v. Pitta,
88-CV-2549, 1991 WL 221033, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1991).
Third Circuit: See, e.g., Tilbury v. AAmes Home Loan, 05CV-2033, 2005 WL 3477558, at *1-5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2005);
Hollis-Arrington v. PHH Mort. Corp., 05-CV-2556, 2005 WL
3077853, at *9 (D.N.J. Nov. 15, 2005); Perry v. Gold & Laine,
P.C., 371 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629 (D.N.J. 2005); Smith v. Litton Loan
Serv., LP, 04-CV-2846, 2005 WL 289927, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4,
2005); Douris v. Bucks County, 04-CV-0232, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1279, at *14-15, 40-41 & n. 19 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2005);
Weber v. Henderson, 275 F. Supp. 2d 616, 618, 622 (E.D. Pa.
2003); Frempong-Atuahene v. City of Phila., 99-CV-4386, 2000
WL 233216, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2000); Frempong-Atuahene
v. Transam. Fin. Consum. Disc. Co., 99-CV-0965, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 324, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2000); Frempong-Atuahene
v. Redev. Auth. of City of Phila., 99-CV-0704, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 113, at *2, 4, 8-9 & n.1-2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2000), aff’d,
250 F.3d 755 (3d Cir. 2001); Armstrong v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 99CV-0825, 1999 WL 773507, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1999);
Broad. Music, Inc. v. La Trattoria East, Inc., 95-CV-1784, 1995 WL
552881, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1995); Wexler v. Citibank, 94CV-4172, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14992, at *19-20 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
21, 1994); Hollawell v. Leman, 94-CV-5730, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14139, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1994); Lyden v. Susser,
93-CV-3949, 1994 WL 117794, at *8 (D.N.J. March 30, 1994);
Kupersmit v. Nat’l Mort., 91-CV-4049, 1992 WL 108967, at *1
(E.D. Pa. May 12, 1992).
18. State Courts: See, e.g., Martin v. D.C. Ct. of App., 506 U.S. 1, 23 (1992); Hamilton v. Fla., 945 So.2d 1121, 1122-1124 (Fla.
2006); Karr v. Williams, 50 P.3d 910, 913-916 (Colo. 2002);
Corley v. U.S., 741 A.2d 1029, 1029-1031 (D.C. 1999); Matter of
Burns, 542 N.W.2d 389, 389-390 (Minn. 1996); Turner-El v. West,
811 N.E.2d 728, 733-736 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Vinson v. Benson,
805 So.2d 571, 573, 576-577 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); Kan. v. Lynn,
975 P.2d 813, 815-816 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999); Thomas v. Sibbett,
925 P.2d 1286, 1286-1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); Mullen v.
GMAC, 919 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); Sud v. Sud, 642
N.Y.S.2d 893, 893-894 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Cain v. Buehner, 839
S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Cronen v. County Storage
Lot, 831 S.W.2d 895, 898-899 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Lepiscopo v.
Hopwood, 791 P.2d 481, 483 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990); Melnitzky v.
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II.

REASONS FOR TREND’S APPEARANCE IN SECOND
AND THIRD CIRCUITS

What is different about the Second and Third Circuits that
has caused the trend to appear there first? Is it that those two
circuits have more pro se litigation than do other federal circuits? The answer appears to be no.
It is beyond cavil that, over the past two decades, it has
become more common for parties to litigate pro se in federal
and state court.19 As one commentator has observed, causes for
this trend include “increased literacy, consumerism, a sense of
rugged individualism, the costs of litigation and attorneys’ fees,
antilawyer sentiment, and the breakdown of family and religious institutions that formerly resolved many disputes that are
now presented to courts instead.”20 However, it does not appear
that the rise in pro se litigation in the Second and Third Circuits
has been any greater than the average rise in such litigation in
other circuits. For example, between 1990 and 2005, the
Second Circuit experienced a 5.9-fold increase in the number of
reported decisions involving pro se litigants, while the Third
Circuit experienced a 5.7-fold increase in the number of such
decisions.21 However, 6 of the 13 other federal circuits (counting the D.C. Circuit and Federal Circuit) experienced a greater
increase in the number of such decisions.22 Indeed, the rate of
increase of such decisions in the Second Circuit and Third
Circuits was below the national average rate of increase (a 14.5fold increase) of such decisions.23

Uribe, 806 N.Y.S.2d 446, *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Spremo v.
Babchik, 589 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1023-1024 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
Federal Courts: See, e.g., Adams v. Nankervis, No. 89-35511,
1990 WL 61990, at *2 (9th Cir. May 10, 1990); Greathouse v. City
of Plymouth, Ohio, 06-CV-2014, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79770, at
*4-5, 16-19 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 1, 2006); Williams v. Smith, 05-CV0845, 2006 WL 2192470, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2006);
Whitfield v. Walker, 04-CV-3136, 2006 WL 618893, at *3 (C.D.
Ill. March 10, 2006); Vongrabe v. Sprint PCS, 312 F. Supp. 2d
1313, 1319-1321 (S.D. Cal. 2004); Jiricko v. Moser and Marsalek,
P.C., 184 F.R.D. 611, 615 (E.D. Mo. 1999); U.S. v. Barker, 19 F.
Supp. 2d 1380, 1382, 1385 & n.1 (S.D. Ga. 1998); Cok v. Forte,
877 F. Supp. 797, 804 (D.R.I. 1994). It is worth noting that ten
such decisions come from within the Tenth Circuit. See Jenkins
v. MTGLQ Inv., No. 05-4057, 2007 WL 431498, at *4-5 (10th Cir.
Feb. 9, 2007); Garrett v. Selby, 425 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005);
Judd v. Univ. of New Mexico, 204 F.3d 1041, 1044 (10th Cir.
2000); Washington v. Dorsey, No. 95-2081, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
17080, at *5 (10th Cir. July 13, 1995); DePineda v. Hemphill, 34
F.3d 946, 948 (10th Cir. 1994); Werner v. Utah, 32 F.3d 1446,
1449 (10th Cir. 1994); In re Winslow, 17 F.3d 314, 315 (10th Cir.
1994); Ketchum v. Cruz, 961 F.2d 916, 921 (10th Cir. 1992); Lynn
v. Roberts, 01-CV-3422, 2006 WL 2850273, at *3-5 (D. Kan. Oct.
4, 2006); Nutter v. Wefald, 90-CV-1436, 1997 WL 833298, at *1
(D. Kan. 1997); Housley v. Burrows, 97-CV-1532, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23049, at *12-13 (W.D. Ok. Oct. 28, 1997). However, generally, the link between the special status of the pro se litigants and
the remedial or punitive action taken by the court in those cases
is less direct than is that link in the cases from within the Second
and Third Circuits.
19. This phenomenon has been well documented by systematic studies, and confirmed by the reports of judges and court managers.
See, e.g., Tiffany Buxton, Foreign Solutions to the U.S. Pro Se
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Nor does it appear that, in the Second and Third circuits,
pro se cases comprise an unusually large percentage of all
civil cases filed there. Based on an analysis of the number of
civil pro se cases filed and the total number of civil cases filed
by circuit (excluding the Federal Circuit) during the twelvemonth period ending September 30, 2004, it appears that the
Second and Third Circuits were in ninth and twelfth place
(respectively).24
Nor does there appear to be an unusually high ratio of
pro se cases per judge in the Second and Third Circuits.
Among all 13 federal circuits, the Second and Third Circuits
issued the fifth and fourth most reported decisions (respectively) involving pro se litigants in 2005.25 Taking into
account the number of authorized federal judgeships in
each of those circuits, the Second and Third Circuits remain
in fifth and fourth place (respectively) in terms of the number of such decisions issued per judge in 2005.26 If the ratio
of pro se cases per judge were the reason for the trend’s
appearance in the Second and Third Circuits, then how
would one explain the fact that the trend does not appear to
be occurring in the two circuits with the most such decisions issued per judge in 2005, namely, the Fourth and Fifth
Circuits?27
Is it that the Second and Third Circuits have experienced
a rise in the number of prisoners incarcerated there, coupled
with the fact that prisoners file most of the pro se cases in fed-

Phenomenon, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L LAW 103, 112 (Fall 2002);
Case, supra note 11, at 701-702 & n.2, 11, 12; Jona Goldschmidt,
The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the
Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 36 (Jan.
2002); Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, Table 2.4: U.S. Court of
Appeals (Excludes Federal Circuit): Pro Se Cases Filed
http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/Table204.pdf (last
visited on Jan. 3, 2007).
20. See Goldschmidt, supra note 19, at 36.
21. These figures come from a chart on file with the author. The chart
was prepared by the author, using data obtained by running simple searches in the relevant LexisNexis files, for example, “counsel (pro se) and date(geq (01/01/1990) and leq (12/31/1990))” in
the LexisNexis “1st” file.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. These figures come from a chart on file with the author. The chart
was prepared by the author, using data obtained from the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, specifically, (1) Table S24: Civil Pro Se and Non-Pro Se Filings, by District, During the 12Month Period Ending September 30, 2005 http://www.
uscourts.gov/judbus2005/tables/s24.pdf (last visited on Jan. 3,
2007), and (2) Table 4.2: U.S. District Courts: Civil Cases Filed by
District http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/Table402.pdf
(last visited on Jan. 3, 2007).
25. See supra note 21.
26. See supra note 21. The number of judges per circuit was determined by adding the number of district judges per circuit, as listed
in title 28, section 133 of the United States Code, to the number
of circuit judges per circuit, as listed in title 28, section 44 of the
United States Code.
27. Id.; see also supra note 18 (not listing any cases from Fourth or
Fifth Circuits).

eral court?28 Again, the answer appears to be no. The three
states whose federal courts have issued the most status-revoking decisions from within the Second and Third Circuits since
1990 are New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.29 However,
between 1977 and 2004, the prison populations in New York
and New Jersey grew about as fast as the average prison population nationally.30 Granted, the prison population in
Pennsylvania grew slightly faster than did the average prison
population nationally.31 However, of the 15 status-revoking
decisions found from courts in the Third Circuit, 11 of those
decisions were issued by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
which does not contain as many prisons as do the Middle or
Western Districts of Pennsylvania.32 More important, only one
of those 15 decisions involved a pro se inmate.33
What, then, is the reason for the trend’s appearance in the
Second and Third Circuits? In analyzing the 15 status-revoking decisions from courts in the Third Circuit, it becomes clear
that seven of those decisions were in actions involving mortgages.34 While only four of these decisions came from the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania (the other three coming from
the District of New Jersey),35 those decisions are consistent
with news articles reporting a surge in the number of borrowers alleging predatory practices by certain lenders in the
greater Philadelphia area in the past decade.36 The cases are
also consistent with news reports of a shortage of pro bono
lawyers able to represent such borrowers.37 As a result, one of
the reasons for the trend’s occurrence in the Third Circuit
appears to have been district courts’ frustration with a handful
of particularly abusive pro se litigants who were complaining
about lending practices in the greater Philadelphia area.

As for the Second Circuit, while an analysis of prisoner-population growth may not explain the trend’s appearance in that
circuit, a further analysis of prisoner litigation in general in
that circuit might offer some explanation for the trend’s
appearance there. This is because, of the 27 status-revoking
decisions that were issued from courts in the Second Circuit
since 1990, 18 of those decisions involved pro se prisoners
suing for alleged civil-rights violations.38 But is prisoner litigation in the Second Circuit somehow different from prisoner
litigation in other circuits, and if so, why?
It appears that the answer to this question is yes in the sense
that, together, the New York State Department of Correctional
Services (DOCS) and the federal district courts located in New
York State appear to foster the creation of experienced pro se
prisoner litigants. This conclusion is based on four pieces of
evidence. First, all 18 of the aforementioned status-revoking
decisions were issued by federal district courts located in New
York State and involved pro se New York State prisoners.
Second, the New York State DOCS maintains prison law
libraries of a relatively high quality as compared to many other
state prison law libraries. “Nearly $2.5 million was spent in
Fiscal [Year] 2005-06 [alone] to maintain all the [state correctional facility] law libraries [in New York State], including the
updates of the law book and periodical collections, and also
the supply of pens, paper and photocopying materials.”39 Such
expenditures are in stark contrast to the cuts in funding of
prison law libraries by other states (such as Arizona,
California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, New Mexico, and
Washington).40 The result of such expenditures by New York
State is a network of 93 law libraries that appears to generally

28. See Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, Table S-24: Civil Pro Se and NonPro Se Filings, by District, During the 12-Month Period Ending
September 30, 2005 http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/tables/
s24.pdf (last visited on Jan. 3, 2007); Jonathan D. Rosenbloom,
Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness in Pro Se
Cases: A Study of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New
York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 314 & n.40 (Nov. 2002).
29. See supra note 17 (citing cases).
30. George Hill and Paige Harrison, Prisoners Under State or Federal
Jurisdiction: 1977-2004; United States Department of Justice, Bureau
of Justice Statistics (Dec. 6, 2005) http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/data/corpop02.csv (last visited Dec. 13, 2006).
31. Id.
32. See supra note 17; see also Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, Institutional Map http://www.cor.state.pa.us/portal/
cwp/view.asp?a=376&q=126815&portalNav=| (last visited Dec.
28, 2006).
33. See Hollawell, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14139.
34. See Tilbury, 2005 WL 3477558, at *4; Hollis, 2005 WL 3077853,
at *2; Litton Loan Serv., LP, 2005 WL 289927, at *4; Transam.,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 324; Wexler, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14992,
at *3, 15; Lyden, 1994 WL 117794, at *8; Kupersmit, 1992 WL
108967, at *1.
35. See Tilbury, 2005 WL 3477558, at *4 (D. N.J. 2005); Hollis, 2005
WL 3077853, at *2 (D. N.J. 2005); Litton Loan Serv., LP, 2005 WL
289927, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Transam., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
324 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Wexler, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14992, at *3,
15 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Lyden, 1994 WL 117794, at *8 (D. N.J. 1994);
Kupersmit, 1992 WL 108967, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1992).

36. See, e.g., Joseph N. DiStefano, Have Speadsheet, Will Travel: The Pa.
Banking Department Is Going Into the Law Enforcement Business,
PHILA. INQUIRER, at C-1 (Feb. 24, 2005); Michael Hinkelman, In a
Deep Financial Hole, Man Tries to Save House, PHILA. DAILY NEWS,
at 4 (March 9, 2004); Paul D. Davies, Predatory-Loan Foes Score
Again: Some See Shift in Battle Momentum, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, at 6
(Aug. 21, 2001); Paul D. Davies, Housed in Debt They Are Poor, in
Debt and Have Bad Credit, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, at 3 (Feb. 5, 2001).
37. See, e.g., Paul Davies, Private Lawyers Sought for Predatory-Loan
Cases, PHILA. DAILY NEWS, at 6 (May 18, 2001).
38. See supra note 17.
39. New York State DOCS, Prison Safety in New York, at 41
http://www.docs.state.ny.us/PressRel/06CommissionerRpt/06Pris
onSafetyRpt.pdf (last visited on Dec. 29, 2006).
40. See, e.g., Richard D. Vogel, Silencing the Cells: Mass Incarceration
and Legal Repression in U.S. Prisons, 56 MONTHLY REV. 37 (May 1,
2004); Nationwide, State DOCs Face Deepest Budget Cuts in 20
Years, 7 CORR. PROF. 10 (Feb. 12, 2002); Steve Terrell, Prison
Contention, SANTE FE NEW MEXICAN, at A-4 (Jan. 22, 2002); Prisons
Get Those Pens Ready, THE FLA. TIMES-UNION, at B-6 (June 30,
2001); David Neiwert, Prison Shell Game, SEATTLE WKLY., at 14
(Feb. 14, 2001); Amid Controversy, Arizona DOC Facilities Are Free
of Law Libraries, 6 CORR. PROF. 3; Corrections Director Wants to
Phase Out Prison Law Libraries, ASS’D PRESS STATE AND LOCAL WIRE
(Feb. 15, 1999); Paul Davenport, Corrections Chief Says Troubled
Paralegal Program Back on Track, ASS’D PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE
(Dec. 1, 1998); DOCS Change Inmate Legal Access Policies, 3 CORR.
PROF. 18 (June 5, 1998); Idaho Dismantles Law Library System, 1
CORR. EDUC. BULL. 9 (June 1998).
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exceed the Supreme Court’s minimum requirements for “adequate” prison law libraries.41 Indeed, the collections of New
York State’s prison law libraries appear to exceed even the
requirements set forth by the American Association of Law
Libraries’ Special Committee on Law Library Services to
Prisoners.42 Furthermore, New York State is one of the few
states that has four non-prison libraries that provide legal
materials to prisoners.43 In this regard, New York State prisoners appear to have greater legal resources at their disposal
than do the prisoners in other states.
Third, the New York State DOCS appears to formally educate more of its inmates in the law each year than do the correctional departments of other states. Specifically, “[b]etween
350 and 400 [New York State] inmates earn legal research certificates each year.”44 Again, these efforts seem in contrast to
the efforts of other states (such as Arizona, Pennsylvania, and
Washington), which appear to be cutting the funding of such
vocational-education programs.45 Clearly, the New York State
inmates receiving this legal training are better equipped, and
perhaps more inclined, to file suit.46 In addition, many of the
New York State inmates receiving this training provide legal
guidance to other New York State inmates. For example, New
York State’s prison law libraries are staffed, in part, by certified
inmate law clerks, who assist inmates in preparing their own
legal papers.47
Fourth, federal district courts located in New York State
make a concerted effort to help pro se prisoner litigants, without, of course, providing substantive legal advice to them.48
For example, both the Northern District of New York and the

Western District of New York provide rather lengthy self-help
manuals to pro se litigants free of charge,49 while the Eastern
District of New York provides a number of shorter instructional materials for pro se litigants, also free of charge.50 In
addition, the Eastern District of New York has created an additional magistrate judge’s position specifically to improve “the
decisionmaking for pro se litigants” and to “direct greater
attention to those pro se cases involving potentially meritorious claims.”51 Finally, the Southern District of New York has
what one former court staff attorney calls “one of the most progressive and largest pro se offices in the country” with “eight
attorneys and seven writ clerks.”52
Perhaps as a result of all these efforts, it appears that, over
the past decade, the experience of pro se prisoner litigants in
the Second Circuit has generally increased. For example, a
recent study conducted of pro se cases in the Southern District
of New York during the second half of the 1990s revealed that,
during that time period, the number of “repeat filers” of pro se
prisoner cases rebounded in 1999 following a temporary drop
after the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act in
1996, which placed certain restrictions on such filings.53
Moreover, the success rate of prisoner civil-rights actions
appears to have increased somewhat.54
Also appearing to increase is the complexity of pro se prisoner complaints. For example, in the Southern District of New
York, pro se prisoner civil-rights complaints that named multiple defendants increased in complexity in the sense that they
named more defendants per complaint over the course of the
latter half of the 1990s.55 It is noteworthy that an increase in

41. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817 (1977).
42. Compare New York State DOCS, Prison Safety in New York, at 4142 & Attach. K (detailing the collections that comprise the holdings of New York State’s prison libraries) with A JAILHOUSE
LAWYER’S MANUAL: VOL. I at 48-53 (Columbia Hum. Rts. Law Rev.
6th ed. 2005) (attaching copy of Am. Ass’n of Law Libraries’
Checklist—Recommended Collection for Prison Law Libraries).
43. See A JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL: VOL. I at 54-56 (Columbia
Hum. Rts. Law Rev. 6th ed. 2005) (listing two such libraries);
Southern Center for Human Rights, Legal Resources and
Organizations by State: New York http://www.schr.org/prisonsjails/state-resources/ny-ref.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2006) (listing
two different such libraries); cf. Am. Ass’n of Law Libraries, Law
Libraries Serving Prisoners: New York http://www.aallnet.org/sis/
srsis/llsp/state.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2006) (listing three of the
four aforementioned libraries).
44. See New York State DOCS, Prison Safety in New York, at 42.
45. See, e.g., Nationwide, State DOCs Face Deepest Budget Cuts in 20
Years, 7 CORR. PROF. 10 (Feb. 12, 2002); Catherine Lucey, InmateRun Legal Clinic at Graterford Prison to Be Closed, ASS’D PRESS STATE
AND LOCAL WIRE (June 5, 2002); Arizona DOCS Closes 34 Inmate
Law Libraries, 2 CORR. PROF. 22 (Aug. 8, 1997).
46. For example, take the case of former New York State inmate
Jeffrey Smith (DOCS Identification Number 96-R-9145). Mr.
Smith received legal training while in prison. See Smith v. Woods,
03-CV-0048, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29745, at *83 (N.D.N.Y.
March 17, 2006). He also filed at least six federal court actions as
a New York State prisoner, averaging one a year for six years. See,
e.g., Smith v. Woods, 03-CV-0048 (N.D.N.Y.) (prisoner civil-rights

action); Smith v. NYS DOCS, 00-CV-1286 (N.D.N.Y.); Smith v.
Taylor, 00-CV-1164 (N.D.N.Y.); Smith v. Albaugh, 00-CV-0404
(S.D.N.Y.); Smith v. NYS DOCS, 99-CV-2157 (N.D.N.Y.); Smith v.
Walker, 98-CV-0129 (N.D.N.Y.).
47. See New York State DOCS, Prison Safety in New York, at 42; see,
e.g., Smith, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29745, at *19, 83.
48. See Nat’l Ass’n for Ct. Mgmt., Model Code of Conduct, art. II(B),
http://www.nacmnet.org/codeofconduct.html (last visited on Jan.
2, 2007); AM. BAR ASS’N’S STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE DELIVERY OF
LEGAL SERVICES, RESPONDING TO THE NEEDS OF THE SELFREPRESENTED DIVORCE LITIGANT, at 24-25 (Am. Bar Ass’n 1994);
FED. R. APP. P. 45(a).
49. The Northern District’s manual is 66 pages long. U.S. District
Court for the N.D.N.Y., PRO SE HANDBOOK ttp://www.nynd.
uscourts.gov/documents/Prosehandbook.pdf (last visited Dec. 29,
2006). The Western District’s manual is 45 pages long. U.S.
District Court for the W.D.N.Y., THE PRO SE LITIGATION GUIDELINES
http://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/document/Guidelines2001.pdf
(last visited Dec. 29, 2006).
50. See U.S. District Court for the E.D.N.Y., Court Forms: Pro Se Forms
http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/General_Information/Court_Form
s/courts_forms.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2006).
51. See Hon. Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts,
Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 N.D. J. L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 475, 493, 495 (2002).
52. See Rosenbloom, supra note 28, at 307 n.9.
53. Id. at 352; see, e.g., Talbot, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39576, at *36.
54. See Rosenbloom, supra note 28, at 339.
55. Id. at 322.
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sophistication of pro se New York State prisoner litigants, and
a willingness on the part of federal district courts located in
New York State to help pro se litigants, would largely explain
why, between 2000 and 2005, the Second Circuit was last (of
the 12 circuits, including the D.C. Circuit) in terms of the
median time to disposition for prisoner civil-rights cases (9.8
months as compared to a national average of 5.7 months).56
For example, one would expect sophisticated pro se prisoner
litigants to be more aware that extensions of time are available
and more likely to ask for extensions of time in which to
respond to dispositive motions filed by defendants; and one
would expect district courts determined to help pro se litigants
to be more likely to routinely grant such requests (thus, delaying the ultimate resolution of the cases).
In sum, while the reason for the trend’s occurrence in the
Third Circuit appears partly to be the result of district courts’
frustration with abusive pro se litigants complaining about
lending practices in Philadelphia over the past decade, the
reason for the trend’s occurrence in the Second Circuit
appears to be an increase in the skill of pro se inmate litigants
due to an effort to educate them by the New York State DOCS
and the federal district courts located in New York State.
However, more enlightening than the reason for the trend’s
appearance is an analysis of the rationales for the revocation
of special status.
III. RATIONALES FOR TREND

Generally, courts have articulated two distinct rationales for
their revocation of the special status of overly litigious pro se
litigants. The first rationale is that the pro se litigant’s exces-

56. These figures come from a chart on file with the author. The chart
was prepared by the Clerk’s Office for the Northern District of
New York, using data provided by the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts. See, e.g., Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, Table C-5:
U.S. District Courts–Median Time Intervals from Filing to
Disposition of Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Method of
Disposition, During the 12-Month Period Ending June 30, 2005
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/tables/C05mar05.pdf (last
visited on Jan. 3, 2007).
57. See, e.g., Eggersdorf, 8 F. App’x at 143; Gummerson, 201 F.3d at
*2; Flynn, 32 F.3d at 31; Saunders, 2006 WL 3051792, at *2;
Pidylpchak, 2006 WL 3751340, at *2; Frawley, 2006 WL
1742738, at *3; Talbot, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39576, at *20,
accord, Riddick, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5394, at *7; Yip, 2004 WL
2202594, at *3; Dean, 204 F.R.D. at 257 & n.5; Santiago, 91 F.
Supp. 2d at 670; McGann, 1999 WL 173596, at *2; Hussein, 1991
WL 221033, at *4.
58. See, e.g., Tilbury, 2005 WL 3477558, at *10; Hollis, 2005 WL
3077853, at *9; Perry, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 629; Litton Loan Serv.,
LP, 2005 WL 289927, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2005); Douris, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1279, at *2-5, 40-41 & n.19; Weber, 275 F. Supp.
2d at 623; Armstrong, 1999 WL 773507, at *2, accord, City of
Phila., 2000 WL 233216, at *3; Broad. Music, Inc., 1995 WL
552881, at *2; Wexler, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14992, at *6, 19 &
n.2; Hollawell, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14139, at *2.
59. See, e.g., Eggersdorf, 8 F. App’x at 143; Gummerson, 201 F.3d at
*2; Flynn, 32 F.3d at 31; Frawley, 2006 WL 1742738, at *3 & n.2;
Talbot, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39576, at *18-20 & n.10; Riddick,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5394, at *7 & n.3; Dean, 204 F.R.D. at 257;

sive litigiousness demonstrates his experience, the lack of
which is the reason for conferring the special status upon the
pro se litigant.57 The second rationale is that the pro se litigant’s excessive litigiousness is tainted with abuse (e.g., frivolousness or vexatiousness), warranting sanctions to curb
future abuses.58
Courts relying on the “experience” rationale look at a variety of factors in assessing whether or not the pro se litigant is
experienced. Most often, these factors include (1) the number
of previous federal or state court actions or appeals filed, and
(2) the recency or simultaneity of the actions or appeals.59
Courts relying on the “abusiveness” rationale also look at a
variety of factors in assessing whether a pro se litigant has
abused the legal system. Most often, these factors include (1)
whether the litigant’s previous actions, appeals and/or motions
were dismissed or denied, and, if so, whether they were so
wholly without merit as to indicate an intent to annoy or
harass,60 (2) whether the previous actions were related to the
subject matter of the current proceeding so as to indicate an
intent to litigate issues already decided,61 and (3) whether the
litigant has violated a rule of civil procedure or court rule,
especially after having been repeatedly advised of the rule so as
to indicate willful disobedience.62 Slightly more important
than the number of previous abuses appears to be the magnitude or severity of those abuses.63 In this regard, the rationale
contains a distinct punitive element, unlike the “experience”
rationale.64 For example, the “experience” rationale would
likely consider a previous dismissal or a violation of a procedural rule as a sign of inexperience, militating against the revocation of the pro se litigant’s special status.65

Santiago, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 670; McGann, 1999 WL 173596, at *2,
8-10; McClellan, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8164, at *3-4 & n.3;
Brown, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213, at *2 n.1.
60. See, e.g., Perry, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 624, 629-632; Douris, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1279, at *2-5; Weber, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 618, 622;
Wexler, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14992, at *4-13; Hollawell, 1994
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14139, at *1-3.
61. See, e.g., Tilbury, 2005 WL 3477558, at *1-5, 10-11; Hollis, 2005
WL 3077853, at *1, 9; Perry, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 624, 629-632;
Douris, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1279, at *2-5; Weber, 275 F. Supp.
2d at 618, 622; Wexler, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14992, at *4-13;
Cok, 877 F. Supp. at 799-801, 804.
62. See, e.g., Hollis, 2005 WL 3077853, at *4, 7-9; Litton Loan Serv.,
LP, 2005 WL 289927, at *1, 3 & n.7-8; Transam., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 324, at *2; Frempong, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113, at *2.
63. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc., 1995 WL 552881, at *2 (imposing
sanctions on pro se plaintiff after filing of only two actions or
appeals); Douris, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1279, at *2-5 (imposing
sanctions on pro se plaintiff after filing of only five federal court
actions).
64. See, e.g., Tilbury, 2005 WL 3477558, at *11; Hollis, 2005 WL
3077853, at *1, 12; Smith, 2005 WL 289927, at *3; Armstrong,
1999 WL 773507, at *2; Hollawell, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14139,
at *2.
65. See, e.g., Burge, 2006 WL 2805242, at *3 & n.4; Cady, 2004 WL
2032768, at *3 & n.8; cf. Bartelli v. “Tradesman” Fedak, 04-CV0407, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20043, at *5, 7 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 13,
2006).
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Generally, courts in the Second Circuit have applied the
“experience” rationale, while courts in the Third Circuit have
applied the “abusiveness” rationale, although there have been
some exceptions.66 Perhaps the most interesting (and instructive) such exception occurred in the winter of 2000 in the
Eastern District Pennsylvania. There, U.S. District Judge
Herbert J. Hutton faced a litigious pro se plaintiff named
Stephen Frempong-Atuahene, who had previously filed a
dozen lawsuits in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.67 In
two decisions, Judge Hutton revoked Frempong-Atuahene’s
special status on the ground that, because Frempong-Atuahene
was an experienced litigant, he was not in need of special status.68 However, by February, Judge Hutton’s patience had
apparently worn thin; continuing to revoke FrempongAtuahene’s special status, he based that revocation on the
ground that Frempong-Atuahene should be punished for abusing the judicial system.69 Perhaps this is the inevitable progression of a court’s experience of a particularly litigious pro se
litigant—liberal leniency, followed by strained patience, followed by downright frustration.
IV. FAIRNESS OF TREND

Is this revocation of special status fair? A litigious pro se litigant might advance a number of arguments in support of his
position that the revocation is unfair. First, he might argue
that he has a constitutional right (e.g., under the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) to use the courts with or
without counsel, that he needs to exercise that right in order to
remedy certain injustices (e.g., errors in the criminal justice
system, abuses in the nation’s overcrowded prisons, etc.), and
that the revocation of his special status constitutes retaliation
for exercising that right.70 Second, he might argue that,
through the denial of a lenient reading of his pleadings, he is

66. See, e.g., Iwachiw, 396 F.3d at 528-529 & n.1; Tibbetts, 2005 WL
2146079, at *7; Kutsa v. Calif. State College, 564 F.2d 108, 111 (3d
Cir. 1977); Transam., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 324, at *2 n.1, accord,
Frempong, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113, at *2 n.1.
67. See Transam., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 324, at *2 n.1.
68. See id., accord, Frempong, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113, at *2 n.1.
69. See City of Phila., 2000 WL 233216, at *3.
70. U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
. . . the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts
of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally.”); see, e.g., Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 80
(2d Cir. 1996).
71. See, e.g., Chavis v. Zodlow, 128 F. App’x 800, 803 & n.3 (2d Cir.
2005) (characterizing its prior holding in Davidson v. Flynn, 32
F.3d 27 [1994], as constituting an “endorse[ment] [of the application of] a heightened pleading standard with respect to a pro se
litigant who ‘at one point had at least 30 simultaneously pending
suits.’”).
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8; Jones v. Block, 127 S.Ct. 910, 919-920 (2007);
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002);
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narc. and Intell. Coord. Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
73. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (“three strikes” statute regarding
civil-rights litigation); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (habeas-corpus statute
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being subjected to a “heightened pleading standard,”71 which
runs afoul of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Supreme Court’s prohibition of heightened pleading standards.72 Third, he might argue that any abusive conduct by pro
se litigants is already being remedied by various statutes that
inhibit abusive conduct by pro se litigants (e.g., vexatious litigation statutes such as those in California, Connecticut,
Florida, Hawaii, and Texas).73
The opponents of an overly litigious pro se litigant would,
no doubt, have some rather predictable responses to these
arguments. With respect to the First Amendment argument,
they would probably argue that (1) requiring pro se litigants to
present their claims in compliance with the same rules
imposed on represented litigants does not deny the pro se litigants access to the courts, (2) the constitutional right of access
to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional (e.g., there
is no constitutional right to abuse the litigation process),74 and
(3) the causation element of a retaliation claim is missing
under the circumstances (since it is not the exercise of the pro
se litigant’s constitutional right that has caused the court to
revoke his special status but the fact that the pro se litigant is
experienced or abusive). With respect to the “heightened
pleading standard” argument, opponents of an overly litigious
pro se litigant would probably argue that, when the special status of an overly litigious pro se litigant is revoked, the litigant
is not being subjected to a “heightened pleading standard” but
to an ordinary pleading standard (i.e., instead of the lowered
pleading standard ordinarily conferred to pro se litigants due
to their usual inexperience).75 With respect to the argument
that abusive conduct by pro se litigants is being remedied by
reliance on various statutes that prohibit abusive conduct by
pro se litigants, opponents of an overly litigious pro se litigant
would probably argue that, in part because such statutes are so

providing for dismissal of “second or successive” applications); 28
U.S.C. § 1927 (federal vexatious litigation statute); CAL. CODE CIV.
PROC. § 391 (California’s vexatious litigation statute); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-568 (Connecticut’s vexatious litigation statute); FLA.
STAT. § 68.093 (Florida’s vexatious litigation statute); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 634J1-634J7 (Hawaii’s vexatious litigation statute);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.52 (Ohio’s vexatious litigation
statute); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 11.001 (Texas’
vexatious litigation statute).
74. See, e.g., Overton v. U.S., 03-CV-0092, 2004 WL 1005577, at *4
(W.D. Tex. March 29, 2004); Housley, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23049, at *12-13; Karr, 50 P.3d at 913-914; Vinson, 805 So.2d at
576; Spremo, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 1023-1024. Indeed, limiting an
abusive pro se litigant’s ability to further proceed pro se has been
construed, by some courts, as protecting the First Amendment
rights of other litigants. See, e.g., Hamilton, 945 So.2d at 11221123.
75. See Wolfe v. George, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
Opponents of an overly litigious pro se litigant would also probably argue that the Second Circuit’s characterization, in 2005, of
the denial of special status to an overly litigious pro se litigant as
an imposition of a “heightened pleading standard” was dictum,
and simply an unfortunate choice of words. See Chavis, 128 F.
App’x at 803 & n.3.

limited in scope, they often do not apply;76 furthermore, even
when they do apply, they do not always stop “repeat filers”
from continuing to file complaints.77
In addition, opponents of an overly litigious pro se litigant
would probably argue that, by infusing missing claims and
arguments into the papers of the overly litigious pro se litigant, courts are unfairly tipping the scales of justice against
the pro se litigant’s opponents and in favor of the pro se litigant, who is in fact either experienced or abusive.78 For
example, such opponents might point out that, with increasing frequency, the papers of “pro se” litigants are in fact being
“ghostwritten” by attorneys.79 As a result, they might
observe, as did one district court, that the result is that
“[undisclosed ghostwriting] necessarily causes the court to
apply the wrong tests in its decisional process . . . . The entire
process [is] skewed to the distinct disadvantage of the nonoffending party.”80 In addition, opponents of an overly litigious pro se litigant might point out that a pro se prisoner
litigant “may possess several distinct advantages over the ordinary litigant: time to draft multiple and prolonged pleadings;
ability to proceed in forma pauperis and thus escape any financial obstacles confronting the usual litigant; and availability of
free materials which the state must provide the prisoner,

including paper and postage.”81 They might also argue that
civilian pro se litigants are increasingly helped by online selfrepresentation resources,82 and that all pro se litigants are
increasingly helped by legal self-help books.83 Indeed, they
might argue that the end result of all of these advantages is
that, often, the papers prepared by an experienced pro se litigant are in many ways comparable to the papers prepared by
either inexperienced or time-pressed attorneys representing
the pro se litigant’s opponents.84
Similarly, all of the courts’ represented litigants might argue
that any conferral of special status to overly litigious pro se
litigants is unfair since it causes the resolution of their cases to
be delayed months, perhaps years, as judges (and their law
clerks) struggle with the papers of overly litigious pro se litigants in order to imagine every conceivable claim and argument they could have raised, stretching the courts’ limited
resources. This burden on the courts has been well documented, both anecdotally (e.g., through comments by judges
in decisions)85 and more formally (e.g., through surveys and
studies).86 The courts’ represented litigants might also point
out that, almost always, the represented litigants have paid the
courts’ costly filing fees,87 while, almost always, the overly litigious pro se litigants have not paid those fees, having been

76. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see, e.g., Jennings v. Natrona County Det.
Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 778-779 (10th Cir. 1999);
Freeman v. Lee, 30 F. Supp. 2d 52, 54 (D.D.C. 1998); Perry, 371 F.
Supp. 2d at 629; Hollis, 2005 WL 3077853, at *9.
77. See Rosenbloom, supra note 28, at 354.
78. See Case, supra note 11, at 735-740; James M. McCauley,
Unbundling Legal Services: The Ethics of “Ghostwriting” Pleadings
for Pro Se Litigants, 2004 PROF. LAW 59, 59 (2004); Jona
Goldschmidt, In Defense of Ghostwriting, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1145, 1148 (Feb. 2002); Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due Process
Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 671-673
(Spring 1988).
79. See Lauren A. Weeman, Current Developments 2005-2006: Bending
the (Ethical) Rules in Arizona: Ethics Opinion 05-06’s Approval of
Undisclosed Ghostwriting May Be a Sign of Things to Come, 19 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1041 (Summer 2006); Anthony Zapata,
Legal “Ghostwriting” in Indiana: An Analysis, 49 RES GESTAE 20, 20
(Sept. 2005); Mark Hansen, Helping Self-Helpers, 90 A.B.A.J. 72,
72 (Sept. 2004); Goldschmidt, supra note 78, at 1146;
Rothermich, supra note 14, at 2689.
80. Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231 (D.
Colo. 1994); see also Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th
Cir. 2001); Laremont-Lopez v. Se. Tidewater Opportunity Ctr.,
968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997); McCauley, supra note 78,
at 59; Goldschmidt, supra note 78, at 1148.
81. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1986).
82. See Weeman, supra note 79, at 1048; see, e.g., Le Parker, The
Manual for the Litigant Filing Without Counsel (2d ed. 1997)
http://www.id.uscourts.gov/pro-se.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2007).
83. See, e.g., PAUL BERGMAN, REPRESENT YOURSELF IN COURT: HOW TO
PREPARE & TRY A WINNING CASE (Nolo 5th ed. 2006); A JAILHOUSE
LAWYER’S MANUAL: VOLS. I AND II (Columbia Hum. Rts. Law Rev.
6th ed. 2005); RODERIC DUNCAN, WIN YOUR LAWSUIT: A JUDGE’S
GUIDE TO REPRESENTING YOURSELF IN CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT
(Nolo 2d ed. 2005); L. POWELL BELANGER, THE PRISONER’S GUIDE TO

SURVIVAL: A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF AND PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS (PSI Pub.,
Inc., 2001); DANIEL E. MANVILLE, PRISONERS’ SELF-HELP LITIGATION
MANUAL (Oceana Pubs., 3d ed. 1995).
84. See Case, supra note 11, at 737 (“While a pro se litigant is not necessarily on equal terms with a litigant who is well represented, he
may well be on such terms with a litigant who is poorly represented.”) [citations omitted]; cf. Wechsler v. R. D. Mgmt. Corp.,
861 F. Supp. 1153, 1157 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“It is hardly an unwarranted leap in logic to extend the command of solicitude [ordinarily afforded to pro se litigants] to a party represented by a less
than adequate lawyer who has failed to plead an absolute defense
or an incontrovertible cause of action.”).
85. See, e.g., Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986);
Urban v. U.N., 768 F.2d 1497, 1499-1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Tilbury, 2005 WL 3477558, at *10; Hollis, 2005 WL 3077853, at
*9; Weber, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 622; Culp v. Phila. Newsp. & Mag.
Empl. Union, 92-CV-0054, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19329, at *1113 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 1992); Mallon v. Padova, 806 F. Supp. 1186,
1187 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
86. See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 28, at 306 n.7; Hon. Sharon E.
Grubin & Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Report of the Second Circuit
Task Force on Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts,
1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 11, 85 (1997); Russell Engler, And Justice
for All–Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revising the Roles of the
Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2056
n.308 (1999); Junda Woo, The Lawyerless: More People Represent
Themselves in Court, But Is Justice Served? WALL ST. J., at A1 (Aug.
17, 1993); Zapata, supra note 79, at 20; Sean Munger, Bill Clinton
Bugged My Brain!: Delusional Claims in Federal Courts, 72 TUL. L.
REV. 1809, 1820 & n.59 (May 1998).
87. For example, as of the date of publication of this article, the
national federal-court filing fees are as follows: $455 in the courts
of appeals (raised from $250 on April 9, 2006), and $350 in the
district courts (raised from $250 on April 9, 2006).
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granted in forma pauperis status.88 Thus, the courts’ represented litigants would probably argue that, in terms of time
and money, the courts’ “paying customers” are shouldering
much of the cost imposed by pro se litigation.89
For these reasons, it appears that, based on a balancing of
the equities, the revocation of special status in the case of
overly litigious pro se litigants is generally fair. As one federal
district court judge noted more than 20 years ago, “[T]here
must come a point at which the solicitude owed the justice
system must (like a supply-demand curve) rise to, intersect
and surpass the obligation owed a persistent litigant such as
[plaintiff].”90
V.

PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR COURTS AND
PRACTITIONERS

When courts and practitioners are considering whether the
special status of a particularly litigious pro se litigant should be
revoked, they might want to keep four points in mind. First,
because the “experience” rationale is remedial in nature and
not punitive, it is generally a more narrowly tailored solution
to the problems posed by a pro se litigant’s litigiousness than is
the “abusiveness” rationale. Again, when relying on the “experience” rationale, courts are simply taking away a court-conferred litigation advantage after finding that the advantage is
no longer necessary. Conversely, when relying on the “abusiveness” rationale, courts are punishing an overly litigious pro
se litigant in a way that is often not directly related to the reason for the punishment. There are a number of sanctions that
may be more directly related to an abusive litigant’s particular

88. See Rosenbloom, supra note 28, at 324-325.
89. See, e.g., Iwachiw, 396 F.3d at 529; Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261;
Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990); Procup,
792 F.2d at 1074; City of Buffalo, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6070, at
*16.
90. Antonelli v. Burnham, 582 F. Supp. 1067, 1069 n.4 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
91. Among these sanctions may be the following: (1) refusing to
extend a procedural deadline (if the litigant’s abuses have to do
with procedural delays); (2) treating designated facts as established for purposes of the action, refusing to allow the litigant to
support or oppose designated claims, prohibiting the litigant from
introducing designated matters in evidence, or drawing an inference adverse to the litigant (if the litigant’s abuses have to do with
the discovery process); and (3) striking part of the litigant’s
motion papers or opposition papers (if the litigant’s abuses have
to do with the filing of frivolous or improper motion papers or
opposition papers).
92. See, e.g., Eggersdorf, 8 F. App’x at 143 (denying leniency to pro se
inmate who had 12 simultaneously pending lawsuits in N.D.N.Y.);
Gummerson, 201 F.3d at *2 (denying leniency to pro se inmate
who had 12 simultaneously pending lawsuits in N.D.N.Y.);
Talbot, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39576, at *18-20 & n.10 (denying
leniency to pro se inmate who had filed 20 lawsuits in N.D.N.Y.);
Riddick, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5394, at *7 & n.3 (denying
leniency to pro se inmate who had filed 20 lawsuits in N.D.N.Y.).
93. See, e.g., Santiago, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 670 (denying leniency to pro
se inmate who had 10 lawsuits pending in S.D.N.Y.); Saunders,
2006 WL 3051792, at *2 & n.11 (denying leniency to pro se
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abuses than is the revocation of his special status.91
Furthermore, courts’ application of the “abusiveness” rationale
often ignores the fact that the pro se litigant remains (despite
his abusiveness) in need of special treatment because of his
inexperience. As a result, it appears that, generally, using an
“experience” rationale is preferable to using an “abusiveness”
rationale, when a choice exists between the two. (A conceivable example of when such a choice might not exist is when a
pro se litigant has filed dozens of frivolous actions in a court,
necessitating an order barring him from again proceeding pro
se in that court without prior leave of the court.)
Second, there is, of course, no formula for determining
“How many cases is too many?” However, it appears that, generally, the magic number is about a dozen.92 Granted, there are
some cases revoking the special status of a pro se litigant who
has filed fewer than a dozen cases.93 However, there appear to
be more cases refusing to revoke the special status of a pro se
litigant who has filed fewer than a dozen cases.94 Interestingly,
this de facto “rule of twelve” is consistent with the California
Code of Civil Procedure, which declines to extend a reduction
in small-claims-court filing fees to those litigants who have
filed more than 12 small-claims lawsuits in the state within the
previous 12 months.95
Third, when employing the “experience” rationale for
revoking special status, courts need not myopically view what
factors indicate whether a pro se litigant is “experienced.” As
explained earlier, when assessing such experience, courts usually look at the number of federal and state court actions and
appeals the pro se litigant has previously filed, as well as the

inmate who had previously filed eight federal court actions or
appeals); McClellan, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8164, at *3-4 & n.3
(denying leniency to pro se inmate who had filed seven previous
lawsuits against prison officials); Brown, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
213, at *2 n.1 (denying leniency to pro se inmate who had seven
lawsuits pending in W.D.N.Y.).
94. See, e.g., McEachin v. Faruki, 03-CV-1442, 2006 WL 721570, at *2
n.3 (N.D.N.Y. March 20, 2006) (refusing to deny leniency to pro
se inmate who had filed 11 other federal lawsuits since 2000);
Pritchett v. Portoundo, 03-CV-0378, 2005 WL 2179398, at *2 n.3
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2005) (refusing to deny leniency to pro se
inmate who had filed eight other federal lawsuits since 1996);
Burke v. Seitz, 01-CV-1396, 2006 WL 383513, at *2 n.5 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 13, 2006) (refusing to deny leniency to pro se inmate who
had filed six other federal lawsuits in previous nine years); Ariola
v. Onondaga County Sher. Dep’t, 04-CV-1262, 2007 WL 119453,
at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2007) (refusing to deny leniency to pro se
inmate who had previously filed five actions or appeals in federal
or state court); Smith, 2006 WL 2805242, at *3 & n.4 (refusing to
deny leniency to pro se inmate who had filed five other lawsuits);
Loren v. Feerick, 97-CV-3975, 1997 WL 441939, at *1 & n.9
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 1997) (continuing to afford special status to pro
se litigant who had filed five previous actions in state or federal
court regarding current matter); Abbas v. Senkowski, 03-CV-0476,
2005 WL 2179426, at *2 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2005) (continuing to afford special status to pro se inmate who had filed three
other federal actions since 1997).
95. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 116.230 (2006).

recency or simultaneity of the actions and appeals.96 However,
some courts also look at the pro se litigant’s effectiveness in litigating the action(s) or appeal(s) in question. Specifically,
these courts typically examine things such as (1) the quality of
pleadings (e.g., whether they are typed, crafted in accordance
with the relevant rules of civil procedure, etc.), (2) the cogency
of motion papers (e.g., whether they are supported by applicable legal authorities, filed in accordance with court rules, etc.),
and (3) the ultimate success of any motions, actions or appeals
the litigant has previously filed (or the failure of any motions
previously opposed).97 Such a practice seems appropriate in
that it is consistent with the standard often used by courts to
decide whether to appoint counsel to a pro se litigant.98 Such
a practice seems appropriate also as a matter of common sense.
Is there a better indicator of experience than skill?
Finally, when applying the “experience” rationale, courts
need not treat special status as an “all or nothing” benefit.
Courts may confer special status to a pro se litigant on a “sliding scale,” treating the litigant more leniently than other represented litigants but not as leniently as inexperienced pro se
litigants.99 Similarly, courts may limit the conferral of the
benefit, or the denial of the benefit, to the particular motion or
stage of the proceeding in question. Doing this would help
mitigate any deleterious effect of mistakenly concluding that a
pro se litigant is experienced when in fact he has simply been
helped by a ghostwriter on a particular occasion.100

the problems posed by a pro se litigant’s excessive litigiousness
than does the “abusiveness” rationale. Second, while there is
no formula for determining “How many cases is too many?”
generally the magic number appears to be about 12. Third,
when using the “experience” rationale for revoking a pro se
litigant’s special status, courts should not look simply at the
number of actions and appeals the pro se litigant has previously filed, and the recency or simultaneity of those actions
and appeals; courts should look also at the pro se litigant’s
effectiveness in previously litigating the actions and appeals.
Finally, when applying the “experience” rationale, courts
should not fall into the trap of believing that special status is
an “all or nothing” benefit: rather, it may be conferred on a
“sliding scale,” and it may be revoked for a discrete phase of
the litigation. By keeping these points in mind, courts may
more easily balance the need of pro se litigants to special treatment against the right of represented litigants to a playing field
that is level and justice that is swift.

VI. CONCLUSION

One of the reasons for the trend’s occurrence in the Third
Circuit appears to be district courts’ frustration with a handful
of particularly abusive pro se litigants complaining about lending practices in the Philadelphia area in the past decade, while
the main reason the trend’s occurrence in the Second Circuit
appears to be an increase in the skill of pro se inmate litigants
due an effort to educate them by the prison system and federal
district courts in New York State. This difference in these reasons for the trend mirrors the difference in the underlying
rationales for the trend: (1) that the pro se litigant’s excessive
litigiousness is tainted with abuse, warranting sanctions to
curb future abuses; and (2) that the pro se litigant’s excessive
litigiousness demonstrates his experience, the lack of which is
the reason for conferring special status onto him. Regardless
of which rationale is used, the practice is generally fair.
However, courts and practitioners might want to keep four
points in mind when wrestling with the issue of whether the
special status of an overly litigious pro se litigant should be
revoked.
First, the “experience” rationale for the revocation of special status appears to be a more narrowly tailored solution to

96. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Saunders, 2006 WL 3051792, at *2 & n.11; Sekendur,
2004 WL 2434220, at *5; cf. Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322
(7th Cir. 1993).
98. See, e.g., Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986);
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-156 (3d Cir. 1993); Farmer, 990
F.2d at 322; Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991);
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Long v. Shillinger, 927 F.2d 525, 527 (10th Cir. 1991).
99. See, e.g., Holsey v. Bass, 519 F. Supp. 395, 407 n.27 (D. Md. 1981);
Kilkenny v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 05-CV-6578, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23399, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006); Bradlow, supra note
78, at 660.
100. See supra note 79 and accompanying next.
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Recent Criminal Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court:
The 2005-2006 Term
Charles Whitebread

I

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the majority in United
States v. Grubbs,1 which held that anticipatory warrants do not
violate the Fourth Amendment so long as there is probable
cause to believe that contraband or evidence of crime will be
found in a particular place when the warrant is executed.
Justices Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg concurred in part but
believed the court erred when it held that an anticipatory warrant does not need to state the contingency intended by the
magistrate to trigger authorization.
Jeffrey Grubbs purchased a child pornography videotape
from a Web site run by an undercover postal inspector. The
Postal Inspection Service arranged for a controlled delivery of
the videotape to Grubbs’s residence and applied for a search
warrant proposing that the search warrant would not be executed “unless and until the parcel has been received by a person(s) and has been physically taken into the residence.” The
magistrate judge issued the warrant and the controlled delivery proceeded. The postal inspectors executed the warrant,
giving Grubbs a copy of the warrant, which included two
attachments that described the places to be searched and the
things to be seized, but not the affidavit that explained when
the warrant would be executed. Grubbs moved to exclude the
evidence, arguing the warrant was invalid because it failed to
list the triggering condition. The district court denied the
motion and the Ninth Circuit reversed.
The Court begins its analysis by concluding that anticipatory
warrants are not categorically unconstitutional. Most anticipatory warrants have conditions precedent to their execution and,
if executed before that condition occurs, “probable cause has

not yet been satisfied when the warrant is issued.” The Court
rejects the argument, however, that this condition precedent
makes anticipatory warrants a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. According to the Court, “[p]robable cause exists
when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular place.” Therefore, all warrants are “anticipatory” because the requirement of probable
cause focuses on whether evidence will be discovered “when
the search is conducted.” The Fourth Amendment only calls
for two additional requirements for anticipatory warrants to be
valid: (1) “if the triggering condition occurs there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place”; and (2) “that there is probable cause that the
triggering condition will occur.”
The majority also believes that the Fourth Amendment does
not require the anticipatory warrant to specify the triggering
condition. The Fourth Amendment “specifies only two matters that must be ‘particularly described’ in the warrant: the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
The Court declines to expand these requirements to include
the conditions precedent to the execution of a warrant.
In Georgia v. Randolph,2 a 5-3 Court held that even if a cooccupant consents to a warrantless search, if the other occupant is present and expressly denies the police permission to
enter the premises, the search is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. Justice Souter delivered the opinion
while Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas
filed dissenting opinions. Justice Alito took no part in the
decision.
Respondent’s wife called police to complain about a domestic dispute. She also accused her husband of using cocaine.
Respondent’s wife consented to a search of the house while
respondent, who was present, expressly refused the police permission to enter. The police found a drinking straw with
cocaine residue. Respondent’s wife subsequently withdrew her
consent, but the police obtained a warrant and searched the
house. They found further evidence of drugs and respondent
was indicted for possession of cocaine.
Respondent moved to suppress the evidence as products of
a warrantless search. The trial court denied the motion stating
that respondent’s wife had “common authority to consent to
the search.” The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed and the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, stating that “the consent to
conduct a warrantless search of a residence given by one occu-

Footnotes
1. 126 S.Ct. 1494 (2006).

2. 126 S.Ct. 1515 (2006).

n this term, as in the previous one, the United States
Supreme Court reasserted the rule of law in the context of
the detainees in the war on terror. At the same time, however, the addition of two new justices shifted the Court’s ideological balance to the right. In terms of criminal cases, the
Court handed down a mixed bag of decisions. It was a bad
term for Fourth Amendment claimants with the government
prevailing in four of five search-and-seizure cases. Outside the
context of the Fourth Amendment, however, criminal defendants fared a little better.
In this article, I review some of the Court’s decisions in the
criminal context. In a separate article, I review some of the
Court’s decisions in the civil context.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
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pant is not valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant
who is physically present at the scene to permit a warrantless
search.” The state supreme court found the case of United
States v. Matlock3 distinguishable because Matlock did not
address the scenario where the co-occupant was at the scene
and expressly denied consent to a search.
The Supreme Court agrees. Warrantless searches of a person’s house are “unreasonable per se” with “one jealously and
carefully drawn exception…consent of an individual possessing authority.” That consent can be given by “a fellow occupant who shares common authority over property, when the
suspect is absent.” The Court does not believe, however, that
consent by a co-occupant to a warrantless search should
extend to situations where the householder is present and
refuses to give consent. As evident in Matlock, Fourth
Amendment rights are not limited by laws of property but are
heavily influenced by “widely shared social expectations.”
The Court starts with the assumption that without any recognized hierarchy, for example, a parent and child relationship,
there is no “common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes
of another, whether the issue is the color of the curtains or invitations to outsiders.” It concludes that “the co-tenant wishing
to open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in
law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting cotenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police
officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the
officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.”
In light of its decision, the Court feels it must discuss
Matlock, where the tenant was in a squad car not far away, and
Illinois v. Rodriguez,4 where the tenant was asleep in his room.
The Court does not want to undercut the holdings in those
cases by its decision and admits it is drawing a fine line.
However, it finds this line justified. It adds that the police cannot remove the objector for the sake of avoiding a possible
objection, but that police are not required to seek out possible
objectors as this would be impractical and “would needlessly
limit the capacity of the police to respond to ostensibly legitimate opportunities in the field.”
Chief Justice Roberts dissents, stating that the “Court creates constitutional law by surmising what is typical when a
social guest encounters an entirely atypical situation.” He
believes the Court’s precedent clearly establishes that “[i]f an
individual shares information, papers, or places with another,
he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share
access to that information or those papers or places with the
government.” Under the Fourth Amendment, the test is
whether the search is unreasonable, not whether consent is
given. Justice Scalia also dissents. He argues that the issue is
not that neither the wife nor husband is master over the other,
but what to do when there is a “conflict between two equals.”
Justice Thomas, also dissenting, finds that Coolidge v. New
Hampshire5 is controlling in this case. In Coolidge, the Court
held that no Fourth Amendment search occurs where “the

spouse of an accused volunBrigham City v.
tarily leads the police to
Stewart . . . held
potential evidence of wrongdoing.”
that police have
In Brigham City v. Stuart,6
an objectively
a unanimous Court held that
reasonable basis
police have an objectively
reasonable basis for entering for entering a home
a home without a warrant
without a warrant
when they see an occupant
when they see an
of the home is seriously
occupant of the
injured or imminently
threatened with serious
home is seriously
injury. In Brigham, police
injured . . . .
responded to a call regarding
a loud party at a residence.
When they arrived, they heard shouting inside and proceeded
up the driveway to investigate. They saw two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard and, through the screen door and windows, saw an altercation between four adults and one juvenile
taking place in the kitchen. The police opened the door to the
kitchen and announced their presence. Nobody noticed so the
police entered the kitchen and announced their presence
again. Respondents were arrested and charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and
intoxication. Respondents moved to suppress all evidence
arguing that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari “in light of differences
among state courts and the Courts of Appeals concerning the
appropriate Fourth Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation.”
While warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable, “the exigencies of the situation” may
make “the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” One exigency “is the need to assist persons who
are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” The
Court reiterates that when determining if an emergency situation exists, making warrantless entry reasonable, the circumstances must be viewed objectively. In this case, “the officers
were confronted with ongoing violence within the home.” The
Court believes that “the officers had an objectively reasonable
basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help
and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning.”
The Court also concludes that the “manner of the officers’
entry was also reasonable.” In these circumstances, the officer’s announcement after he opened the door but prior to
entering was equivalent to and satisfied the knock-andannounce rule. The Court states, “once the announcement
was made, the officers were free to enter; it would serve no
purpose to require them to stand dumbly at the door awaiting
a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to their
presence.”

3. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
4. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).

5. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
6. 126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006).
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Samson v. California
. . . held that the
Fourth Amendment
does not bar a
police officer from
conducting a
suspicionless search
of a parolee.

Justice Stevens filed a
short concurrence in which
he calls this “an odd flyspeck of a case.” He writes
that the only difficult question is what is “most peculiar”: (1) that the state
courts found a Fourth
Amendment violation; (2)
that the case was pursued
all the way to the Supreme
Court; or (3) that the Court

granted certiorari.
The Court held in Hudson v. Michigan7 that exclusion is not
a remedy for violation of the knock-and-announce rule.
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of a five-member majority
and an opinion in part. Justice Kennedy concurred in part and
in the judgment, while Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented.
In this case, police obtained a warrant to search petitioner’s
home for drugs and firearms. When they arrived, the police
announced their presence but only waited about three to five
seconds before entering. Petitioner moved to exclude the evidence found during the search, “arguing that the premature
entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights.” The trial court
granted the motion, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed.
Hudson was convicted and renewed his claim on appeal.
Since respondent concedes a violation of the knock-andannounce rule, the Court focuses only on a remedy for the violation. The Court writes that “[s]uppression of evidence...has
always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” It is
“applicable only where its remedial objectives are thought
most efficaciously served,…that is, where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.” The Court clarifies
its approach by stating that “exclusion may not be premised on
the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’
cause of obtaining evidence.” Instead, the more appropriate
question in such a case is “whether granting establishment of
the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection
is made, has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint.” This attenuation can occur when the
causal connection is remote and, “even given a direct causal
connection, the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.”
The warrant requirement shields individuals and their property from government scrutiny. The Court has held that
“[e]xclusion of the evidence obtained by a warrantless search
vindicates that entitlement.” However, the Court believes the
interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement
are different. The latter protects human life and limb, “because
an unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed selfdefense by the surprised resident,” property from being

7. 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006).
8. 126 S.Ct. 2193 (2006).
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destroyed by a destructive entry, and “those elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance,”
for example, by giving individuals time to dress. It concludes
that applying the exclusionary rule to a violation of the knockand-announce rule does not vindicate these interests.
In addition, the Court believes the deterrence benefits do
not outweigh the social costs. It finds the costs here considerable. The costs include not only “the grave adverse consequences that exclusion of relevant incriminating evidence
always entails,” but also would result in a flood of challenges
regarding alleged failures to follow the rule. In addition, the
Court believes that applying the exclusionary rule would result
in police “refraining from timely entry,” which may result in
such things as violence against officers or destruction of evidence. At the same time, the Court concludes that the “deterrence benefits” do not amount to much. While a violation of
the knock-and-announce rule might occasionally lead to the
discovery of otherwise undiscoverable evidence, ignoring the
rule primarily achieves nothing other than “the prevention of
destruction of evidence and the avoidance of life-threatening
resistance by occupants of the premises–dangers which, if
there is even ‘reasonable suspicion’ of their existence, suspend
the knock-and-announce requirement anyway.”
Justice Breyer dissents because the Court’s opinion
“destroys the strongest legal incentive to comply with the
Constitution’s knock-and-announce requirement.” Justice
Breyer also believes the majority opinion is a significant departure from the Court’s precedent, and “weakens, perhaps
destroys, much of the practical value of the Constitution’s
knock-and-announce protection.”
In Samson v. California,8 a 6-3 Court, in an opinion written
by Justice Thomas, held the Fourth Amendment does not bar
a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a
parolee. Petitioner was on parole in California when he was
stopped and searched without a warrant or probable cause.
The search was conducted pursuant to California Penal Code
section 3067(a), which authorizes a warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee. The officer conducting the search
found a plastic baggie containing methamphetamine and petitioner was charged with possession. The trial court denied
petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that section 3067(a) “authorized the search and that the search was
not arbitrary or capricious.” Petitioner was convicted and the
conviction was affirmed on appeal.
The Court begins by conducting a Fourth Amendment
analysis, examining the “‘totality of the circumstances’ to
determine whether a search is reasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.” The Court states, “[w]hether a
search is reasonable is determined by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” The Court
mentions that it recently applied this approach in United State
v. Knights,9 where it determined that a California law subject-

9. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).

ing a probationer to a warrantless search was reasonable. In
Knights, the Court determined (1) that a probationer’s expectation of privacy was significantly diminished due to his status
as a probationer, and (2) that the law was necessary to promote
legitimate governmental interests, mainly the dual interests of
“integrating probationers back into the community and combating recidivism.”
Applying the same analysis, the Court believes that a
parolee has even less of an expectation of privacy than a probationer because parolees “are on the continuum of stateimposed punishments.” In addition, the Court finds salient, as
it did in Knights, that “the parole search condition under
California law…was clearly expressed to petitioner;” he
“signed an order submitting to the condition and thus was
unambiguously aware of it.” The Court also finds, as it did in
Knights, that the state’s interests are substantial. The state’s
interests in reducing recidivism and promoting reintegration in
society “warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise
be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment.” The Court looks
at empirical evidence regarding recidivism to support its conclusion.
SIXTH AMENDMENT

In Washington v. Recuenco,10 Justice Thomas delivered the
opinion of a 7-2 Court, which held that a Blakely error is subject to a harmless-error analysis. Respondent threatened his
wife with a handgun. He was charged with second-degree
assault, which is defined under Washington law as “intentional
assault…with a deadly weapon.” The trial court used a special-verdict form “that directed the jury to make a specific finding whether respondent was armed with a deadly weapon at
the time of the commission of the crime.” There was nothing
on the form, however, that identified the deadly weapon as a
handgun. The jury returned a guilty verdict. At sentencing,
the trial court determined that respondent qualified for, and
imposed, the three-year firearm enhancement instead of the
one-year deadly weapon enhancement.
Before the Washington Supreme Court heard respondent’s
appeal, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey11
and Blakely v. Washington.12 In Apprendi, the Court held that,
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, “[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” In Blakely,
the Court held that “the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on
the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant.” The Washington Supreme Court held that
a Sixth Amendment violation occurred. It also determined
that a harmless-error analysis did not apply.
The Court states that it has “repeatedly recognized that the
commission of a constitutional error at trial alone does not enti-

10. 126 S.Ct. 2546 (2006).
11. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
12. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
13. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).

tle a defendant to automatic
Washington v.
reversal.” Only a “structural”
error, an error that “necessarily Recuenco . . . held
renders a criminal trial fundathat a Blakely
mentally unfair or an unreliable error is subject to
vehicle for determining guilt or
a harmless-error
innocence,” requires automatic
reversal. Relying on its decianalysis.
sion in Neder v. United States,13
the Court concludes that a Blakely error is not a structural error.
In Neder, the district court failed to instruct the jury on an element of the crime. The Court held that a harmless-error analysis applied “because an instruction that omits an element of the
offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or
innocence.” The Court believes this case is indistinguishable
from Neder because its decision in Apprendi makes clear that
elements of a crime and sentencing factors are “treated the same
for Sixth Amendment purposes.”
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg filed dissenting opinions.
Justice Stevens believes that even if the Court had the power to
decide this case, there was no reason it should since the
Washington Supreme Court can set its own standards for this
type of error. He also states that the Court did not address
respondent’s strongest argument: “that Blakely errors are structural because they deprive criminal defendants of sufficient
notice regarding the charges they must defend against.” Justice
Ginsburg believes that no error occurred during trial. The
prosecutor proceeded under the theory of assault with a deadly
weapon and the jury rendered a guilty verdict as requested.
According to Justice Ginsburg, “[t]he harmless-error doctrine
was not designed to allow dislodgment of that error-free jury
determination.”
In Davis v. Washington,14 the Court considered the companion cases of Davis v. Washington15 and Hammon v. Indiana.16 An
8-1 Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Scalia, held that
statements made during a 911 call are non-testimonial, and not
covered by the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,
when objective circumstances show that the interrogation by
police is necessary to assist in an ongoing emergency. However,
statements made to the police are testimonial when there is no
ongoing emergency and objective circumstances show the primary purpose of the interrogation is to gather evidence for
later criminal prosecution.
In Davis, Michelle McCottry made numerous statements to
a 911 operator who had determined that McCottry was
involved in a domestic disturbance with her former boyfriend,
Adrian Davis. McCottry did not testify at Davis’s trial so, to
establish McCottry’s injuries were caused by Davis, the prosecution, over Davis’s objections, used the 911 tapes. Davis was
convicted and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.
In Hammon, police responded to a reported domestic dis-

14. 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006).
15. No. 05-5224.
16. No. 05-5705.
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turbance call.
Amy
Hammon admitted and
signed an affidavit to the
effect that her husband
physically assaulted her.
Amy did not testify at trial
and, over petitioner’s
objections, an officer testified to what Amy told him
that night and authenticated Amy’s affidavit.
Petitioner was convicted
and his conviction was
affirmed on appeal. The
Indiana Supreme Court
determined that “Amy’s
statement was admissible
for state-law purposes as
an excited utterance” and
was not testimonial under Sixth Amendment standards. It did,
however, determine that the affidavit was testimonial and inadmissible, but found its erroneous admission harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides: “In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to
be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In Crawford v.
Washington,17 the Court held that the Confrontation Clause
bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did
not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”
A critical component of this holding is the definition of “testimonial statements” because the Confrontation Clause only
applies to witnesses who make testimonial statements. In
Crawford, the Court identifies “statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations” as testimonial. However,
the Court did not have to establish what kind of police interrogations produce testimony.
Without producing an “exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements,” the Court holds that “[s]tatements are
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency.” However, statements are testimonial “when the circumstances objectively indicate that
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” In
Crawford, the Court recognized that the Confrontation Clause
“applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused–in other words,
those who bear testimony.” In turn, “[t]estimony,…is typically
a solemn declaration of affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact.” Therefore, an “accuser
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark
to an acquaintance does not.”

As to a 911 call, the Court believes it “is ordinarily not
designed primarily to ‘establish or prove’ some past fact, but to
describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.”
The Court views McCottry’s statements as speaking to events
as they occurred and that McCottry was facing an ongoing
emergency. In addition, the Court concludes that, viewed
objectively, “the elicited statements were necessary to be able
to resolve the present emergency.” The Court concludes that
while a 911 call may become testimonial, “the circumstances
of McCottry’s interrogation objectively indicate its primary
purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency.” She was not a “witness” or in the act of “testifying.”
As to Hammon, the Court believes the statements are “not
much different from the statements we found to be testimonial
in Crawford.” The Court writes, “[i]t is entirely clear from the
circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct—as, indeed, the testifying officer expressly acknowledged.” While it is true that the
interrogation in Crawford was much more formal, that difference only makes it more objectively apparent that the statements obtained were testimonial in nature; it does not change
the characterization of the statements made in Hammon.
Although the Court implicitly rejects the Indiana Supreme
Court’s implication that “virtually any initial inquiries at the
crime scene will not be testimonial…[it] do[es] not hold the
opposite—that no questions at the scene will yield nontestimonial answers.” As the Court already indicated, the police
might need to obtain answers to “assess the situation, the
threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential
victim.”
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment in part and dissents in part. He believes that the Court has adopted a test as
equally unpredictable as that abandoned by Crawford. Instead
of requiring courts to divine the primary purpose of police
interrogations, Justice Thomas would focus instead on what
type of statements qualify as testimonial: those include “extrajudicial statements…contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confession.” He believes that neither the 911 call nor the statements made by Amy to the police are testimonial.
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,18 Justice Scalia, writing
for a 5-4 Court, held that the denial of a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to private counsel based on the erroneous
disqualification of counsel requires automatic reversal.
Respondent was charged with conspiracy to distribute marijuana. His family hired John Fahle to represent him. After the
arraignment, respondent hired Joseph Low, an attorney from
California. The trial court denied Low’s numerous motions for
admission pro hoc vice on the grounds that Low violated Rule
4-4.2, which prohibits a lawyer from contacting a represented
client directly without consent of counsel. The district court
determined that Low’s contact with respondent was made
without consent by Fahle. During trial, respondent was represented by local counsel Karl Dickhause and was convicted.

17. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

18. 126 S.Ct. 2557 (2006).

“Statements are
nontestimonial when
made in the
course of police
interrogation under
circumstances
objectively indicating
that the primary
purpose . . . is to
enable police
assistance to meet
an ongoing
emergency.”
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The Eighth Circuit reversed after it determined that the district court erred in interpreting Rule 4-4.2. It then concluded
that because of this error, the district court “violated respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of his choosing.”
It held that the violation was not subject to harmless-error
review. The Supreme Court agrees.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to counsel. The Court has previously interpreted this
guarantee as including “the right of a defendant who does not
require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him.”
The Court does not believe, as argued by the government,
“that the Sixth Amendment violation is not ‘complete’ unless
the defendant can show that substitute counsel was ineffective
within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington,19—i.e., that
substitute counsel’s performance was deficient and the defendant was prejudiced by it.” Nor does it believe “that the defendant must at least demonstrate that his counsel of choice
would have pursued a different strategy that would have created a reasonable probability that…the result of the proceedings would have been different.” The Court writes that “the
Government’s argument in effect reads the Sixth Amendment
as a more detailed version of the Due Process Clause—and
then proceeds to give no effect to the details.” The purpose of
the Sixth Amendment is ultimately to provide a fair trial; however, “it does not follow that the rights can be disregarded so
long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.”
Following this same line of reasoning, the Court also held
that this error is not subject to review for harmlessness. The
Court cites to Arizona v. Fulminante,20 where it divided constitutional errors into two classes: (1) “‘trial error,’ because the
errors occurred during presentation of the case to the jury and
their effect may be quantitatively assessed in the context of
other evidence presented in order to determine whether [they
were] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”; and (2) “structural defects” that “defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards
because they affect the framework within which the trial proceeds, and are not simply an error in the trial process itself.”
The Court has little difficulty in concluding that the deprivation of counsel of one’s choice is a structural error. The Court
again rejects the government’s attempt to compare this type of
error with ineffective assistance of counsel.
EIGHTH AMENDMENT

In Oregon v. Guzek,21 the Court determined that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments do not provide a criminal defendant with the right to introduce new evidence of innocence at
a sentencing hearing. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of
the Court while Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito took no
part in the decision.
Respondent was convicted of capital murder and sentenced
to death. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the

19. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
20. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
21. 126 S.Ct. 1226 (2006).
22. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).

conviction but remanded
Oregon v. Guzek . . .
for a new sentencing heardetermined that
ing. Guzek was sentenced
to death two more times
the Eighth and
and each time the Oregon
Fourteenth
Supreme Court ordered a
new sentencing hearing. Amendments do not
When the case was before
provide a criminal
it a fourth time, the
defendant with the
Oregon Supreme Court,
right to introduce
“[s]eeking to avoid further
new evidence of
errors…also addressed the
admissibility of certain eviinnocence at a
dence Guzek [sought] to
sentencing hearing.
introduce at that proceeding, including live testimony from his mother about his alibi.” This type of evidence
falls into the category of “residual doubt” evidence as it goes
toward whether the defendant committed the crime as
opposed to his or her role in the crime. The Oregon Supreme
Court held “that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments provide Guzek a federal constitutional right to introduce this evidence at his upcoming sentencing proceeding.”
The Supreme Court does not agree. The Court distinguishes the cases relied on by the Oregon Supreme Court. In
Lockett v. Ohio,22 the plurality determined that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require introduction of evidence
related to “any aspect of defendant’s character or record and
any circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death.” This statement was
adopted by the majority in Eddings v. Oklahoma.23 The Court
states that Lockett is distinguishable from the case before it
because in Lockett the evidence “tended to show how, not
whether, the defendant committed the crime. Nor was the evidence directly inconsistent with the jury’s finding of guilt.”
The Court also points out that, contrary to the Oregon
Supreme Court’s understanding, its decision in Green v.
Georgia24 does not undermine this factual distinction. That
opinion “focused only upon the hearsay problem, and it
implicitly assumed that, in the absence of the hearsay problem,
state law would not have blocked admission of the evidence.”
Regardless, the Court concludes that its subsequent opinion,
Franklin v. Lynaugh,25 made “clear, contrary to the Oregon
Supreme Court’s understanding, that this Court’s previous
cases had not interpreted the Eighth Amendment as providing
a capital defendant the right to introduce at sentencing evidence designed to cast ‘residual doubt’ on his guilt.”
The Court in Franklin did not determine whether the
Eighth Amendment required a trial court to allow residualdoubt evidence to be introduced during a sentencing hearing.
Instead, the plurality held that “the sentencing scheme at issue
was constitutional even if such a right existed.” The Court

23. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
24. 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
25. 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
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makes the same determination here: even if an Eighth
Amendment right does exist,
“it could not extend so far as
to provide this defendant with
a right to introduce the evidence at issue.” The Eighth
Amendment only requires: (1)
“reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case”; and (2) “that a sentencing jury be able to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence.” According
to the Court, “the Eighth
Amendment does not deprive the State of its authority to set
reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can submit,
and to control the manner in which it is submitted.”

Holmes v. South
Carolina . . . held
that a rule barring
the admission of
evidence that a
third-party
committed the
crime cannot
rest on the
strength of the
prosecution’s case.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Justice Alito wrote for a unanimous Court in Holmes v. South
Carolina,26 which held that a rule barring the admission of evidence that a third-party committed the crime cannot rest on
the strength of the prosecution’s case. Petitioner was convicted
for murder, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, first-degree
burglary, and robbery. He was sentenced to death and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. Petitioner received a new trial
after successful post-conviction review. At the second trial,
petitioner sought to undermine the prosecution’s case by
showing that the evidence was contaminated and the police
were trying to frame him. As part of this, petitioner introduced
the testimony of expert witnesses and evidence that a third
party committed the crime.
The trial court excluded petitioner’s third-party guilt evidence, citing State v. Gregory,27 which states that such evidence
is admissible if it “raises a reasonable inference or presumption
as to [the defendant’s] own innocence” but is inadmissible if it
merely “casts a bare suspicion upon another” or “raises a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by
another.” The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where strong evidence of an appellant’s guilt exists—
especially strong forensic evidence—evidence of a third party’s
guilt “does not raise a reasonable inference as to the appellant’s
own innocence.”
The Court begins by recognizing the constitutional broad
latitude afforded to state and federal rulemakers to enact rules
excluding evidence from criminal trials. However, this latitude
is limited by a criminal defendant’s right to present a complete
defense. The Court does not specify from where this limitation
stems but recognizes that it may arise from the “Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory
Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.” A

26. 126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006).
27. 198 S.C. 98 (1941).
28. 126 S.Ct. 2709 (2006).
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defendant’s right to present a complete defense is undercut by
evidentiary rules that “infringe upon a weighty interest of the
accused and are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes
they are designed to serve.”
The Court provides examples from previous cases where it
held that a defendant’s right to present a full defense was violated. It writes that although the Constitution prohibits rules
that exclude evidence and which “serve no legitimate purpose
or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted
to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial
judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed
by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of
issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” For instance, evidence
that another individual committed the crime may be regulated
under these principles if the evidence is inconsistent with a
defendant’s guilt and do not raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to the defendant’s innocence. However, South
Carolina attempted to extend this type of rule.
The Court criticizes South Carolina’s approach because the
trial judge does not weigh the probative value or potential
adverse effects of admitting the third-party guilt evidence, and
instead the critical analysis turns on the strength of the prosecution’s case. Further, this approach “seems to call for little, if
any, examination of the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses or the reliability of its evidence.” The Court concludes
that this rule “does not rationally serve the end that the
Gregory rule and its analogues in other jurisdictions were
designed to promote, i.e., to focus the trial on the central issues
by excluding evidence that has only a very weak logical connection to the central issues.”
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court in Clark v.
Arizona,28 which held that a state does not violate the Due
Process Clause by limiting evidence of insanity to the insanity
defense and excluding its admission to rebut mens rea. Justice
Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, filed a dissenting opinion.
Petitioner Eric Clark killed a police officer. Clark was
charged with first-degree murder and “did not contest the
shooting or death, but relied on his undisputed paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident in denying that he had the
specific intent to shoot a law enforcement officer or knowledge
that he was doing so, as required by the statute.” He wanted
to present the evidence of mental illness in two ways: (1) as an
affirmative defense; and (2) to rebut the prosecutor’s evidence
of the requisite mens rea. The trial court held that Clark could
not use evidence of his mental illness to dispute the mens rea.
It relied on State v. Mott,29 which “refused to allow psychiatric
testimony to negate specific intent,…and held that Arizona
does not allow evidence of a defendant’s mental disorder short
of insanity…to negate the mens rea element of a crime.” The
Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed and the Arizona Supreme
Court denied further review.

29. 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234
(1997).

When Arizona first codified the insanity rule, it adopted the
“landmark English rule in M’Naghten’s Case,” which provides
that a party is not guilty by reason of insanity if “the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.” In 1993, however, Arizona
modified its insanity rule and dropped the cognitive-incapacity portion. Thus, under current law, “a defendant will not be
adjudged insane unless he demonstrates that at the time of the
commission of the criminal act [he] was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that [he] did not know the
criminal act was wrong.” The Court rejects Clark’s argument
that the M’Naghten test “represents the minimum that a government must provide in recognizing an alternative to criminal
responsibility on grounds of mental illness or defect.”
The Court also rejects Clark’s alleged due-process violation
based on the Arizona Supreme Court’s adoption of the rule in
Mott. The Court believes that Clark’s argument “turns on the
application of the presumption of innocence in criminal cases,
the presumption of sanity, and the principle that a criminal
defendant is entitled to present relevant and favorable evidence
on an element of the offense charged against him.” As to the
presumption of innocence, the prosecution must prove each
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including the
mens rea. The presumption of sanity is “equally universal in
some variety or other, being (at least) a presumption that a
defendant has the capacity to form the mens rea necessary.”
However, unlike the presumption of innocence, a state can
decide whether to allow a defendant to bring forth “evidence
of mental disease or incapacity for the bearing it can have on
the government’s burden to show mens rea” or may allow
insanity only to be raised as an affirmative defense. In these
instances, the burden is carried by the defendant and the state
may determine the extent of that burden.
Finally, the Court believes that Clark’s argument touches
upon the principle that a criminal defendant has the dueprocess right to “present evidence favorable to himself on an
element that must be proven to convict him.” This right may
be curtailed for good reason. The Court writes: “While the
Constitution…prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence
under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote,
well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to
exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain
other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or potential to mislead the jury.” The Court believes that
Arizona’s law channeling and restricting mental-disease and
capacity evidence satisfies the standard of fundamental fairness
required by due process. The Court concludes by stating that
Arizona has the “authority to define its presumption of sanity…by choosing an insanity definition…and by placing the
burden of persuasion on defendants who claim incapacity as
an excuse from customary criminal responsibility.”

In Dixon v. United
The Court held that
States,30 a 7-2 Court held
the Hobbs Act
that neither the Due Process
Clause nor modern common
only criminalizes
law requires the government
violence that is
to bear the burden of disrelated to robbery
proving duress. Petitioner
was indicted and convicted or extortion; it does
of “one count of receiving a
not criminalize
firearm while under indictfree-standing
ment…and eight counts of
physical violence.
making false statements in
connection with the acquisition of a firearm.” At trial, petitioner “admitted that she knew
she was under indictment when she made the purchases and
that she knew doing so was a crime; her defense was that she
acted under duress because her boyfriend threatened to kill her
or hurt her daughters if she did not buy the guns for him.” She
argued that “the Government should be required to disprove
beyond a reasonable doubt the duress.” The district court,
bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, denied the request and petitioner renewed her argument on appeal, claiming: (1) “her
defense controverted the mens rea required for conviction and
therefore that the Due Process Clause requires the Government
to retain the burden of persuasion on that element”; and (2)
“that the Fifth Circuit’s rule is contrary to modern common
law.”
The Supreme Court disagrees. The Court states: “[t]he
duress defense, like the defense of necessity…may excuse conduct that would otherwise be punishable, but the existence of
duress normally does not controvert any of the elements of the
offense itself.” In addition, the Court believes it bears repeating that under common law, the defendant had the burden of
proving an affirmative defense. The Court does not believe
that any recent developments, including its decision in Davis v.
United States,31 support a contrary conclusion.

30. 126 S.Ct. 2437 (2006).
31. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).

32. 126 S.Ct. 1264 (2006).

CRIMINAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

In Scheidler v. NOW,32 Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of
the Court in which all justices joined except Justice Alito, who
took no part in the decision. The Court held that the Hobbs Act
only criminalizes violence that is related to robbery or extortion; it does not criminalize free-standing physical violence.
Respondents brought an action against petitioners under
the Hobbs Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), claiming that petitioners’ protest
activities at abortion clinics amounted to extortion and “that
these extortionate acts created a pattern of racketeering activity.” The Hobbs Act, Title 18 of the United States Code, “says
that an individual commits a federal crime if he or she
‘obstructs, delays, or affects commerce’ by robbery, extortion,
or committing or threatening physical violence to any person
or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything
in violation of this section.”
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A jury found in favor of respondents and the district court
entered a nationwide injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed
but the Supreme Court reversed. It noted that the Hobbs Act
defines extortion “as necessarily including improper obtaining
property from another.” The Court did not agree that the
“claimed property consisted of a woman’s right to seek medical
services from a clinic, the right of the doctors, nurses or other
clinic staff to perform their jobs, and the right of the clinics to
provide medical services for free from wrongful threats, violence, coercion, and fear.” On remand, the Seventh Circuit did
not reverse the district court’s decision or terminate the injunction. Instead, it “considered respondents’ argument that the
jury’s RICO verdict rested not only upon many instances of
extortion-related conduct, but also upon four instances (or
threats) of physical violence unrelated to extortion.” Since this
theory was not presented in the district court, the Seventh
Circuit determined that the Court did not have a chance to
determine if these acts were sufficient to constitute a Hobbs
Act violation. The Seventh Circuit remanded, but the petitioners sought, and the Court granted, a writ of certiorari.
The Supreme Court believes the determinative question is
whether the phrase, “in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do
anything in violation of this section,” as used in the Hobbs Act,
refers to violence “(1) that furthers a plan or purpose to affect
commerce…by robbery or extortion, or to violence (2) that
furthers a plan or purpose simply to affect commerce.” The
Court chooses the former, more restrictive, reading for four
reasons. First, the Court believes the “more restrictive reading
[is] the more natural one” in light of the entire subparagraph.
Second, the Court finds support in the fact that “Congress
often intends such statutory terms as ‘affect commerce’ or ‘in
commerce’ to be read as terms of art connecting the congressional exercise of legislative authority with the constitutional
provision (here, the Commerce Clause) that grants Congress
that authority.” Here, it provides a limit to what Congress
intended to define as criminal conduct. Third, the Court relies
on legislative history. Finally, the Court believes that the other
reading “broadens the Act’s scope well beyond what case law
has assumed” and “would federalize much ordinary criminal
behavior.”
In Zedner v. United States,33 Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that a criminal defendant may not
prospectively waive application of the Speedy Trial Act of
1974. He was joined by all the Members of the Court except
Justice Scalia who joined only in part and filed a separate opinion concurring in part and in the judgment.
Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury on seven counts of
attempting to defraud a financial institution and one count of
knowingly possessing counterfeit obligations of the United
States. After numerous continuances, the trial court requested
that petitioner waive his rights under the Act “for all time.”
The petitioner gave both an oral and written waiver. Due to
other delays, the trial did not start for another six years.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the charges for violation of the
Act, but the trial court denied the motion based on petitioner’s

33. 126 S.Ct. 1976 (2006).
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prospective waiver. Petitioner was convicted and the Second
Circuit affirmed. It determined that petitioner’s waiver may
have been ineffective; however, an exception exists “when
defendant’s conduct causes or contributes to a period of delay.”
The Court begins its opinion with a synopsis of the Act’s
provisions and purposes. The Act requires a trial to begin
within 70 days from the time the information or indictment is
filed or the defendant makes his initial appearance. The Act
also provides a “detailed list of periods of delay that are
excluded in computing the time within which the trial must
start.” Among these is an “ends-of-justice” continuance,
which “permits a district court to grant a continuance and to
exclude the resulting delay if the court, after considering certain factors, makes on-the-record findings that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the public’s
and defendant’s interests in a speedy trial.”
The Court agrees with petitioner that he could not prospectively waive application of the Act. First, the Court notes that
the Act does not list as one of the categories of delay a period
during which the defendant waives application of the Act.
Instead, it specifically requires “that defense continuance
requests fit within one of the specific exclusions set out” in the
Act. Even the flexible “ends-of-justice” delay requires the district court to consider certain factors on the record. The Court
believes that if a “defendant could simply waive the application
of the Act whenever he or she wanted more time, no defendant
would ever need to put such considerations before the court
under the rubric of an ends-of-justice exclusion.”
Additionally, the Court believes that the “purposes of the Act
also cut against exclusion on the grounds of mere consent or
waiver.” The Act protects both a defendant’s rights and the
public’s interests in a speedy resolution; the latter cannot be
served if defendants can opt out of the Act.
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n this article, I review the key civil decisions of the 20052006 Term. It was a tough term for First Amendment claims:
almost all the major cases were decided against free-speech
claims. The most widely noted case of the Term determined
that the President lacked the authority to convene military
commissions as part of the war on terrorism.
CIVIL RIGHTS

The Court decided two cases related to the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA): Schaffer v. Weast1 and
Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. v. Murphy.2 In Schaffer, the
Court held that the party seeking relief under IDEA has the burden of persuasion. In Arlington, it held that IDEA does not
authorize a district court to award expert fees to prevailing parents.
IDEA, passed by Congress in 1970, was designed to reverse
a history of neglect of disabled students in the educational environment. IDEA establishes a cooperative process between parents and schools: “State educational authorities must identify
and evaluate disabled children…develop an [“individualized
education program” (IEP)] for each one . . . and review every
IEP at least once a year.” Among parents’ rights are the right to
“obtain an independent educational evaluation of their child”
and, if they believe an IEP is inappropriate, to “seek an administrative impartial due process hearing.” While Congress allows
the states discretion in determining who conducts the hearings
and establishing fair hearing procedures, it “has chosen to legislate the central components of due process hearings,” i.e. minimal pleading standards, the presentation of evidence, and the
ability of the parties to compel witnesses to testify.
In Schaffer, Brian Schaffer, who suffers from learning disabilities and speech-language impairments, was asked to leave his
school. Brian’s parents contacted the Montgomery County
Public School System (MCPS), which convened an IEP team
and eventually recommended placement in one of the two
MCPS middle schools. The parents were not satisfied with the
arrangement and enrolled Brian in a private school. They “initiated a due process hearing challenging the IEP and seeking
compensation for the cost of Brian’s subsequent private education.” As per Maryland’s procedures, the hearing was conducted by an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ “deemed
the evidence close, held that the parents bore the burden of persuasion, and ruled in favor of the school district.” The parents
filed a civil action in the district court challenging the result.
The district court reversed and remanded, concluding the
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school district held the burden of persuasion. The ALJ
“deemed the evidence truly in ‘equipoise,’ and ruled in favor of
the parents.” The district court affirmed and a divided panel for
the Fourth Circuit reversed.
A 6-2 Court affirmed, concluding that the parents bore the
burden of persuasion. According to the Court, the term “burden of proof,” of which the burden of persuasion is part, “is one
of the slipperiest members of the family of legal terms.” To
decide who has the burden of proof in a statutory context, the
Court first looks to the statute. The plain text of IDEA fails to
specify which party bears the burden of persuasion. The Court,
therefore, “begin[s] with the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs
bear the risk of failing to prove their claims.” While there are
exceptions to this rule, the Court will not shift the burden “at
the outset of a proceeding” unless there is reason to believe
such a result was intended by Congress. Despite petitioner’s
arguments, the Court does not find such reason. The Court
does not believe that “putting the burden of persuasion on
school districts will further IDEA’s purposes because it will help
ensure that children receive a free appropriate public education.” It concludes that “very few cases will be in evidentiary
equipoise” and such assignment might make IDEA more costly
to administer.
In Arlington, respondents filed an action under IDEA on
behalf of their son, “seeking to require petitioner Arlington
Central School District Board of Education to pay for their son’s
private school tuition.” They prevailed in district court and the
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. Respondents sought to recover fees for the services of
an educational consultant, Marilyn Arons, who assisted respondents throughout the proceedings. The district court awarded
respondents part of Arons’ fees. The Second Circuit affirmed
but the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Alito, reversed,
finding IDEA does not authorize recovery of expert fees. Justice
Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment. Justices Souter and Breyer filed dissenting opinions.
IDEA was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, which
therefore guides the Court’s decision. Under the Spending
Clause, “when Congress attaches conditions to a State’s acceptance of federal funds, the conditions must be set out unambiguously.” In other words, the state must have clear notice
regarding the liability at issue. The statutory text of IDEA does
not provide that prevailing parents are entitled to recover expert
fees. The relevant portion provides, “in any action of proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may

2. 126 S.Ct. 2455 (2006).

award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party.” The
statute “does not even hint that acceptance of IDEA funds
makes a State responsible for reimbursing prevailing parents for
services rendered by experts.”
A unanimous Court held in United States v. Georgia3 that
Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in
circumstances where a claimant asserts a Title II claim for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Tony
Goodman is a paraplegic inmate currently incarcerated in the
Georgia prison system. “After filing numerous administrative
grievances in the state prison system, Goodman filed a pro se
complaint” in the district court “challenging the conditions of
his confinement.” Among the more serious allegations, he
complained that: (1) “he was confined for 23-to-24 hours per
day in a 12-by-3 foot cell in which he could not turn his wheelchair around”; (2) “lack of accessible facilities rendered him
unable to use the toilet and shower without assistance, which
was often denied”; (3) “he had been denied physical therapy
and medical treatment”; and (4) he was “denied access to virtually all prison programs and services on account of his disability.”
The district court dismissed the action on the grounds that
“the allegations in the complaint were vague and constituted
insufficient notice pleading as to Goodman’s § 1983 claims.” It
also dismissed Goodman’s Title II claims and, after the Court’s
decision in Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garret,4
granted summary judgment against Goodman for his monetary
claims on the grounds that those claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Goodman appealed and the United States intervened “to defend the constitutionality of Title II’s abrogation of
state sovereign immunity.” The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed “because Goodman’s multiple pro se
filings…alleged facts sufficient to support a limited number of
Eighth-Amendment claims under § 1983 against certain individual defendants.” The Eleventh Circuit did not “address the
sufficiency of Goodman’s allegations under Title II” and,
instead, affirmed the district court’s determination that
Goodman’s claims for monetary damages were barred by sovereign immunity. The Court granted certiorari on this issue.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, begins the opinion by
stating that the Court will “assume without deciding” that
Goodman “alleged actual violations of the Eighth Amendment”
and that the same conduct that violated the Eighth Amendment
violates Title II of the ADA. The Court also suggests that
Goodman’s claims for money damages might have been based
“on conduct that independently violated the provisions of § 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Therefore, Goodman’s claims
differ in the sense that the Court’s other cases address
“Congress’s ability to abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to
its § 5 powers.”
The Court states that while its members have “disagreed
regarding the scope of Congress’s prophylactic enforcement
powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment…no one
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damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.” The Court instructs on remand that the lower
court should determine on a claim-by-claim basis which of
Goodman’s claims fit under this rule.
In Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,5 Justice
Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all the justices joined except Justice Alito, who filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. The Court held Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision covers those employer actions that are materially
adverse to a reasonable employee, but does not confine the
actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur in the workplace.
Sheila White was the only female employee in her department. Shortly after she began employment as a forklift operator, she complained to Burlington officials that her supervisor,
Bill Joiner, “had repeatedly told her that women should not be
working in… [her] department” and also “made insulting and
inappropriate remarks to her in front of her male colleagues.”
Burlington investigated and suspended Joiner for ten days. At
the same time White was informed of Joiner’s punishment, she
was also informed that she was being removed from her duties
and reassigned. Burlington “explained that the reassignment
reflected co-worker’s complaints that, in fairness, a more senior
man should have the less arduous and cleaner job of forklift
operator.”
White filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). After exhausting her
administrative remedies, White filed an action against
Burlington, claiming, in relevant part, that “Burlington’s
actions—changing her job responsibilities, and suspending her
for 37 days without pay—amounted to unlawful retaliation in
violation of Title VII.” The jury found in favor of White and
awarded her damages. The Court of Appeal for the Sixth
Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed. While the panel unanimously
agreed on the outcome, the members disagreed as to the proper
scope of the anti-retaliation provision.

3. 126 S.Ct. 877 (2006).
4. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).

5. 126 S.Ct. 2405 (2006).
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The Court determines that “the
anti-retaliation provision does not
confine the actions and harms it
forbids to those that are related to
employment or occur in the workplace.” It also held, however, that
“the provision covers those (and
only those) employer actions that
would have been materially
adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant.” Title VII’s
anti-retaliation provision “forbids employer actions that discriminate against an employee (or job applicant) because he
has opposed a practice that Title VII forbids or has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in a Title VII investigation proceeding or hearing.” There is no dispute that “the
term ‘discriminate against’ refers to distinctions or differences
in treatment that injure protected individuals.” The dispute
surrounds “whether the challenged action has to be employment or workplace related and about how harmful that action
must be to constitute retaliation.”
Petitioner and the Solicitor General argue that the Sixth
Circuit’s requirement that a link be established between the
retaliatory action and terms, conditions, or status of employment is correct. Their argument progresses through three
stages: (1) “that Title VII’s substantive anti-discrimination provision protects an individual only from employment-related
discrimination”; (2) “the anti-retaliation provision should be
read in pari materia with the anti-discrimination provision”;
and, therefore, (3) “the employer actions prohibited by the antiretaliation provision should similarly be limited to conduct that
affects the employee’s compensation, terms, condition, or privileges of employment.”
The Court disagrees. The language of the substantive provision of Title VII “differs from that of the anti-retaliation provision in important ways.” Primarily, the anti-retaliation provision does not have the same limiting words as the anti-discrimination provision. Therefore, the question is not whether the
two provisions should be read in pari material, but “whether
Congress intended its different words to make a legal difference.” The Court normally presumes that where different
words are used, Congress purposely intended different results.
The Court finds this presumption is also supported by the language of the provisions because they differ not only “in language but in purpose as well”: “[t]he anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated
against” while “[t]he anti-retaliation provision seeks to secure
that primary objective by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure
or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.” To
secure the first objective, Congress only needed to prohibit
“employment-related discrimination.” However, to secure the
second objective, it needed to prohibit a broader range of
behavior.
The Court recognizes that there are some limits in the antiretaliation provision: the “anti-retaliation provision protects an

individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm.” Adopting the formulation set forth
by the Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits, the Court
believes that “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee
would have found the challenged action materially adverse,
which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” The Court uses the words “materially adverse” to
“separate significant from trivial harms.” It also uses the word
“reasonable” because it believes “that the provision’s standard
for judgment harm must be objective.”
A 5-2 Court held in Hartman v. Moore,6 that in an action for
civil damages against the government based on retaliatory criminal prosecution for exercising a constitutional right, the plaintiff
has the burden of pleading and showing the absence of probable
cause for the underlying criminal charges. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court while Justice Ginsburg, joined by
Justice Breyer, filed a dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito took no part in the decision.
The Postal Service put both respondent and his company,
REI, under investigation for various crimes. Despite “very limited evidence,” an Assistant United States Attorney brought
charges against respondent, REI, and REI’s vice-president. The
district court granted the REI defendants’ motion for judgment
of acquittal and respondent subsequently filed an action in district court against the prosecutor and five postal inspectors for
civil liability under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents.7
Respondent raised five causes of action, including a claim “that
the prosecutor and the inspectors had engineered his criminal
prosecution in retaliation for criticism of the Postal Service,
thus violating the First Amendment.” Ultimately, only respondent’s retaliation prosecution claim against the inspectors was
not dismissed.
The Court states that the issue in this case is narrow:
“whether a plaintiff in a retaliatory-prosecution action must
plead and show the absence of probable cause for pressing the
underlying criminal charges.” The Court thinks “there is a fair
argument for what the inspectors call an ‘objective’ fact requirement in this type of case,” and the strongest argument for an
objective fact requirement stems from “the need to prove a
chain of causation from animus to injury.” Turning to its prior
cases, the Court states that even if it has not actually specified
“any necessary details about proof of a connection between the
retaliatory animus and the discharge,” its cases “have simply
taken the evidence of the motive and the discharge as sufficient
for a circumstantial demonstration that the one caused the
other.” The Court also thinks its clear that “the causation is
understood to be but-for causation, without which the adverse
action would not have been taken.”
The Court believes when the retaliatory action is criminal
prosecution, there are two significant changes: (1) “there will
always be a distinct body of highly valuable circumstantial evidence available and apt to prove or disprove retaliatory causation, namely evidence showing whether there was or was not
probable cause to bring the criminal charge”; and (2) “the req-

6. 126 S. Ct. 1695 (2006).

7. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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uisite causation between the defendant’s retaliatory animus and
the plaintiff’s injury is…more complex…and the need to show
this more complex connection supports a requirement that no
probable cause be alleged and proven.” As to the first, the
Court believes that while this evidence will go a long way to
show whether the government’s actions were retaliatory, it does
not necessarily mean that a plaintiff should be required to plead
and prove no probable cause. As to the second, the Court states
that the retaliation action in this scenario will not be brought
against the prosecutor but an official “who may have influenced
the prosecutorial decision,” like the inspectors in this case.
Therefore, “the causal connection required here is not merely
between the retaliatory animus of one person and that person’s
own injurious action, but between the retaliatory animus of one
person and the action of another.”
The Court identifies this as a “distinct problem of causation”
because “[e]vidence of an inspector’s animus does not necessarily show that the inspector induced the action of a prosecutor who would not have pressed charges otherwise.” Further,
the Court states that there is the added difficulty that the plaintiff must overcome the “legal obstacle in the longstanding presumption of regularity accorded to prosecutorial decisionmaking.” It believes that “[s]ome sort of allegation…is needed both

to bridge the gap between
the nonprosecuting government agent’s motive and the
prosecutor’s action, and to
address the presumption of
prosecutorial regularity.” It
concludes that the “connection, to be alleged and
shown, is the absence of
probable cause.”

[T]he Court held that
. . . the Government
bears the burden of
showing that a
compelling state
interest significantly
outweighs the
burden placed on a
specific religious
FIRST AMENDMENT
Chief Justice Roberts
group . . . .

delivered the opinion of the
Court in Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,8 in which all the
justices joined except Justice Alito, who took no part in the
decision. The Court held that under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), the government bears the burden of
showing that a compelling state interest significantly outweighs
the burden placed on a specific religious group by the
Controlled Substances Act.
RFRA prohibits the federal government from substantially

8. 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).
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burdening “a person’s exercise
of religion, even if the burden
results from a rule of general
applicability.” The only exception is when the government
can show that the burden to the
person “(1) is in furtherance of
a compelling government
interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental
interest.”9
Respondent is a Christian
Spiritist sect based in Brazil with approximately 130 members
in the United States. Central to its faith is “receiving communion through hoasca…a sacramental tea made from two plants
unique to the Amazon region.” One of these plants contains
dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a hallucinogen, which is listed in
Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Under the
CSA, Schedule I drugs are “subject to the most comprehensive
restrictions, including an outright ban on all importation and
use, except pursuant to strictly regulated research projects.”
After respondent had difficulties importing hoasca, it filed an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction against the Attorney General and other federal
law-enforcement officials, alleging that the application of CSA
to its “sacramental use of hoasca violates RFRA.”
At the preliminary injunction hearing, the district court
determined that the evidence regarding the effects of hoasca,
specifically whether it caused or minimized health risks and
whether there was a market for hoasca outside its religious use,
was in equipoise.
It therefore determined that “the
Government had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest
justifying what it acknowledged was a substantial burden
on…[respondent’s] sincere religious exercise.” The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The central issue before the Court is whether “evidentiary
equipoise is an insufficient basis for issuing a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the Controlled Substances
Act.” The Court rejects the government’s argument that a finding for a party based on a “mere tie in the evidentiary record”
violates the “well-established principle that the party seeking
pretrial relief bears the burden of demonstrating a likelihood of
success on the merits.” The government admitted that the
enforcement of the CSA substantially burdened respondent’s
religious exercise; the district court’s ruling, therefore, was
based on whether the government met its burden in showing
that its interests outweighed the burden on respondent. The
Court does not agree the burden of disproving the asserted
interests fell on respondent during the preliminary injunction
hearing based on its prior decision in Ashcroft v. ACLU.10
The Court also dismisses the government’s second argument
“that the Act’s description of Schedule I substances as having ‘a

high potential for abuse,’ ‘no currently accepted medical use in
treatment…’, and ‘lack of accepted safety for use…,’ by itself
precludes any consideration of individualized exceptions such
as that sought by [respondent].” The Court states, “RFRA, and
the strict scrutiny test it adopted, contemplate an inquiry more
focused than the Government’s categorical approach,” as is evidenced from the government’s necessity of “demonstrating that
the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of
the challenged law to the person.” In addition, RFRA expressly
adopts the tests set forth in Sherbert v. Verner11 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder,12 which require a court to “scrutinize[] the asserted harm
of granting specific exemptions to particular religious
claimants.”
The Court believes that under the more “focused inquiry,”
the government’s argument “cannot carry the day.” Schedule I
substances are exceptionally dangerous. However, the classification is not a “categorical answer that relieves the Government
of the obligation to shoulder its burden under RFRA.” The
Court finds support for this determination in the CSA itself,
which allows the government to exempt certain manufacturers,
distributors, and dispensers from registration if it “finds it consistent with the public health and safety.” Further, peyote, a
Schedule I drug, has been exempt from the ban for 35 years if
used for religious purposes. According to the Court, the peyote
exception “also fatally undermines the Government’s broader
contention that the Controlled Substances Act establishes a
closed regulatory system that admits of no exceptions under
RFRA.”
Finally, the Court discusses the government’s argument that
it had an interest in complying with the 1971 United Nations
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which was signed by
the United States and implemented by the CSA. The convention “calls on signatories to prohibit the use of hallucinogens,
including DMT.” The Court agrees with the government that
the tea is covered by the convention. However, it does not
believe that this “automatically mean[s] that the Government
has demonstrated a compelling interest in applying the
Controlled Substances Act…[to respondent’s] sacramental use
of the tea.”
Chief Justice Roberts also filed the opinion for the Court in
Rumsfeld v. FAIR,13 in which all the justices joined except for
Justice Alito who took no part in the decision. It held that the
Solomon Amendment does not violate the First Amendment by
requiring law schools to provide equal access to military
recruiters. Respondent Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights (FAIR), “is an association of law schools and law faculties,” which promotes “‘academic freedom, support[s] educational institutions in opposing discrimination and vindicate[s]
the rights of institutions of higher education.’” In 2003, FAIR
sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
Solomon Amendment. The Court and the parties agree that the
amendment requires a law school to “offer military recruiters
the same access to its campus and students that it provides to

9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).
10. 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
11. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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13. 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
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the nonmilitary recruiter receiving the most favorable access”
in order to receive federal funding.
The district court denied the preliminary injunction. In
addition, the district court also determined that “recruiting is
conduct and not speech…[and] any expressive aspect of
recruiting is entirely ancillary to its dominant economic purpose.” The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,
finding that the Amendment “violated the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine because it forced a law school to choose
between surrendering First Amendment rights and losing federal funding for its university.” The Third Circuit also found
that the Amendment regulated speech, not merely expressive
conduct.
Congress enacted the Solomon Amendment through its
spending powers instead of under its broad authority to raise
armies under Article I, section 8. The Court believes this makes
“Congress’ power to regulate military recruiting under the
Solomon Amendment…arguably greater because universities
are free to decline the federal funds.” Generally, the Court has
rejected First Amendment challenges to Congress’s spending
power on the grounds that Congress attached restrictions to
federal funding except in circumstances where the government
has denied a benefit “to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected.”14 The Court believes that this case
does not require it to decide if the amendment is an “unconstitutional condition” because “the First Amendment would not
prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon
Amendment’s access requirement.” It believes, “[a]s a general
matter, the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not
speech.”
To support its finding to the contrary, the Third Circuit
determined that the Solomon Amendment violated the First
Amendment in three ways; the Court discusses each in turn.
First, the Court does not agree that because the law school
might provide some services, i.e., sending e-mails and distributing flyers, the Solomon Amendment forces them to engage in
speech. Second, the Court rejects the argument that because
the military comes to campus to express a message, the
Solomon Amendment “requires law schools to host or accommodate the military’s speech.” The Court points out that in its
prior cases, which found this requirement unconstitutional, the
“compelled-speech violation…resulted from the fact that the
complaining speaker’s own message was affected by the speech
it was forced to accommodate.” Finally, the Court rejects the
Third Circuit’s analysis that, if the Solomon Amendment does
not regulate speech, it regulates expressive conduct that is protected by the First Amendment. The Court previously rejected
the idea in United States v. O’Brien,15 in that the First
Amendment only applies to “conduct that is inherently expressive,” for instance, burning the American flag. Here, the conduct is not inherently expressive.
The Court next discusses whether the Solomon Amendment
violates a law school’s First Amendment rights to “expressive
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public accommodations law, which required the organization to
accept a homosexual as a scoutmaster.” The Court does not
agree that the Solomon Amendment has the same impact.
According to the court, the recruiters are just “outsiders who
come onto campus for a limited purpose of trying to hire students.” The law school is not required to “accept members it
does not desire.”
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of a 5-4 Court in
Garcetti v. Ceballos,17 which held “that when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline.” Respondent was employed as the
calendar deputy in the district attorney’s office during the relevant period. He was contacted by a defense attorney who
informed respondent that he had filed a motion to challenge the
validity of a warrant. Respondent, in accordance with his job
duties, reviewed the case. Respondent determined that the affidavit contained “serious misrepresentations” and relayed his
findings to his superiors. The district attorney’s office decided
not to drop the charges and a hearing was held on the motion.
Defense called respondent, who recounted his observations
about the affidavit. The trial court ultimately rejected the challenge to the warrant.
Respondent claimed that in the aftermath “he was subjected
to a series of retaliatory employment actions,” including reassignment, transfer, and denial of a promotion. Respondent filed
a grievance, which was denied, and then sought relief in district
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming “petitioners violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments by retaliating against him
based on his memo.” The district court granted summary judgment for petitioners because respondent, who drafted his
memo as part of his employment, was not entitled to First
Amendment protection or, alternatively, even if he was, “petitioners had qualified immunity because the rights Ceballos
asserted were not clearly established.” The Ninth Circuit
reversed, relying on Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High
School Dist. 205, Will County18 and Connick v. Myers.19

14. US v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2002) (quoting Bd. of
Comm’rs, Waubaunsee City v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996)).
15. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
16. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).

17. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
18. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
19. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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The Court’s prior decisions
have noted “the unchallenged
dogma…that a public employee
had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of
employment—including those
which restricted the exercise of
constitutional rights.” However,
there are qualifications: “the First
Amendment protects a public
employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public
concern.” According to the Court, Pickering and subsequent
cases “identify two inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional protections accorded to public employee speech.”
First, the court must determine “whether the employee spoke
as a citizen on a matter of public concern.” If the employee did
not, then he or she has no First Amendment protection. If the
employee did speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern,
then the court must determine “whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the
employee differently from any other member of the general
public.”
The Court states that the overarching objectives of this
inquiry are evident. “Government employers, like private
employers, need a significant degree of control over their
employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.” On
the other hand, the Court has also recognized that public
employees are citizens. Therefore, they are entitled to First
Amendment protections and the public employer cannot
“leverage the employment relationship to restrict, incidentally
or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.” The Court has also “acknowledged
the importance of promoting the public’s interest in receiving
the well-informed views of government employees engaging
in civic discussion.” The Court concludes that its decisions
“have sought both to promote the individual and societal
interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on
matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform their important public
functions.”
The Court turns to the present case. First, the Court does
not think it dispositive that respondent did his “talking” inside
his workplace as “it would not serve the goal of treating public
employees like ‘any member of the general public’…to hold
that all speech within the office is automatically exposed to
restriction.” The Court also does not believe it is dispositive
that the memo concerned the subject matter of respondent’s
employment since the “First Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker’s job.” The Court believes the dispositive factor is that respondent’s “expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.”
Justice Breyer announced the judgment of the Court in Beard

v. Banks,20 which determined that Pennsylvania’s regulation
denying certain inmates access to newspapers, magazines, and
photographs does not violate the First Amendment. He was
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and
Souter. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment while Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg filed dissenting opinions. Justice Alito took no part
in the decision.
Pennsylvania has three special units for difficult prisoners,
including the Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU). Prisoners
held in the most restrictive level of LTSU, Level 2, “face the
most severe form” of restrictions and “have no access to newspapers, magazines, or personal photographs.” This ban does
not include legal correspondence, religious and legal materials,
library books, and writing paper. Ronald Banks is confined to
Level 2 and filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming
that the Level 2 Policy bears “no reasonable relation to any
legitimate penological objective and consequently violates the
First Amendment.” The district court granted the secretary’s
motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed on the grounds that “the prison regulation cannot be supported as a matter of law by the record in this
case.” The Court granted certiorari.
The plurality starts by citing to Turner v. Safley21 and Overton
v. Bazzetta,22 which set forth the “basic substantive legal standards governing this case.” In Turner, the Court held that
“imprisonment does not automatically deprive a prisoner of
certain important constitutional protections, including those of
the First Amendment.” As pointed out in Overton, however,
“the Constitution sometimes permits greater restriction of such
rights in a prison than it would allow elsewhere” and “substantial deference” is due to “the professional judgment of prison
administrators.” Ultimately, “restrictive prison regulations are
permissible if they are ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological interests.” Turner sets forth four factors used to determine reasonableness: (1) there must be a “valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2) there must be
“alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to
prison inmates”; (3) “the court must weigh the impact made on
guards, inmates, and prison resources if that constitutional
right is accommodated”; and (4) “the court must also determine if there are ‘ready alternatives’ for furthering the governmental interest.”
The secretary set forth multiple justifications for the prison’s
policy, which are not in dispute, “including the need to motivate better behavior on the part of particularly difficult prisoners, the need to minimize the amount of property they control
in their cells, and the need to assure prison safety, by, for example, diminishing the amount of material a prisoner might use to
start a cell fire.” The plurality believes it need go no further
than the first justification to find that summary judgment in the
secretary’s favor was warranted. Analyzing the first justification
under each of Turner’s four requirements, the plurality con-

20. 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
21. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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cludes that the stated purpose is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment. He believes that
because “[j]udicial scrutiny of prison regulations is an endeavor
fraught with peril,” the framework he set forth in Overton is the
best, least perilous “approach for resolving challenges to prison
regulations.” In his view, states are free to define incarceration
as they see fit—“provided only that those deprivations are constituent with the Eighth Amendment.” Therefore, “[w]hether a
sentence encompasses the extinction of a constitutional right
. . . turns on State law, for it is a State’s prerogative to determine
how it will punish violations of its law.”
Justice Stevens dissents. Using the test set forth in Turner,
Justice Stevens states that the regulation cannot survive constitutional scrutiny if “the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy
arbitrary and irrational,…or if the regulation represents an
‘exaggerated response’ to legitimate penological objectives.” He
believes it is clear that the regulations infringe upon the
inmates’ First Amendment rights and that the secretary has
failed, as a matter of law, to establish that the state’s penological
interests are sufficient to justify the regulations. Justice
Ginsburg also dissents. She agrees with Justice Stevens’s opinion and writes to emphasize that summary judgment was not
appropriate in this circumstance.
In Randall v. Sorrell,23 Justice Breyer announced the judgment of the Court, which found that Vermont’s campaign
finance laws, which limit the amount of money a candidate can
spend on his or her campaign and the amount of money an
individual or corporation can contribute, violate the First
Amendment. He was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and by
Justice Alito in part. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring
in part and in the judgment. Justice Kennedy and Justice
Thomas, the latter who was joined by Justice Scalia, filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Souter also filed a dissenting opinion
and was joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Stevens in part.
In 1997, Vermont enacted more stringent campaign financing laws (the Act), which impose mandatory expenditure limits and restrictions for contributions to campaigns for state candidates. The expenditure limits are indexed for inflation but
the contributions limits are not. Petitioners filed an action in
federal district court challenging the Act under the First
Amendment. The district court agreed that the Act’s expenditure limits violated the First Amendment but held that only certain of the contribution limits were unconstitutional. A divided
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit “held that
all of the Act’s contribution limits are unconstitutional” and
“that the Act’s expenditure limits may be constitutional.” It
found two compelling state interests—an interest in preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption and an interest in
limiting the amount of time state official must spend raising
campaign funds—and remanded to the district court to determine if “the Act’s expenditure limits were narrowly tailored to
those interest.” The Court granted certiorari.
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statute’s expenditure limitations violated the First
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Amendment.” In Buckley,
the government sought to uphold the statute by relying on its
interest in preventing “corruption and the appearance of corruption.” However, the Court believed that while “this rational
provided sufficient justification for the statute’s contribution
limitations,” it “did not provide sufficient justification for the
expenditure limitations.” The Court explained the basic reason
for this difference: “Expenditure limitations impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do contribution limitations.” The latter only marginally restrict “the contributor’s
ability to engage in free communication.”
As to the Act’s expenditure limits, the plurality believes that
this case is not distinguishable from Buckley. In both cases, the
expenditure limitations impose a “dollar cap” on a candidate’s
expenditures. Further, Vermont’s justification for the Act, “preventing corruption and its appearance,” is the same as offered
by the government in Buckley. Respondents try to distinguish
Buckley by arguing they have an interest also in reducing “the
amount of time candidates must spend raising money.” In the
plurality’s view, this “protection rationale” does not change the
outcome mandated by Buckley and the “Buckley Court was
aware of the connection between expenditure limits and a
reduction in fundraising time” too when it issued its decision.
The plurality next addresses the Act’s contribution limits. In
Buckley, the Court upheld a $1,000 contribution limit on the
grounds that “contribution limits are permissible as long as the
Government demonstrates that the limits are ‘closely drawn’ to
match a ‘sufficiently important interest.’” The question here is
whether the Act’s restrictions are “too low and too strict to survive First Amendment scrutiny.” The plurality cannot, as stated
in Buckley, probe each possible contribution level or “determine with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the statute’s legitimate objectives.” However,
the plurality believes it “must recognize the existence of some
lower bound” because “[a]t some point the constitutional risks
to the democratic electoral process become too great.” It finds
“danger signs” present in this case because the Act’s limits “are
sufficiently low as to generate suspicion that they are not
closely drawn.”
The plurality next examines the record to determine if the
limits are “closely drawn” to match Vermont’s interests and con-

23. 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
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cludes they are too restrictive. It bases its opinion
“not merely on the low dollar amounts of the limits
themselves, but also on the
statute’s effect on political
parties and on volunteer
activity in Vermont elections.”
It concludes:
“Taken together, Act 64’s
substantial restrictions on
the ability of candidates to
raise the funds necessary to
run a competitive election,
on the ability of political
parties to help their candidates get elected, and on the
ability of individual citizens to volunteer their time to campaigns show that the Act is not closely drawn to meet its objectives.”
Justice Alito concurs in part and in the judgment. He writes
because he believes respondents’ primary defense is different
than that articulated by the plurality. Justice Kennedy concurs
in the judgment. He believes that, with respect to campaign
contributions, the parties have not asked the Court to overrule
Buckley or challenge the level of scrutiny that should applied.
He agrees with the plurality however that “respondents’
attempts to distinguish the present limitations from those we
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have invalidated are unavailing.” Justice Thomas also concurs
in the judgment but disagrees with the rationale applied by the
plurality. He “continue[s] to believe that Buckley provides
insufficient protection to political speech, the core of the First
Amendment.” Justice Thomas writes that he still believes the
Court “erred in Buckley when it distinguished between contribution and expenditure limits, finding the former to be a less
severe infringement on First Amendment rights.” He also
believes that the plurality’s opinion “demonstrates that
Buckley’s limited scrutiny of contribution limits is ‘insusceptible
of principled application.’”
Justice Stevens dissents. He believes that Buckley never
addressed the issue of “whether the pernicious effects of endless
fundraising can serve as a compelling state interest that justifies
expenditure limits,” but believes if it did, the holding was
wrong. He believes the limits placed on expenditures were a
long-established practice prior to the Buckley decision and the
Court’s decisions prior to Buckley “provided solid support for
treating these limits as permissible regulations of conduct
rather than speech.” He believes it is possible for candidates to
work under these limits and the state’s interest “in freeing candidates from the fundraising straitjacket” also provides a compelling reasons for expenditure limits. Justice Souter also dissents and would “adhere to the Court of Appeal’s decision to
remand for further enquiry bearing on the limitations on candidates’ expenditures, and…think[s] the contribution limits
satisfy controlling precedent.”

In Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood,25 a unanimous Court, in an
opinion written by Justice O’Connor, held that the lower courts
should not have invalidated a New Hampshire statute requiring
parental notification of a minor’s abortion in its entirety as this
is the ultimate remedy to be applied only after a court determines it (1) cannot invalidate only the unconstitutional provisions of the statute and (2) the legislature would not have
intended the statute to remain in force without the invalidated
provisions. The constitutional defect was failure to provide a
medical-emergency exception.
New Hampshire enacted the Parental Notification Prior to
Abortion Act in 2003. “The Act prohibits physicians from performing an abortion on a pregnant minor…until 48 hours after
written notice of the pending abortion is delivered to her parent
or guardian.” The Act provides for three exceptions but not an
explicit exception for the “physician to perform an abortion in a
medical emergency without parental notification.” Respondents
filed an action in federal court alleging the Act was unconstitutional on these grounds. The district court agreed and issued a
permanent injunction. The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed. It found the Act unconstitutional because it
did not contain an explicit health exception, and “its judicial
bypass, along with other provisions of state law, is no substitute.”
The Court begins by stating that the case comes to it with
three propositions already established: (1) “States unquestionably have the right to require parental involvement when a
minor considers terminating her pregnancy”; (2) “a State may
not restrict access to abortions that are necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for preservation of the life or health of
the mother”; and (3) “[i]n some very small percentage of cases,
pregnant minors, like adult women, need immediate abortions
to avert serious and often irreversible damage to their health.”
New Hampshire concedes that, under the Court’s cases, “it
would be unconstitutional to apply the Act in a manner that
subjects minors to significant health risks.”
The Court, therefore, turns to the remedy. When faced with
an unconstitutional statute, the Court prefers to “limit the solution to the problem.” For example, it would rather excise or
enjoin enforcement of only that part of the statute instead of
invalidating the statute in its entirety. The Court identifies
[t]hree interrelated principles that inform its approach to remedies: (1) it tries “not to nullify more of a legislature’s work than
is necessary”; (2) it does not rewrite state laws to conform to
constitutional requirements “even as we try to salvage it,” as it is
not the Court’s role; and (3) it looks to legislative intent because
“a court cannot use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent
of the legislature.” As to the latter, if the Court finds a statute
unconstitutional, it asks whether “the legislature [would] have
preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at all.”
The Court believes in this case that the courts did not need
to invalidate the entire Act because only certain portions of the
statute present constitutional problems and “the lower courts
can issue a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting
the statute’s unconstitutional application.” The Court does not
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In Jones v. Flowers,26 a 5-3 Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires a State to take additional reasonable steps
to notify a property owner of a pending tax sale if it knows that
its prior notice was ineffective. Petitioner Gary Jones owned a
house in Little Rock, Arkansas, but did not reside there. Jones
paid his property taxes through the mortgage company until
1997, when the mortgage was paid off. After 1997, the property taxes were not paid and the property was certified as delinquent. In April 2000, the Commissioner of State Lands
attempted to notify Jones of the delinquency by certified letter
mailed to the house. The letter went unclaimed and was
returned to the commissioner marked “unclaimed.” Two years
later, the commissioner published a notice of the public sale in
the Arkansas Democratic Gazette. No bids were submitted and
the state negotiated a private sale.
Linda Flowers submitted a purchase offer. The commissioner sent another certified letter to Jones at the house, which
was also returned “unclaimed.” Flowers purchased the home
and, when the 30-day period of post-resale redemption had
passed, sent an unlawful detainer notice to the property that
was served on petitioner’s daughter. The daughter contacted
Jones and notified him of the sale. Jones filed a lawsuit in state
court against the commissioner and Flowers, “alleging that the
Commissioner’s failure to provide notice of the tax sale and of
Jones’ right to redeem resulted in the taking of his property
without due process.” The state court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents, concluding that “the Arkansas
tax sale statute, which set forth the notice procedure followed
by the Commissioner, complied with constitutional due process
requirements.” The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, begins by setting forth the due-process requirements. Due process does not
require actual notice but only requires the government to provide “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” The
Court has not addressed what additional steps are necessary, if
any, when the state “becomes aware prior to the taking that its
attempt at notice has failed.” Even so, the Court has held that
“‘when notice is a person’s due process…the means employed
must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it,’…and that assess-

25. 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006).
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ing the adequacy of a particular form of notice requires
balancing the interest of the
State against the individual
interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.” The Court
concludes that it “do[es] not
think that a person who actually desired to inform a real
property owner of an
impending tax sale…would
do nothing when a certified
letter sent to the owner is
returned unclaimed.” It believes that if the commissioner
wanted to inform Jones, he would have taken “further reasonable steps if any were available.”
The Court states that in prior cases it has required the government to consider the particular circumstances of the individual “regardless of whether a statutory scheme is reasonably
calculated to provide notice in the ordinary case.” The commissioner, and the dissent, point out that in the Court’s prior
cases the government knew of the individualized circumstances
prior to notice and here they did not. The Court agrees that the
constitutionality of a particular procedure is assessed “ex ante,
rather than post hoc.” However, it concludes that “if a feature
of the State’s chosen procedure is that it promptly provides
additional information to the government about the effectiveness of notice, it does not contravene the ex ante principle to
consider what the government does with that information in
assessing the adequacy of the chosen procedure.” The Court
also points to numerous additional steps it deems “reasonable,”
for example, resending the letter by regular mail, and those that
it does not, for example, searching for Jones’s current address in
the phonebook or income tax rolls.
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FEDERALISM

In Gonzales v. Oregon,27 a 6-3 Court held that the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) does not prohibit state-licensed physicians from prescribing drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide under a valid state law. Justice Kennedy delivered the
opinion of the Court. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas, dissented. Justice Thomas also
filed a dissenting opinion.
In 1994, Oregon legalized physician-assisted suicide through
the enactment of Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA).
The drugs that can be used by physicians under ODWDA are
covered by the CSA and classified as Schedule II substances,
which are those that are “generally available only pursuant to a
written, nonrefillable prescription by a physician.” Under a
regulation promulgated by the attorney general, every prescription for a controlled substance must “be issued for a legitimate
medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the
usual course of his professional practice.” The CSA requires
that a “practitioner” register with the attorney general to law-
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fully prescribe Schedule II drugs. The attorney general has the
power to “deny, suspend, or revoke” a physician’s registration if
“the physician’s registration would be ‘inconsistent with the
public interest.’” In making this determination, the attorney
general is instructed to consider five factors.
In 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued the
November 9, 2001 Interpretative Rule “announcing his intent
to restrict the use of controlled substances for physicianassisted suicide” on the grounds that it “is not a ‘legitimate
medical purpose’” for which controlled substances can be used.
The State of Oregon, joined by a number of physicians, pharmacists, and terminally ill patients, filed suit in federal district
court seeking a permanent injunction against enforcement of
the Interpretative Rule. The district court granted a permanent
injunction and a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It
determined that “by making a medical procedure authorized
under Oregon law a federal offense, the Interpretative Rule
altered the usual constitutional balance between the States and
the Federal Government without the requisite clear statement
that the CSA authorized such action.”
The Court agrees. The Court does not believe that the attorney general’s interpretation of the CSA is entitled to deference
under Auer v. Robbins28 or Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC.29 Under
Auer, instead of giving specificity to a statute or regulation, the
Interpretative Rule “does little more than restate the terms of the
statute itself.” Under Chevron, deference is not necessary
because “the rule must be promulgated pursuant to authority
Congress has delegated to the official.” Under the CSA, the
attorney general is “not authorized to make a rule declaring illegitimate a medical standard of care and treatment of patients
that is specifically authorized under state law.” According to the
Court, the CSA only gives the attorney general limited authority: (1) “to add a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, to a schedule under part B of this subchapter”; and (2) to
regulate the “registration” of state-licensed physicians. The
Court finds that the Interpretative Rule does not fall under this
latter authorization of power because “[i]t does not undertake
the five-factor analysis and concerns much more than registration.”
The Court next turns to whether the “CSA can be read as
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.” The Court concludes
that the “statute and our case law amply support the conclusion
that Congress regulates medical practice insofar as it bars doctors from using their prescription-writing powers as a means to
engage in illicit drug dealing and trafficking as conventionally
understood.” As structured, the CSA presupposes state regulation of medicine and, according to the Court, ODWDA is just
one example. The Court recognizes that the federal government can set national standards but concludes that the CSA sets
standards in only one area, how to treat narcotic addictions.
Finally, the Court addresses the government’s argument that
the phrase “written prescription of a practitioner” necessarily
implies “that the substance is being made available to a patient
for a legitimate medical purpose.” The government argues that
it is incumbent upon it to define “medical purpose.” The Court

29. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

concludes that the government’s argument fails because it
assumes that “the CSA impliedly authorizes an Executive officer to bar a use simply because it may be inconsistent with one
reasonable understanding of medical practice.” Further, the
attorney general’s ability to schedule drugs requires him only to
make findings regarding abuse and the addictive substance of
drugs.
Justice Scalia’s dissent rests on the ground that the attorney
general has the authority to ensure that prescriptions are issued
for legitimate medical purposes, and that Congress’s use of
“prescription” and “legitimate medical purpose” are ambiguous. On this basis, he believes the majority’s opinion is incorrect for three reasons: (1) “the Attorney General’s interpretation
of ‘legitimate medical purpose’” is valid; (2) even if no deference is required, it is correct upon a de novo review; and (3)
even if incorrect, “the Attorney General’s independent interpretation of the statutory phrase ‘public interest’…and…‘public
health and safety’…are entitled to deference under Chevron.”
Justice Thomas writes separately to point out the inconsistencies between the Court’s opinion in this case and Gonzales v.
Raich,30 in which the Court determined that the CSA preempted California’s medicinal-marijuana law on the grounds
that “the CSA is a comprehensive regulatory regime specifically
designed to regulate which controlled substances can be utilized for medical purpose, and in what manner.”

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,31 the Court held that the president
lacks the authority to convene the military commissions as
described in his November 13, 2001 Order, which were
intended to try the individuals held in connection with the War
on Terror. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the
Court and delivered the opinion of the Court in part. Justice
Breyer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice
Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part. Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito filed dissenting opinions. Chief Justice
Roberts took no part in the decision.
After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center,
Congress adopted a joint resolution, the Authorization for Use
of Military Force (AUMF), “authorizing the President to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks…in order to prevent any
future acts of international terrorism against the United States.”
On November 13, 2001, “the President issued a comprehensive
military order intended to govern the Detention, Treatment,
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism” (the November 13 Order). It covers any individual
who the President deems (1) was or is a member of al Qaeda or
(2) “has engaged or participated in terrorist activities aimed at
or harmful to the United States.” It provides that these individuals “shall, when tried, be tried by military commission for
any and all offenses triable by military commission that such
individual is alleged to have committed, and may be punished
in accordance with the penalties provided under applicable law,
including imprisonment or death.”
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[T]he Court rejected
petitioner Salim Ahmed
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However, on November 8,
political
2004, the district court
gerrymander.
granted Hamdan’s habeas
petition and stayed the military commission proceedings. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
The Court does not believe the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 (DTA) divests it of jurisdiction to hear this case and so
addresses the substantive issues of the case. It begins with the
history and formation of military commissions: “The military
commission, a tribunal neither mentioned in the Constitution
nor created by statute, was born of military necessity.”
Subsequently, however, Congress enacted the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ). Article 21 of the UCMJ sets forth the
president’s power to convene military commissions, and the
limitations on that power. In general, Article 21 preserved what
power the president had under the Constitution and common
law of war before 1916—“with the express condition that the
President and those under his command comply with the law
of war.” Under these laws, the military commissions at issue
here are not authorized.
The Court does not believe, as the government asserts, that
the AUMF and DTA specifically authorize the president to convene the military commissions at issue here as neither of the
Congressional Acts “expands the President’s authority to convene military commission.” Even if the Court assumes the
AUMF activated the president’s war powers, “and that those
powers include the authority to convene military commissions
in appropriate circumstances…there is nothing in the text or
legislative history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress
intended to expand or alter the authorization set forth in Article
21 of the UCMJ.” The DTA also does not explicitly authorize
it, only “recognizes the existence of the Guantanamo Bay commissions in the weakest sense.”
Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens turns to the inquiry
of whether Hamdan’s military commission is authorized under
the president’s authority as set forth in the Constitution and the
laws of the United States. Under common law, military commissions were traditionally convened in three circumstances:
(1) to replace civil courts when martial law has been declared;
(2) in occupied enemy territory where civilian governments are
not functioning; and (3) as “an ‘incident to the conduct of war’
when there is need ‘to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede
our military effort have violated the law of war.’” As to the latter, certain preconditions must be met: (1) whether the indi-
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vidual violated a law of war;
(2) whether the violation was
committed during a war; (3)
whether the military commission is trying an individual of
the enemy’s army; and (4)
whether certain jurisdictional
limitations are met.
Hamdan argues, and the
Court agrees, that none of the
specific allegations of “overt
acts” made against him constitute a violation of the law of
war. Therefore, this fact casts doubt on the legality of the charge
and, hence, the commission. The Court recognizes that this is
not always fatal to the military commission’s viability, but, since
Hamdan’s crimes are not necessarily defined by statute or treaty,
the precedent upon which the government relies to define the
charge as a violation of the law of war must be plain and unambiguous. The standard is not met here.
Justice Stevens then continues for the majority and concludes that, regardless of whether Hamdan’s offense violates a
law of war, the commission lacks the power to proceed because
the commission’s procedures do not comply with the common
law of war, the UCMJ, or “with the rules and precepts of the law
of nations,” including the Geneva Convention. Essentially, the
Court concludes that because the commissions do not comport
with the bodies of laws listed above, the president lacked
authority to convene them by his November 13 Order. The
Court points to a number of procedures that contravene the
common law of war, the UCMJ, the laws of nations, and the
Geneva Convention. For instance, if a criminal defendant
chooses private counsel over appointed military counsel, “[t]he
accused and his civilian counsel may be excluded from, and precluded from ever learning what evidence was presented during,
any part of the proceeding that either the Appointing Authority
or the presiding officer decides to close.”
Justice Breyer concurs. He writes that the Court’s conclusion
rests on a single ground: “Congress has not issued the Executive
a ‘blank check.’” Justice Kennedy concurs in part. He also
believes that this “is a case where Congress, in the proper exercise of its powers as an independent branch of government, and
as part of a long tradition of legislative involvement in matters
of military justice, has considered the subject of military tribunals and set limits on the President’s authority.” Primarily,
Congress “requires that military commissions like the ones at
issue conform to the ‘law of war.’”
Justice Scalia dissents. He believes that the DTA divests the
Court of jurisdiction to hear this case. He rests his decision on
the “ancient and unbroken line of authority” that establishes
“that statutes ousting jurisdiction unambiguously apply to cases
pending at their effective date.” In addition, even if the DTA had
not explicitly divested the Court of jurisdiction, he believes the
Court should have abstained from exercising jurisdiction under
“equitable principles” governing “both the exercise of habeas
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jurisdiction and the granting of the injunctive relief sought by
petitioner” since Congress provided an alternative avenue for
petitioner’s claims by enacting the DTA. Justice Thomas, also
dissenting, agrees but writes also to express his disagreement
with the Court’s resolution of the merits.
Justice Alito also dissents. He too believes the Court lacks
jurisdiction because of the DTA but writes to add further explanation for his disagreement with the majority. He believes that
under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, a “regularly constituted” court has been “appointed, set up, or established” under United States law. He does not believe that a “regularly constituted court” means that it must be “similar in structure and composition to a regular military court or unless there
is an ‘evident practical need’ for the divergence.”
ELECTIONS

In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry,32 the
Court rejected a statewide challenge to a Texas redistricting plan
based on the claim it was an unconstitutional political gerrymander. It also rejected a challenge to the redistricting of the
Dallas area based on § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, but determined that the state’s redistricting of District 23 in southwest
Texas did violate § 2. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment
of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court in part.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Souter, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, also filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Chief Justice Roberts, joined in part by
Justice Alito, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, concurring in part, and dissenting in part. Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts and by Justice Alito in
part, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part.
After the 2000 census, Texas received two additional congressional seats. However, the legislature was unable to pass a
redistricting plan. This resulted in litigation and the issuance of
a court-ordered plan, which is referred to as “Plan 1151C.” In
2003, the legislature was able to enact a redistricting plan, called
“Plan 1374C.” The Court’s opinion involves four consolidated
cases where a three-judge court, convened under 28 U.S.C. §
2284, “heard appellants’ constitutional and statutory challenges
to Plan 1374C.” In 2004, the district court found in favor of
appellees, but the Court reversed for reconsideration in light of
Vieth v. Jublelirer.33 The district court, in Henderson v. Perry34
again found for appellees.
In this case, appellants rely on two similar theories to argue
that Plan 1374C should be invalidated as an unconstitutional
political gerrymander: (1) they argue a presumption of unconstitutionality should apply because the Texas legislature’s purpose for the redistricting plan was for partisan advantage; and
(2) a mid-decade redistricting plan for partisan purposes violates the one-person, one-vote rule. The Court has not articulated a standard under which to analyze appellants’ claims. In
Davis v. Bandemer,35 it held “that an equal protection challenge
to a political gerrymander presents a justiciable case or contro-

34. 399 F. Supp. 2d 756 (2005).

versy,” but disagreed “over what substantive standard to apply.”
The disagreement persists. The Court does not believe it needs
to revisit the issue and can instead address “whether appellants’
claims offer the Court a manageable, reliable measure of fairness for determining whether a partisan gerrymander violates
the Constitution.”
Justice Kennedy rejects appellant’s first argument. Article I
“leaves with the States the primary responsibility for apportionment of their federal congressional…districts,” although
Congress may set further requirements. It has “generally
required single-member districts.” In this case, and with appropriate authority, the district court drew a redistricting map
when Texas failed to enact a plan that complied with the oneperson, one-vote requirement. Appellants claim that the legislature was motivated by partisan objectives and argue that a
rule or presumption of unconstitutionality is “salutary” when
the legislature’s sole motivation for replacing a court-ordered
plan is partisan motivation. Justice Kennedy believes, however,
that “appellants’ case for adopting their test is not convincing.”
First, there is some merit to appellees’ claim that this was not
their sole motivation. Further, “a successful claim attempting
to identify unconstitutional acts of partisan gerrymandering
must do what appellants’ sole-motivation theory explicitly disavows: show a burden, as measured by a reliable standard, on
the complainants’ representational rights.”
The plurality addresses appellants’ second political gerrymandering theory: “that mid-decade redistricting for exclusively partisan purposes violates the one-person, one-vote
requirement.” Appellants’ argue that since the population of
Texas shifted from 2000 to 2003, the 2003 redistricting which
relied on the 2000 census, “created unlawful interdistrict population variances.” The plurality believes, as did the district
court, that “this is a test that turns not on whether a redistricting furthers equal-population principles but rather on the justification for redrawing a plan in the first place.” In this regard,
the plurality believes that appellants’ argument merely “restates
the question whether it was permissible for the Texas
Legislature to redraw the districting map.” It cannot agree with
appellant “that a legislature’s decision to override a valid, courtdrawn plan mid-decade is sufficiently suspect to give shape to
a reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders.”
In Part III of the opinion, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority, addresses appellants’ arguments that the redistricting
plan made changes to district lines in south and west Texas that
violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state violates section
2 if the totality of circumstances shows that the election process
is “not equally open to participation by members of [a racial
group] in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice.” In Thornburg v.
Gingles,36 the Court identified “three threshold conditions for
establishing a § 2 violation: (1) the racial group is ‘sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority sin-

gle-member district’; (2) the
The Court upheld
racial group is ‘politically cohethe Corps’
sive’; and (3) the majority ‘votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable interpretation “to
it…usually to defeat the minor- include wetlands
ity’s preferred candidate.’”
that actually
The most significant changes
in Texas were made to District
abutted on
23, which contains “an increas‘traditional
ingly powerful Latino populanavigable
tion that threatened to oust the
waters.’”
incumbent Republican,” and,
consequently,
District
25.
Appellants’ argue that the changes to District 23 diluted the voting rights of Latinos. The Court applies the Gingles requirements to this case and concludes that the preconditions are
met. It then moves on to analyze the “totality of the circumstances” to determine whether the redistricting constituted
impermissible voter dilution. It first conducts a proportionality
inquiry, which it concludes should be conducted on a statewide
basis in this instance, instead of a regional basis. In the Court’s
estimates, Latinos are two districts shy of proportionality.
However, there is no “‘magic parameter’…and ‘rough proportionality’…must allow for some deviations.” The Court does
not feel it needs to decide if this degree of disproportionality is
substantial because there is other evidence, which, coupled
with the disproportionality, shows the Texas legislature’s goal
was voter dilution. Primarily, “District 23’s Latino voters were
posed to elect the candidate of their choice.”
The Court holds that “Plan 1374C violates § 2 in its redrawing of District 23,” and, therefore, does not “address appellants’
claims that the use of race and politics in drawing that district
violates the First Amendment and equal protection.” It also
does not address whether the drawing of District 25 violates the
equal protection because the “districts in south and west Texas
will have to be redrawn to remedy the violation in District 23.”
Justice Kennedy continues for the plurality and discusses
appellants’ challenges to the redistricting around Dallas on the
grounds that “they dilute African-American voting strength in
violation of § 2.” Appellants contend that African-American
voters had “effective control” of District 24 prior to redistricting even though they made up only the second-largest racial
group in the district. The Court assumes, for the sake of this
argument, that a section 2 challenge can proceed for a racial
group that makes up less than 50% of the population in a district. The Court does not, however, believe appellants’ can
show how they satisfy the Gringles prongs. Specifically, appellants cannot demonstrate that African-American voters could
have elected the candidate of their choice. It is not relevant that
African-Americans had “influence” in the district; they needed
to prove they could “elect representatives of their choice.”
Justice Stevens concurs in part and in the judgment. He
would hold that Plan 1374C is entirely invalid. Justice Stevens
believes the Texas legislature’s redistricting plan, “which creates
districts with less compact shapes, violates the Voting Rights

35. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).

36. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

Court Review 45

Act, and fragments communities of interest—all for
purely partisan purposes—
violated the State’s constitutional duty to govern impartially.” Justice Stevens writes
that the question posed by
this case—“whether it was
unconstitutional for Texas to
replace a lawful districting
plan in the middle of a
decade, for the sole purpose
of maximizing partisan
advantage”—is narrower than the issue considered in Vieth and
it is possible for the Court to create a “judicially manageable
standard” under which to analyze appellant’s claims.
Justice Breyer concurs in part and dissents in part. He agrees
that the legislature’s sole purpose for the mid-decade redistricting plan was to “maximize partisan advantage” and believes
that because the redistricting “will likely have serious harmful
electoral consequences,” would find that the plan in its entirety
violates the Equal Protection Clause. Chief Justice Roberts
concurs in part, concurs in the judgment in part, and dissents
in part. He believes that because appellants have not identified
a “reliable standard for identifying political gerrymanders” or
argued whether any standard exists, the Court properly disposed of this claim. He does not, however, agree with the
Court’s conclusions that the redistricting of District 23 violated
section 2.
Justice Scalia concurs in the judgment in part and dissents in
part. He believes that “claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering do not present a justiciable case or controversy.”
He criticizes the Court for finding that appellants have not
stated a claim for which relief can be granted but never articulating what elements constitute a claim. He also believes that
appellants do not state a claim under section 2, arguing that “§
2 jurisprudence continues to drift ever further from the Act’s
purpose of ensuring minority voters electoral opportunities.”

The Court held that
a violation of Article
36 of the Vienna
Convention does
not warrant
suppression of
evidence or relief
for state procedural
default rules.

CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

The Court decided two cases relating to the Clean Water Act
(CWA or Act): S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board of Environmental
Protection37 and Rapanos v. United States.38 In S.D. Warren, the
Court held that the use of the word “discharge” in section 401
of the Clean Water Act is interpreted by its ordinary meaning
and includes discharge of water from a dam. Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by all the
Justices except Justice Scalia who joined only in part.
S.D. Warren operates hydropower dams for which it needs
licenses to operate. The licenses are issued by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under the Federal
Power Act. Under section 401 of the CWA, if an activity “could
cause a ‘discharge’ into navigable waters; a license is conditioned on a certification from the State in which the discharge

37. 126 S. Ct. 1843 (2006).
38. 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
39. 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
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may originate that it will not violate certain water quality standards, including those set by the State’s own laws.” In 1999,
Warren sought to renew its license for five dams and applied
for water-quality certifications from Maine “but . . . under
protest, claiming that its dams do not result in any ‘discharge
into’ the river triggering application of § 401.” The Maine
agency issued the certifications with certain caveats and FERC
eventually licensed the dams “subject to the Maine conditions.”
After filing unsuccessful administrative appeals, Warren filed
suit in state court. The court rejected Warren’s claims that its
dams did not result in discharges and the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine affirmed.
The Court identifies the issue in this case as the meaning of
the word “discharge.” The Act does not define the term; it only
“provides that the term ‘discharge’ when used without qualification includes a discharge of a pollutant, and a discharge of pollutants.” The Court concludes, however, that “‘discharge’ presumably is broader, else superfluous, and since it is neither
defined in the statute nor a term of art, we are left to construe it
in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.” The ordinary meaning of discharge is “flowing or issuing out” and this
meaning is consistent with the Court’s interpretation of discharge in prior water cases. The Court states that in fact this
meaning was accepted by all the members of the Court in its
only prior case dealing with section 401, PUD No. 1 v.
Washington Dep’t of Ecology.39 Finally, the Court states that both
the Environmental Protection Agency and FERC “have each
regularly read ‘discharge’ as having its plain meaning and thus
covering releases from hydroelectric dams.”
In Rapanos, the Court considered the consolidated cases of
Rapanos v. United States40 and Carabell v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers.41 The issue before it in both cases is the definition of “waters of the United States” as used in the Clean
Water Act and whether wetlands qualify as a subset of “waters.”
Justice Scalia announced the judgment of the Court, which held
that the phrase “waters of the United States” as used in the Act
only includes those relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water forming hydrographic features
that are described in ordinary parlance. Justice Scalia also wrote
the opinion for the plurality. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice
Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion.
The Act’s main objective is “to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.” Section 1311(a) of the Act, provides “that the discharge
of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.” The Act
defines “discharge of pollutant…broadly to include ‘any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source.’” Pollutant[s] include “not only traditional contaminants but also solids such as dredged soil,…rock, sand, [and]
cellar dirt.” Navigable water is defined as “the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas.”
Prior to the enactment of CWA, the Court “interpreted the

40. No. 04-1034.
41. No. 04-1384.
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phrase ‘navigable waters of
the United States’ in the
Act’s predecessor statutes
to refer to interstate waters
that are ‘navigable in fact’
or readily susceptible of
being rendered so.” After
the Act’s enactment, the
Army Corps of Engineers,
which is charged with
enforcing the Act, ultimately adopted a broader
definition. The Corps’
current regulations define “the waters of the United States” to
include “traditional navigable waters,…all interstate waters
including interstate wetlands,…all other waters such as
intrastate lakes, rivers, stream (including intermittent streams),
mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet
meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce,…tributaries of [such] waters,…and wetlands adjacent
to [such] waters [and tributaries] (other than waters that are
themselves wetlands).” The regulation also defines “‘adjacent’
wetlands as those bordering, contiguous [to], or neighboring
waters of the United States.”
In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.,42 the Court
interpreted the phrase “water of the United States” as they
related to “a wetland that was adjacent to a body of navigable
water.” The Court upheld the Corps’ interpretation “to include
wetlands that actually abutted on ‘traditional navigable
waters.’” It reasoned that “the transition from water to solid
ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one, and
that the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which
water ends and land begins.” Since that decision, the Corp has
further broadened its interpretation. The Court limited the
Corps’ broadening interpretation however and, in Solid Waste
Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs43 (hereinafter
SWANCC), in which it held that “waters of the United States”
did not include “nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters.”
Regardless of this decision, the Corps did not amend its regulations.
The plurality begins by addressing the breadth of the definition of “navigable waters.” They do not believe “navigable
waters” should be defined simply as those that are in fact navigable or capable of being made so. The plurality feels that it
doesn’t have to define the outer parameters of the definition,
however, and needs only to state that it is not as expansive as
the Corps defines it. They also believe that the term “the waters
of the United States” includes “only relatively permanent,
standing or flowing bodies of water.” According to the plurality, this restriction stems from the wording of the phrase itself
as well as commonsense.
The plurality also believes that “the Act’s use of the traditional phrase ‘navigable waters’ (the defined term) further con-

firms that it confers jurisdiction only over relatively permanent
bodies of water.” The Act adopted the term from its predecessor statutes and the Court consistently interpreted this phrase
to include “only discrete bodies of water.” The plurality
believes that even its more recent decisions limit the scope of
the Act: “In Riverside Bayview,44 we stated that the phrase in the
Act [‘the water of the United States’] referred primarily to
‘rivers, streams, and other hydrographic features more conventionally identifiable as ‘waters’ than the wetlands adjacent to
such features.” The plurality believes that the “most significant” support for its interpretation, however, is that “the CWA
itself categorizes the channels and conduits that typically carry
intermittent flows of water separately from ‘navigable waters,’
by including them in the definition of ‘point source,’” which is
a separate and distinct category from navigable waters.
Under its definition, the plurality concludes that wetlands
do not qualify as a subset of “waters.” In Riverside Bayview, the
Court stated that there was an “inherent ambiguity in drawing
the boundaries of any ‘waters’” and because of this, deferred to
the agency’s inclusion of “wetlands actually abutting traditional
navigable waters.” However, “[i]t was the significant nexus
between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that informed our
reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview.” The plurality concludes, therefore, “only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’
in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between
‘waters’ and wetlands, are ‘adjacent to’ such waters and covered
by the Act.”
Chief Justice Roberts concurs. He writes that instead of
responding the Court’s opinion in SWANCC to promulgate useful regulations, “and providing guidance meriting deference
under our generous standards, the Corps chose to adhere to its
essentially boundless view of the scope of its power.” Justice
Kennedy concurs in the judgment. To define the scope of the
CWA, he relies heavily on the Court’s use of the term “significant nexus” when it held in SWANCC that “to constitute ‘navigable waters’ under the Act, a water or wetland must possess a
‘significant nexus’ to waters that are or were navigable in fact or
that could reasonably be so made.”
Justice Stevens dissents. He believes that Riverside Bayview
controls this case but still reaches a contrary conclusion. He
also asserts that because the Corps has “reasonably interpreted”
the CWA, its decision is required deference under Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC.45 Finally, he believes the plurality’s opinion ignores the “fundamental significance of the Clean Water
Act,” which totally restructures and rewrote “existing water
pollution legislation.” Congress intended the Act to be all
encompassing and Justice Stevens believes that the plurality’s
opinion contravenes this purpose. Justice Breyer, also dissenting, adds that “[i]f one this is clear, it is that Congress intended
the Army Corps of Engineers to make the complex technical
judgments that lie at the heart of the present cases (subject to
deferential judicial review).”

42. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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The Court believes
that the reasons it
suppresses evidence
for Fourth and Fifth
Amendment
violations are
entirely absent in the
consular notification
context.
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In a per curiam decision in Lance v. Dennis,46 the Court held
that a party is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from
filing a federal court action even if that party is in privity with
a party who received an adverse state-court judgment. In May
2001, the Colorado General Assembly failed to pass a redistricting plan and, thus, one was created by the district court. In
2003, the General Assembly passed a redistricting plan,
“prompting further litigation—this time about which electoral
map was to govern, the legislature’s or the court’s.” The
Colorado Supreme Court held in People ex rel. Salazar v.
Davidson47 (hereinafter Salazar), that the legislature’s plan violated Article V, section 44 of the Colorado Constitution, “which
the court construed to limit congressional redistricting to ‘once
per decade.’”
A second action that was also filed was removed to federal
court based on federal-law claims. The district court held, however, that defendant could not assert any challenges to Salazar.
This suit, filed in the district court, was filed by Colorado citizens who were unhappy with the Colorado Supreme Court’s
decision in Salazar. They alleged “that Article V, § 44, of the
Colorado Constitution, as interpreted by the Colorado Supreme
Court, violated the Elections Clause of Article I, § 4, of the U.S.
Constitution…and the First Amendment’s Petition Clause.” A
panel of three district court judges dismissed the Elections
Clause claim under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Court begins by stating that it “is vested, under 28
U.S.C. § 1257, with jurisdiction over appeals from final statecourt judgments.” This jurisdiction is exclusive and, therefore
“under what has come to be known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.” The RookerFeldman doctrine is derived from two cases. In Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co.,48 a party who lost in the state court did not
obtain review with the Supreme Court but instead filed an
action in federal district court challenging the constitutionality
of the state-court judgment. The Court held that the federal
action was “tantamount to an appeal of the Indiana Supreme
Court decision, over which only this Court had jurisdiction,
and said that the ‘aggrieved litigant cannot be permitted to do
indirectly what he no longer can do directly.’” In District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,49 the plaintiff had been
denied admission to the District of Columbia bar by the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals and sought relief in federal court.
The Court held “that to the extent plaintiffs challenged the
Court of Appeals decisions themselves—as opposed to the bar
admission rules promulgated nonjudicially by the Court of
Appeals—their sole avenue of review was with this Court.”
The Court’s cases since Feldman “have tended to emphasize
the narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman rule.” The Court states
that it has never addressed the issue presented here, but has
held that Rooker-Feldman is “inapplicable where the party
against whom the doctrine is invoked was not a party to the
underlying state-court proceedings.” In this case, the plaintiffs

were not parties to Salazar. Instead, the district court relied on
privity, judging it by “the preclusive effect that state courts are
required to give federal-court judgments.” The Court believes
that the district court “erroneously conflated preclusion law
with Rooker-Feldman.” It states that the “doctrine applies only
in limited circumstances,…where a party in effect seeks to take
an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court.” It does not “bar actions by nonparties to the earlier
state-court judgments simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the
judgment.”
Justice Stevens dissents, stating that “Rooker and Feldman
are strange bedfellows.” He believes that Rooker was correctly
decided but Feldman was not. He believes that Court correctly
“interred” the doctrine last term and by precluding the district
court from resuscitating it today. He dissents from the majority’s opinion, however, because the Court fails to address the
fact that Colorado state law precludes this action.
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,50 the Court considered the
companion cases of Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Bustillo v.
Johnson. The Court held that a violation of Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention does not warrant suppression of evidence
or relief for state procedural default rules. Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Ginsburg filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion. He was joined by Justices Stevens and Souter
and by Justice Ginsburg in part.
In Sanchez-Llamas, petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a
Mexican national, was arrested in December 1999 after a
shootout with the police. He was read his rights pursuant to
Miranda v. Arizona51 but was never informed of his right to have
the Mexican Consulate notified of his detention pursuant to
Article 36, which essentially provides that the police must,
without delay, inform a detainee of his right to have the consular officers of his home country notified of his detention.
During interrogation, Sanchez-Llamas made a number of
incriminating statements. He moved to suppress his statements
on various grounds, including that “the authorities had failed to
comply with Article 36.” His motion was denied and SanchezLlamas was convicted. His conviction was affirmed on appeal.
In Bustillo, petitioner Mario Bustillo, a Honduran national,
was arrested for murder. He was never informed of his Article
36 rights. At trial, his defense rested on the fact that another
man, Sirena, who had subsequently fled the country, was
responsible for the attack. Bustillo was convicted and, after his
conviction became final, filed a state habeas petition. In his
petition, he argued for the first time that the authorities had
violated his rights under Article 36. Bustillo also argued ineffective assistance of counsel since defense counsel failed to
notify him of his rights under Article 36. The consulate provided a letter stating that if it had known of Bustillo’s detention,
it would have “helped him locate Sirena prior to trial.” His
claim was dismissed on state procedural default grounds.
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The Court identifies the three questions for which it granted
certiorari: “(1) whether Article 36…grants rights that may be
invoked by individuals in a judicial proceeding; (2) whether
suppression of evidence is a proper remedy for a violation…;
and (3) whether an Article 36 claim may be deemed forfeited
under state procedural rules because a defendant failed to raise
the claim at trial.” The Court reaches two conclusions quickly:
the “exclusionary rule as we know it is an entirely American
legal creation,” which is universally rejected by most other
countries and the law is clear that the Court “do[es] not hold
supervisory power over the courts of the several States.” The
Court concludes, therefore, as argued by the state and United
States, that its “authority to create a judicial remedy applicable
in state court must lie, if anywhere, in the treaty itself.”
The Court agrees with Sanchez-Llamas that the Vienna
Convention “implicitly requires a judicial remedy because it
states that the laws and regulations governing the exercise of
Article 36 rights ‘must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights are intended.’” However, it notes
that the Convention also states that “Article 36 rights ‘shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State.’” In the United States, the exclusionary rule is
not applied lightly and the Court mainly has applied it to deter
constitutional violations. It has only applied it in a limited
number of circumstances involving the violation of a statute
and then only when “the excluded evidence arose directly out
of the statutory violations that implicated important Fourth and
Fifth Amendment interests.”
The Court believes that the reasons it suppresses evidence
for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations are entirely absent
in the consular-notification context. The Court excludes
coerced confessions because it disapproves of coercion and
“such confessions tend to be unreliable.” It excludes the fruits
of unreasonable searches because otherwise “the constraints of
the Fourth Amendment might too easily be disregarded.”
Failure of the police to inform the defendant of his Article 36
rights is (1) unlikely to result in a coerced or unreliable confession and (2) police would not benefit in terms of a search and
seizure by ignoring Article 36.
The Court next discusses Bustillo’s claim. Virginia’s state
procedural default rules provide that if a habeas petitioner fails
to raise a claim on direct appeal, he is barred from raising that
claim on collateral review. “There is an exception if a defendant
can demonstrate both ‘cause’ for not raising the claim at trial,
and ‘prejudice’ from not having done so.” Bustillo argues that
“state procedural default rules cannot apply to Article 36
claims” because “the Convention requires that Article 36 rights
be given “full effect” and Virginia’s procedural default rules ‘prevented any effect (much less “full effect”) from being given to’
those rights.”
The Court notes that this is not the first time it has been
“asked to set aside procedural default rules for a Vienna
Convention claim.” In Breard v. Greene,52 the petitioner did not
raise his Article 36 claim until he filed a federal habeas petition.
The Court rejected petitioner’s argument that since the convention was the supreme law of the land, it trumped the proce-
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dural-default doctrine. It observed, “it has been recognized in
international law that, absent a clear and express statement to
the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State.” Further, the Court
“reasoned that while treaty protections such as Article 36 may
constitute supreme federal law, this is no less true of the provisions of the Constitution itself, to which rules of procedural
default apply.”
The Court also rejects Bustillo’s argument that two decisions
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which have “interpreted the Vienna Convention to preclude the application of
procedural default rules to Article 36 claims,” should direct the
Court’s decision. Under the judicial power created by the
Constitution, the courts are vested with “the duty to say what
the law is.” The Court believes, therefore, that if “treaties are to
be given effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law ‘is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department,’ headed by the
‘one supreme Court’ established by the Constitution.” The
Court does not believe that anything in the “structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended
to be conclusive on our court.” In fact, any decision the ICJ
renders has no binding effect “even as to the ICJ itself.”
Finally, Article 36 states that “the rights it provides ‘shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State’ provided that ‘full effect…be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are
intended.’” In the United States, this means the application of
the procedural-default rules, which even apply to claims under
the Constitution. The Court believes that the ICJ’s ruling fails to
give effect to the purpose of the procedural default rule, “which
relies chiefly on the parties to raise significant issues and present
them to the courts in the appropriate manner at the appropriate
time for adjudication.” In addition, the Court believes “[p]rocedural default rules generally take on greater importance in an
adversary system such as ours than in the sort of magistratedirected, inquisitorial legal system characteristic of many of the
other countries that are signatories to the Vienna Convention.”
In concluding its analysis of Bustillo’s claim, the Court likens
the failure to warn a defendant of his Article 36 rights to the
failure of the police to inform a defendant of his rights pursuant
to Miranda. Similarly, without the warning a defendant might
not be aware he even had such rights. Regardless, if a defendant fails to object to a Miranda violation prior to trial, he may
be barred from raising it in a collateral proceeding.
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BRYAN GARNER
COMES COURTING
http://www.lawprose.org
Bryan Garner has been the editor for
the last two editions of Black’s Law
Dictionary. He also is the author of
Garner’s Modern American Usage, A
Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, Legal
Writing in Plain English, and The
Redbook: A Manual on Legal Style.
But he is best known for giving great
seminars on legal writing and editing—
including an in-house workshop that he
has conducted for many state and federal courts on judicial writing. Starting
this August, he will be conducting those
once-private workshops as part of his
regular series of public sessions. We
think many judges will be interested.
Garner’s “Advanced Judicial Writing”
seminar emphasizes techniques used by
first-rate judicial writers. Garner has
identified 12 different ways to open
judicial opinions; he discusses the way
in which the opening paragraphs determine the style of what follows and
shows which of these ways may best
frame the determinative issues of the
case. The seminar also demonstrates
effective editing techniques, taking
materials taught successfully for many
years in his seminars for lawyers and
adapting them to the unique issues
faced in writing judicial opinions.
This year’s Advanced Judicial Writing
seminars will be held in San Francisco
(August 14), Dallas (August 16),
Washington, D.C. (August 21), and
New York City (August 22).
Registration fees for the full-day seminar are $345.
Those who don’t want to attend the
seminar can get much of Garner’s writing and editing advice in Legal Writing
in Plain English. For usage tips, both of
the usage manuals cited above are good;
A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage has a
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brief discussion of opinion-writing
(under “Opinions, Judicial”).
Last, the Redbook is the legal-stylemanual equivalent of the legal-citation
Bluebook. Garner asked attendees at his
seminars for three to four points of legal
style they would like to have answered.
The book covers those and more, with
basic sections on punctuation and
grammar as well as word choices often
found in legal writing.
PBS SERIES ON THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT
http://www.ambrosevideo.com
A four-hour video series on the
United States Supreme Court ran on
most PBS stations in January and
February 2007. The series is available
on DVD for $79.99 and, in addition to
being sharply produced, interesting,
and well presented, it could have great
potential for use in educational settings.
Chief Justice John Roberts and
retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
each gave in-depth interviews for this
series. The program aired in four parts.
Part one examined the time from the
court’s creation through the Dred Scott
case in 1857, which New York Law
School Dean Emeritus James Simon
describes as “the worst opinion ever
written” by the court. Part two reviews
issues that arose between the Civil War
and the 1930s. Part three focused on
the court’s rulings in civil rights from
the 1940s to the present. Part four
focused on the changes brought about
by the Rehnquist court, after President
Nixon had been given the opportunity
to name four of the nine members of
the court.
A separate website for educators,
providing teaching resources that would
be quite helpful to judges, is found at
www.historyofsupremecourt.org. The
series does a good job of providing both
legal history and biography of key players, including litigants before the court.
Actor David Strathairn narrates the
series.
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NEW RESOURCE ON
PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE
http://www.ncsconline.org/PSC
Two years of effort have resulted in a
new, online and interactive resource for
judges and courts interested in using a
problem-solving court approach. The
National Center for State Courts has
launched the Problem-Solving Justice
Toolkit on its website. The toolkit is
interactive, so that you can move easily
to resources that would be most of interest to you. It includes explanatory text,
hundreds of links to online resources,
and videoclips from 22 judges, attorneys, social workers, and court managers discussing topics related to problem-solving justice.
Until now, discussion of problemsolving techniques has often been limited to judges assigned to specialty
courts—drug courts, family courts, or
mental-health courts, for example. The
toolkit attempts to take a step toward
achieving two separate goals: providing
resources for judges in specialized dockets like those, while also providing
resources for judges with more general
dockets.
To use the toolkit, go to the section
marked “Initial Assessment Questions.”
Based on what you are most interested in
(such as resources available to address
problems you’ve been seeing), you’ll be
taken to the resources in that area.
Two AJA leaders—Libby Hines, a
trial judge in Michigan, and Steve
Leben, a trial judge in Kansas—served
as members of a 20-person advisory
committee that worked with National
Center staff on development of the
toolkit. For more information, or if you
have comments or feedback on the
toolkit, contact researcher Pam Casey,
project director for the toolkit, at the
National Center for State Courts
(pcasey@ncsc.dni.us).

